It is common to argue that the communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam, following the theory of "people's war," defeated the French in the First Indochina War. This argument is correct everywhere except for southern Vietnam. France's slow and systematic implementation of what it called "pacification," in concert with allied self-defense and paramilitary forces, slowly brought increasing parts of the Mekong Delta under the control of France and its allies. In reaction, The Resistance pursued a four-prong strategy: 1) they strengthened the communist core of the Resistance by recruiting cadres, purging "unreliable" non-communists, and working to capture control of the Resistance at all levels; 2) they reached out to potential allies like the Khmer, Chinese, Buddhists, and Catholics; 3) they practiced outreach towards rivals and enemies through proselytization (Địch vận); 4) they strengthened Resistance ability to engage in a sophisticated repertoire of violence ranging from intimidation to conventional warfare. Despite this sound strategy, the Resistance precipitously shifted to conventional warfare. The French-led forces took advantage of this costly mistake. France's commission of war crimes in keeping food from the population, its access to increased American funding after 1949, and contingent factors also contributed to Resistance failure.

In the standard arguments about the First Indochina War, 1945–54, known in Vietnam today as the Resistance War against the French, a resolute, initially outmatched, and broad-based Vietnamese revolutionary nationalist Resistance fights against a powerful French military, ultimately triumphing against great odds. This is usually presented as a very ‘northern’ story. In contrast, this book centers on the South, with its own particular history, where the communist-led Resistance failed to win. Why? One reason: this was both a civil war involving Vietnamese (and Khmer) and a war pitting Vietnamese against the French. It was not, in other words, a simple two-sided conflict. To understand this complexity and its dynamics, this chapter examines in depth the issues of sovereignty, institutions (and their collapse), and violence, as this discussion helps to frame the book as a whole.

In the standard narratives of modern Vietnamese history, France's agreement to make Vietnam "independent" in 1949 within the framework of a new entity, the French Union, is seen as a sham. Instead, the DRV's military victory over France at Điện Biên Phủ in 1954, immediately followed by negotiations in Geneva, marks the key point of rupture: the collapse of the French empire in Indochina and the beginning of a new era of contested sovereignty in which two Vietnamese states vied for control of one Vietnam. In this view, the non-communist State of Vietnam (1949-1955) is treated as an ersatz state, a product of French machinations. This chapter contests this view. The creation of a new Vietnamese state, despite all its flaws, inaugurated the transition of sovereignty from the French colonial state to its new Vietnamese successor. The chapter shows the relevance of the precolonial heritage to decolonization. It looks at the "unmaking" or "disassemblage" of the French colonial state and its "reassemblage" into the new Vietnamese state. It examines issues of ethnicity and citizenship.

The history of the Mekong Delta, late 1700s to 1945, in Vietnam. Before late seventeenth century, this area was a lightly settled region far from the centers of Cambodian or Vietnamese power. The chapter sketches out the character of this region over time. It examines the emerging conflicts between Khmer, already settled in this area, and new settlers. The chapter argues that this conflict was not resolved when France, from late 1850s onwards, conquered these territories. In fact, the Khmer-Vietnamese conflict over sovereignty was simply put in abeyance. The chapter also sketches out the Mekong Delta by 1945: its different populations, especially Vietnamese, Chinese, and Khmer; some comments on religion as well. It examines the economic dislocations up to 1945 that shaped the delta during the First Indochina War.

By 1947, "normal" state and village institutions had either collapsed or were destroyed. Food insecurity dramatically increased, and parts of the delta experienced acute hunger. Violence marked the delta. In this situation of radical uncertainty, people felt more vulnerable as outside forces reshaped local lives. Many fled short distances, or out of rural areas to towns and cities. Perhaps a half a million fled the delta altogether to find security. This chapter gives an overview of the process, and provides vignettes of individual experiences.