Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: Victims or actors? European neutrals and non-belligerents, 1939–1945
- PART ONE THE ‘PHONEY WAR’ NEUTRALS
- 1 Denmark, September 1939–April 1940
- 2 Norway
- 3 The Netherlands
- 4 Belgium: fragile neutrality, solid neutralism
- PART TWO THE ‘WAIT-AND-SEE’ NEUTRALS
- PART THREE THE ‘LONG-HAUL’ NEUTRALS
- Appendix
- Index
1 - Denmark, September 1939–April 1940
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 October 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: Victims or actors? European neutrals and non-belligerents, 1939–1945
- PART ONE THE ‘PHONEY WAR’ NEUTRALS
- 1 Denmark, September 1939–April 1940
- 2 Norway
- 3 The Netherlands
- 4 Belgium: fragile neutrality, solid neutralism
- PART TWO THE ‘WAIT-AND-SEE’ NEUTRALS
- PART THREE THE ‘LONG-HAUL’ NEUTRALS
- Appendix
- Index
Summary
Denmark's policy of neutrality from September 1939 to April 1940 was rooted in a centuries-old tradition of alliance-free neutrality, which was conditioned by the country's geo-strategic position, its role as a small country and historical experience. The Danish government tried to maintain its position of neutrality even during the German occupation, and continued this policy after 1945, until the Cold War compelled Denmark to join NATO in 1949.
HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
In 1864, Denmark tried to resolve the Schleswig-Holstein question by means of a war against Austria and Prussia. This decision was the result of a foolhardy, unrealistic foreign policy that counted on help from outside, but which led to defeat and the loss of North Schleswig. The loss of two-fifths of its territory and of a million inhabitants led to a profound national crisis and intense heart-searching. It placed a question mark against whether Denmark could maintain its existence as an independent state and created a small-country neurosis that affected several generations of foreign policy makers. The 1870–1 Franco-German War briefly rekindled the hope that North Schleswig could be regained via an alliance with France, but Prussia's victory crushed any hopes in this direction and made a policy of neutrality a sine qua non. Fear of the increasing military might of Germany became the dominant element of Danish defence policy and acknowledgement of Denmark's extremely limited freedom to manoeuvre became a maxim in defence policy circles.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2001
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