In response to cartel formation, competition lawyers and policymakers in nine Asian jurisdictions have experimented with leniency programmes. This mechanism allows firms to come forward with information in relation to their illegal cartel participation in return for a reduction of or immunity from a sanction. The experimentation plays out across three different dimensions: the revision of early adopted leniency programmes, the introduction of newly written leniency programmes, and the decision – deliberate or otherwise – not to create a leniency programme. This volume is the first to analyse the empirical evidence across a number of countries to determine how effective these measures have been, and how they have been amended in response to problems encountered. In this volume, local experts from key Asian jurisdictions, together with international experts, offer an introduction to this fast-developing field, and explore the theoretical, international and regulatory contexts of leniency programmes.

‘This book offers a comprehensive understanding on the critically important topic of leniency in Asian competition law.’

D. Daniel Sokol - Carolyn Craig Franklin Chair Professor in Law and Business, Gould School of Law, University of Southern California

‘Leniency has already achieved remarkable success in eliciting confessions from cartel participants; nevertheless, leniency programs across the globe have not converged, with markedly different scorecards among countries. Getting out of this impasse requires case studies, together with solid theoretical inquiries. This book, the first large-scale study on leniency in Asia, presents a refreshing answer to this challenge. It is a pleasure to read this meticulously constructed book, with a sharply focused introduction, followed by countries’ case studies, not only of Asia (including China) but also of the pioneering US and EU, conducted by first-rate scholars in each country.’

Toshiaki Takigawa - Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Law, Kansai University, Osaka