Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-mwx4w Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-25T06:52:10.044Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - The Anti-theological Argument That There Are No Necessary Beings

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2009

Alexander R. Pruss
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
Get access

Summary

COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

One objection to the PSR is that it is simply false because it entails the existence of a causally efficacious necessary being. Consider applying the PSR (or, in the third case, a version of the CP) to one of these:

  1. (30) The proposition that there exists at least one contingent being

  2. (31) The conjunction of all contingent true propositions

  3. (32) The contingent existence of the actual aggregate of all contingent beings (i.e., of the universe)

All of these explananda have the property that any explanans must entail the existence of a causally efficacious necessary being. The explanation of why there is a contingent being or why the aggregate of all contingent beings exists cannot itself, at the pain of circularity, proceed by citing the causal efficacy of any contingent being.

The case of the conjunction of all contingent true propositions – call this conjunction the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF) – takes a little bit more thought. Swinburne (1968) has argued that human beings have available only two kinds of explanations (as a friendly amendment we may add, in addition to reductive explanation): scientific explanations in terms of boundary conditions and laws and personal explanation in terms of the free activity of a person. No scientific explanation of the BCCF can be given, assuming for now that the laws are contingent – alternate proposals will be discussed in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.6.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Principle of Sufficient Reason
A Reassessment
, pp. 82 - 96
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×