Books, articles, papers
Abbott, K. W. and Snidal, D. 2000. “Hard and soft law in international governance,” International Organization 54(3): 421–56.
Abdelal, R. 2007. Capital rules: the construction of global finance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Abdelal, R., Blyth, M., and Parsons, C. (eds.) 2010. Constructing the international economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, Cornell Studies in Political Economy.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. 2013. Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. New York: Crown Business.
Aggarwal, V. 2010. “I don’t get no respect: the travails of IPE,” International Studies Quarterly 54(3): 893–5.
Alesina, A. and Dollar, D. 2000. “Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?” Journal of Economic Growth 5(1): 33–63.
Babb, S. L. 2009. Behind the development banks: Washington politics, world poverty, and the wealth of nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Babb, S. L. 2012. “The Washington consensus as transnational policy paradigm: its origins, trajectory, and likely successor,” Review of International Political Economy 20(2): 268–97.
Baker, A. 2006. The group of seven: finance ministries, central banks, and global financial governance. New York: Routledge.
Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. 1999. “The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations,” International Organization 53(4): 699–732.
Barro, R. J. and Lee, J. 2005. “IMF programs: who is chosen and what are the effects?” Journal of Monetary Economics 52: 1245–69.
Beeson, M. 2009. “Comment: trading places? China, the United States, and the evolution of the international political economy,” Review of International Political Economy 16(4): 729–41.
Best, J. 2007. “Legitimacy dilemmas: the IMF’s pursuit of country ownership,” Third World Quarterly 28(3): 469–88.
Bidwell, P. and Diebold, W. 1949. The United States and the International Trade Organization international conciliation. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Bird, G. and Rowlands, D. 2006. “IMF quotas: constructing an international organization using inferior building blocks,” Review of International Organizations 1(2): 153–71.
Birdsall, N. 2007. “Why it matters who runs the IMF and the World Bank,” in Ranis, G., Vreeland, J. R., and Kosack, S. (eds.), Globalization and the nation state: the impact of the IMF and the World Bank. London, New York: Routledge Studies in the Modern World Economy, pp. 429–51.
Birdsall, N. and Fukuyama, F. 2011. “The post-Washington consensus: development after the crisis,” Foreign Affairs (March/April): 45–53.
Blyth, M. 2002. Great transformations: economic ideas and institutional change in the twentieth century. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Boughton, J. M. 2001. Silent revolution: the International Monetary Fund, 1979–1989. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Boughton, J. M. and Lombardi, D. (eds.) 2010. Finance, development, and the IMF. London: Oxford University Press.
Bradford, C. I. and Lim, W. 2011. “Conclusion: priority innovations and challenges for the G20,” in Bradford, C. I. and Lim, W. (eds.), Global leadership in transition: making the G20 more effective and responsive. Seoul; Washington, DC: Korea Development Institute; Brookings Institution, pp. 324–32.
Bronz, G. 1949. “The international trade organization charter,” Harvard Law Review 62: 1089–125.
Brooks, S. and Wohlforth, W. 2009. “Reshaping the world order how Washington should reform international institutions,” Foreign Affairs, 88(2): 49–63.
Brooks, S., Wohlforth, W., and Ikenberry, G. J. 2012. “Don’t come home America: the case against retrenchment,” International Security 37(3): 7–51.
Brown, G. 2010. Beyond the crash: overcoming the first crisis of globalization. New York: Free Press.
Broz, J. L. 2005. “Changing IMF quotas: the role of the United States Congress,” in Buira, A. (ed.), Reforming the governance of the IMF and the World Bank. New York: Anthem Press, pp. 283–328.
Broz, J. L. 2008. “Congressional voting on funding the international financial institutions,” Review of International Organizations 3: 351–74.
Broz, J. L. and Hawes, M. B. 2006. “Congressional politics of financing the International Monetary Fund,” International Organization 60(2): 367–99.
Bryant, R. 2008. Reform of quota and voting shares in the International Monetary Fund: “nothing” is temporarily preferable to an inadequate “something”. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Buchanan, A. and Keohane, R. O. 2006. “The legitimacy of global governance institutions,” Ethics and International Affairs 20(4): 405–37.
Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. 2000. “Aid, policies, and growth,” American Economic Review 90(4): 847–68.
Bush, G. W. 2010. Decision points (1st ed.). New York: Crown.
Canuto, O. and Lin, J. Y. 2010. “Introduction,” in Nabil, M. K. (ed.), The great recession and developing countries: economic impact and growth prospect. Washington, DC: The World Bank, pp. 1–12.
Cassidy, J. 2009. How markets fail: the logic of economic calamities. London: Allen Lane.
Chin, G. 2010. “Remaking the architecture: the emerging powers, self-insuring, and regional insulation,” International Affairs 83(3): 693–715.
Chwieroth, J. 2008. “Organizational change ‘from within’: exploring the World Bank’s early lending practices,” Review of International Political Economy 15(4): 481–505.
Chwieroth, J. 2010. Capital ideas: the IMF and the rise of financial liberalization. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cohen, B. 2006. “The macrofoundations of monetary power,” in Andrews, David M. (ed.), International monetary power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 31–51.
Cohen, B. 2008. International political economy: an intellectual history. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cohen, B. 2010. “Are IPE journals becoming boring?” International Studies Quarterly 54(3): 887–91.
Collier, P. 2006. The bottom billion: why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Cooper, A. 2010. “The G20 as an improvised crisis committee and/or a contested ‘steering committee’ for the world,” International Affairs 86(3): 741–57.
Cooper, R. N. and Truman, E. M. 2007. “The IMF quota formula: linchpin of fund reform,” International Economics Policy Brief No. PB07-1. Washington, DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics. www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb07–1.pdf.
Copelovitch, M. S. 2010. The International Monetary Fund in the global economy: banks, bonds, and bailouts. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cox, R. W. 1992. “Multilateralism and world order,” Review of International Studies 18(2): 161–80.
Cox, G. W. 2004. “Lies, damned lies, and rational choice analyses,” in Shapiro, I., Smith, R. M., and Masoud, T. E. (eds.), Problems and methods in the study of politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 167–85.
Darling, A. 2011. Back from the brink: 1,000 days at Number 11. London: Atlantic Books.
Diebold, W. 1952. The end of the I.T.O. Princeton: Princeton University Department of Economics and Social Institutions, International Finance Section.
Dollar, D. 2007. “Globalization, poverty and inequality since 1980,” in Held, D. and Kaya, A. (eds.), Global inequality: patterns and explanations. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 73–103.
Dreher, A., Sturm, J., and Vreeland, J. R. 2009. “Development aid and international politics: does membership on the UN security council influence World Bank decisions?” Journal of Development Economics 88: 1–18.
Dreher, A., Sturm, J., and Vreeland, J. R. 2009. “Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations security council,” European Economic Review 53: 742–57.
Drezner, D. W. 2007. All politics is global: explaining international regulatory regimes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Drezner, D. W. 2008. “The realist tradition in American public opinion,” Perspectives on Politics 6(1): 51–70.
Drezner, D. W. and McNamara, K. R. 2013. “International political economy, global financial orders and the 2008 financial crisis,” Perspectives on Politics 11(1): 155–66.
Dryden, S. 1995. Trade warriors: USTR and the American crusade for free trade. New York: Oxford University Press.
Duffield, J. S. 2003. “The limits of ‘Rational Design,’” International Organization 57(2): 411–30.
Easterly, W. R. 2006. The white man’s burden: why the west’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good. New York: Penguin Press.
Eichengreen, B. 1987. “Hegemonic stability theories of the International Monetary System,” NBER Working Paper No. 2193, March. www.nber.org/papers/w2193.pdf.
Eichengreen, B. 2007a. “A blueprint for IMF reform: more than just a lender,” International Finance 10(2): 153–75.
Eichengreen, B. 2007b. “Hegemonic stability theories of the International Monetary System,” in Can nations agree? Issues in international economic cooperation. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, pp. 255–86.
Einhorn, J. 2006. “Reforming the World Bank – creative destruction,” Foreign Affairs 85(1): 17–22.
Elster, J. 1989. Nuts and bolts for the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, J. 2000. “Rational choice history: a case of excessive ambition,” The American Political Science Review 94(3): 685–95.
Evans, P., and Finnemore, M. 2001. “Organizational reform and the expansion of the South’s voice at the Fund,” Vol. G-24 Discussion Papers Series, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. http://unctad.org/en/Docs/pogdsmdpbg24d15.en.pdf.
Feis, H. 1948. “The Geneva proposals for an international trade charter,” International Organization 2(1): 39–52.
Ferejohn, J. 2004. “External and internal explanation,” in Shapiro, I., Smith, R. M., and Masoud, T. E. (eds.), Problems and methods in the study of politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 144–64.
Finnemore, M. 1996. National interests in international society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Fioretos, O. 2011. “Historical institutionalism in international relations,” International Organization 65(2): 367–99.
Fleck, R. and Kilby, C. 2006. “How do political changes influence US bilateral aid allocations? Evidence from panel data,” Review of Development Economics 10(2): 210–23.
Foot, R., MacFarlane, S. N., and Mastanduno, M. 2003. US hegemony and international organizations: the United States and multilateral institutions. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Frankel, J. and Saravelos, G. 2012. “Can leading indicators assess country vulnerability? Evidence from the 2008–09 global financial crisis,” Journal of International Economics (87): 216–31.
Fues, T. and Wolff, P. 2010. “The G-20 and global development: which road to take?” Think tank 20: global perspectives on the Seoul G-20 summit. November. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, pp. 21–3.
Fukuyama, F. 1992. The end of history and the last man. New York: Maxwell MacMillan.
Gardner, R. N. 1980. Sterling-dollar diplomacy, the origins and the prospects of our international economic order (New, expanded ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Gilpin, R. 1981. War and change in world politics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gold, J. 1972. Voting and decisions in the International Monetary Fund; an essay on the law and practice of the fund. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Gold, J. 1974. Membership and nonmembership in the International Monetary Fund: A study in international law and organization. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Gold, J. 1981. “The origins of weighted voting power in the Fund,” Finance and Development 18(1): 25–8.
Goldstein, J. 1988. “Ideas, institutions, and American trade policy,” International Organization 42(1): 179–217.
Goldstein, J. 1993. “Creating GATT rules: ideas, institutions and American politics,” in Ruggie, John (ed.), Multilateralism matters. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 201–32.
Goldstein, J. and Gowa, J. 2002. “US national power and the post-war trading regime,” World Trade Review 1(2): 153–70.
Golub, S., Bernhardt, A., and Michelle, L. 2011. “Development and trade strategies for LDCs. 2001–2010 and looking ahead,” Paper Prepared for UNCTAD, March.
Grant, R. and Keohane, R. 2005. “Accountability and abuses of power in world politics,” American Political Science Review 99(1): 29–43.
Green, D. P. and Shapiro, I. 1994. Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Grieco, J. M. 1990. Cooperation among nations: Europe, America and nontariff barriers to trade. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Grieco, J. M. 1995. “The Maastricht Treaty, economic and monetary union and the neo-realist research programme,” Review of International Studies 21(1): 21–40.
Hawkins, D., Lake, D., Nielson, D., and Tierney, M. (eds.) 2006. Delegation and agency in international organizations. London: Cambridge University Press.
Helleiner, E. 2012. “The limits of incrementalism: the G20, the FSB and the international regulatory agenda,” Journal of Globalization and Development, 2(2): 1–19.
Helleiner, E. and Pagliari, S. 2011. “The end of an era in international financial regulation? A postcrisis research agenda,” International Organization 65(1): 169–200.
Hoekman, B. M. and Kostecki, M. M. 2001. The political economy of the world trading system: the WTO and beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hopf, T. 2010. “The logic of habit in international relations,” European Journal of International Relations 16(4): 539–61.
Horsefield, J. K. 1969. The International Monetary Fund, 1945–1965: twenty years of international monetary cooperation. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Hudec, R. 1998. “The GATT legal system: a diplomat’s jurisprudence,” in Howse, R. (ed.), The world trading system: critical perspectives on the world economy. New York: Routledge, pp. 8–59.
Hurd, I. 1999. “Legitimacy and authority in international politics,” International Organization 53(2): 379–408.
Hurd, I. 2007. After anarchy: legitimacy and power in the United Nations security council. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hurrell, A. 2008. “Lula’s Brazil: a rising power, but going where?,” Current History 107(706): 51–7.
Ikenberry, G. J. 1992. “A world economy restored: expert consensus and the Anglo-American postwar settlement,” International Organization 46(1): 289–321.
Ikenberry, G. J. 2000. After victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ikenberry, G. J. 2008. “The rise of China and the future of the west: can the liberal system survive?” Foreign Affairs 87(1): 23–37.
Ikenberry, G. J. 2009. “Liberal internationalism 3.0: America and the dilemmas of liberal world order,” Perspectives on Politics 7(1): 71–87.
Ikenberry, G. J. 2012. Liberal leviathan: the origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
International Affairs. 2013. Special Issue, “Negotiating the Rise of New Powers,” 89(3): 561–792.
Irwin, D. A., Mavroidis, P. C., and Sykes, A. O. 2008. The genesis of the GATT. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Jackson, J. H. 2000. The jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: insights on treaty law and economic relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jervis, R. 1999. “Realism, neoliberalism and cooperation: understanding the debate,” International Security 24(1): 42–63.
Johnston, A. I. 2008. Social states: China in international institutions 1980–2000. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kahler, M. 1998. “Rationality in international relations,” International Organization 52(4): 919–41.
Kahler, M. 2013. “Rising powers and global governance: negotiating change in a resilient status quo,” International Affairs 89(3): 711–29.
Kapur, D. 2002. “The common pool dilemma of global public goods: lessons from the World Bank’s net income and reserves,” World Development 30(3): 337–54.
Kapur, D., Lewis, J. P., and Webb, R. (eds.) 1997. The World Bank: its first half century. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Kastner, S. L. 2007. “When do conflicting political relations affect international trade?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(4): 664–88.
Kaya, A. 2012. “Conflicted principles, uncertain agency: The International Monetary Fund and the Great Recession,” Global Policy 3(1): 24–34.
Kaya, A. 2012b. “Revival of multilateralism and the challenges ahead,” Global Economy and Development Working Paper No. 49. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Kaya, A. and Keba, A. 2011. “Why global inequality matters: derivative global egalitarianism,” Journal of International Political Theory 7(2): 140–65.
Kennedy, P. 1989. The rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Vintage Books.
Keohane, R. 1984. After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, R. 1998. “International institutions: can interdependence work?” Foreign Policy 110: 82–96.
Keohane, R. 2003. “Global governance and democratic accountability,” in Held, D. and Koenig-Archibugi, M. (eds.), Taming globalization: frontiers of governance, London: Polity Press, pp. 130–59.
Keohane, R. 2009. “The old IPE and the new,” Review of International Political Economy 16(1): 34–46.
Keohane, R. O. and Buchanan, A. 2006. “Precommitment regimes for intervention: supplementing the security council,” Ethics & International Affairs 25(1): 41–63.
Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. 1977. Power and interdependence: world politics in transition. Boston: Little, Brown.
Keohane, R. O., Nye, J. S., and Hoffmann, S. 1993. After the Cold War / international institutions and state strategies in Europe, 1989–1991. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kharas, H. and Lombardi, D. 2012. The group of twenty: origins, prospects and challenges for global governance. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Kilby, C. 2013. “The political economy of project preparation: an empirical analysis of World Bank projects,” Journal of Development Economics 105: 211–25.
Kirshner, J. 2010. “The tragedy of offensive realism: classical realism and the rise of China,” European Journal of International Relations 18(1), 53–75.
Kirton, J. 2011. “The G8: legacy, limitations and lessons,” in Bradford, C. I. and Lim, W. (eds.), Global leadership in transition: making the G-20 more effective and responsive. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and Korean Development Institute.
Koremenos, B. 2005. “Contracting around international uncertainty,” American Political Science Review 99(4): 549–65.
Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., and Snidal, D. 2001a. “The rational design of international institutions,” International Organization 55(4): 761–99.
Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., and Snidal, D. 2001b. “Rational design: looking back to move forward,” International Organization 55(4): 1051–82.
Krasner, S. 1983. International regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Krasner, S. 1985. Structural conflict: the third world against global liberalism. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Krasner, S. 1991. “Global communications and national power: life on the Pareto frontier,” World Politics 43(3): 336–66.
Kumar, R. 2010. “IMF reforms bode well for the G-20 Seoul summit, but more tangible gains are needed,” Think Tank 20: Global Perspectives on the Seoul G-20 Summit. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Kuziemko, I. and Werker, E. 2006. “How much is a seat on the security council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations,” Journal of Political Economy 114(5): 905–30.
Lake, D. A. 1993. “Leadership, hegemony, and the international economy: naked emperor or tattered monarch with potential?” International Studies Quarterly 37(4): 459–89.
Lake, D. A. 2010. “Making America safe for the world: multilateralism and the rehabilitation of US authority,” Global Governance 16(4): 471–84.
Lake, D. A. 2013. “Great power hierarchies and strategies in twenty-first century world politics,” in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., and Simmons, B. (eds.), The handbook of international relations (2nd ed.). Newbury Park: Sage, pp. 555–77.
Lancaster, C. 2007. Foreign aid: diplomacy, development, domestic politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lavelle, K. C. 2011. Legislating international organization: The US congress, the IMF and the World Bank. New York: Oxford University Press.
Layne, C. 2009. “The waning of U.S. hegemony – myth or reality? a review essay,” International Security 34(1): 147–72.
Layne, C. 2012. “This time it’s real: the end of unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” International Studies Quarterly 56(1): 203–13.
Leech, D. 2002. “Voting power in the governance of the international monetary fund,” Annals of Operations Research 109(1–4): 375–97.
Lerrick, A. 2007. “All eyes on the World Bank,” Statement presented to the Subcommittee of Security and International Trade and Finance of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the United States Senate. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
Lesage, D., Debaere, P., Dierckx, S., and Vermeiren, M. 2013. “IMF reform after the crisis,” International Politics 50(4): 553–78.
Lesage, D. and Kacar, Y. 2010. “Turkey’s profile in the G20: emerging economy, middle power and bridge-builder,” Studia Diplomatica 63(2): 125–40.
Lim, W. 2011. “Sharing knowledge for development,” in Bradford, C. I. and Lim, W. (eds.), pp. 209–18.
Lipscy, P. 2003. “Japan’s Asian monetary fund proposal,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 3(Spring): 93–104.
Lipson, C. 1991. “Why are some international agreements informal?” International Organization 45(4): 495–538.
Lister, F. K. 1984. Decision-making strategies for international organizations: the IMF model. Denver: Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.
Lombardi, D. 2010b. “The role of the IMF in low-income countries: an institutional approach,” in Boughton, J. M. and Lombardi, D. (eds.), pp. 3–14.
Lombardi, D. 2011. The governance of the financial stability board. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Lombardi, D. and Woods, N. 2008. “The politics of influence: an analysis of IMF surveillance,” Review of International Political Economy 15(5): 711–39.
Loree, R. F. 1950. Position of the national foreign trade council with respect to the Havana charter for an international trade organization. New York: National Foreign Trade Council.
MacDonald, P. K. and Parent, J. M. 2011. “Graceful decline?: The surprising success of great power retrenchment,” International Security 35(4): 7–44.
Mahoney, J., and Schensul, D. 2006. “Historical context and path dependence,” in Goodin, R. E. and Tilly, C. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 454–71.
Mansfield, E. D. and Pevehouse, J. C. 2000. “Trade blocs, trade flows, and international conflict,” International Organization 54(4): 775–808.
Martinez-Diaz, L. 2007. The G20 after eight years: how effective a vehicle for developing-country influence? Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Mason, E. S. and Asher, R. E. 1973. The World Bank since Bretton Woods: the origins, policies, operations, and impact of the International Bank for reconstruction. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
McIntyre, E. 1954. “Weighted voting in international organizations,” International Organization 8(4): 484–97.
Mearsheimer, J. 1994/1995. “The false promise of international institutions,” International Security 19(3): 5–49.
Mearsheimer, J. 2001. The tragedy of great power politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
Mikesell, R. F. 1994. The Bretton Woods debates: a memoir. Essays in International Finance No. 192. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
Milner, H. V. 1997. Interests, institutions, and information: domestic politics and international relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Milner, H. V. 2005. “Globalization, development and international institutions: normative and positive perspectives,” Perspectives on Politics 3(4): 833–54.
Momani, B. 2004. “American politicization of the International Monetary Fund,” Review of International Political Economy 11(5): 880–904.
Moravcsik, A. 1997. “Taking preferences seriously: a liberal theory of international politics,” International Organization 51(4): 513–53.
Moravcsik, A. 2000. “The origins of human rights regimes: democratic delegation in postwar Europe,” International Organization 54(2): 217–52.
Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., and Tabares, T. E. 1998. “The political determinants of international trade: the major powers, 1907–90,” American Political Science Review 92(3): 649–61.
Moschella, M. 2010. Governing risk: The IMF and global financial crises. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mosley, L. and Singer, D. A. 2009. “The global financial crisis: lessons and opportunities for international political economy,” International Interactions 35(4): 420–29.
Moyo, D. 2009. Dead aid: why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Naim, M. 2000. “Fads and fashions in economic reforms: Washington consensus or Washington confusion?” Third World Quarterly 21(3): 505–28.
Nelson, R. M., Weiss, M. A., Belkin, P., and Mix, D. E. 2012. “The eurozone crisis: overview and issues for congress,” Congressional Research Service, September 26. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42377.pdf.
Neumayer, E. 2003. “Do human rights matter in bilateral aid allocation? A quantitative analysis of 21 donor countries,” Social Science Quarterly 84(3): 650–66.
Odell, J. 2001. “Case study methods in international political economy,” International Studies Perspectives 2(2): 161–76.
Odell, J. 2009. “Breaking deadlocks in international institutional negotiations: The WTO, Seattle, and Doha,” International Studies Quarterly 53(2): 273–99.
Odell, J. and Eichengreen, B. 1998. “The United States, the ITO, and the WTO: exit options, agent slack, and presidential leadership,” in The WTO as an International Organization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ostrom, E. 1991. “Rational choice theory and institutional analysis: toward complementarity,” The American Political Science Review 85(1): 237–43.
Patrick, S. 2011. “The G20: shifting coalitions of consensus rather than blocs,” in Bradford, C. I. and Lim, W. (eds.), pp. 257–64.
Pauly, L. 1997. Who elected the bankers?: surveillance and control in the world economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pauly, L. 2008. “The institutional legacy of Bretton Woods IMF surveillance, 1973–2007,” in Andrew, D. (ed.), Orderly change: International Monetary relations since Bretton Woods. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 189–210.
Pierson, P. 2004. Politics in time: history, institutions, and social analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pincus, J. R. and Winters, J. A. 2002. “Reinventing the World Bank,” in Pincus, J. and Winters, J. A. (eds.), Reinventing the World Bank. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Powell, W. W. and DiMaggio, P. J. 1991. The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Putnam, R. 1988. “Diplomacy and domestic politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42(3): 427–46.
Qureshi, Z. 2010. “The G-20 and global development,” in Fardoust, S., Kim, Y., and Paz Sepúlveda, C. (eds.), Postcrisis growth and development: a development agenda for the G-20. Washington, DC: The World Bank, pp. 119–71.
Rajan, R. 2008. “The future of the IMF and the world bank,” American Economic Review 98(2): 110–15.
Rapkin, D., Elston, J., and Strand, J. 1997. “Institutional adjustment to changed power distributions: Japan and the United States in the IMF,” Global Governance 3(2): 171–95.
Rapkin, D. P. and Strand, J. R. 2005. “Developing country representation and governance of the International Monetary Fund,” World Development 33(12): 1993–2011.
Reinhardt, E. and Kucik, J. 2008. “Does flexibility promote cooperation? An application to the global trade regime,” International Organization 62(3): 477–505.
Reus-Smit, C. 2007. “Human rights and the social construction of sovereignty,” Review of International Studies 27(4): 519–38.
Rodrik, D. 2008. One economics, many recipes: globalization, institutions, and economic growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rogoff, K. 2003. “The IMF strikes back,” Foreign Policy 134(January–February): 38–46.
Rosendorff, B. P. and Milner, H. V. 2001. “The optimal design of international trade institutions: uncertainty and escape,” International Organization 55(4): 829–57.
Roubini, N. and Mihm, S. 2010. Crisis economics: a crash course in the future of finance. New York: Penguin Press.
Ruggie, J. G. 1982. “International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the post-war economic order,” International Organization 36(2): 379–415.
Scharpf, F. W. 1999. Governing in Europe: effective and democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schirm, S. A. 2011. “Global politics are domestic politics: how societal interests and ideas shape ad hoc groupings in the G20 which supersede international alliances,” Paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Convention, Montreal, Canada.
Schuler, K. and Rosenberg, A. 2012. The Bretton Woods transcripts. New York: Center for Financial Stability.
Schweller, R. 2001. “The problem of international order revisited – a review essay,” International Security 26(1): 161–86.
Schweller, R. L. and Priess, D. 1997. “A tale of two realisms: expanding the institutions debate,” Mershon International Studies Review 41(1): 1–32.
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