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10 - Fairness in Urban Land Use

An Evolutionary Contribution to Law and Economics

from Part IV - Advances in Explaining and Assessing Institutional Evolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2018

By
Christian Schubert
Edited by
Ulrich Witt  and
Andreas Chai
Ulrich Witt
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute, Jena
Andreas Chai
Affiliation:
Griffith University, Queensland
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Understanding Economic Change
Advances in Evolutionary Economics
 , pp. 309 - 340
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2018

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