Constitutional and human rights doctrines and rights differ across cultures not only in their substance, but also in their architecture. Some rights are worded broadly and vaguely while others are written in narrow and precise terms; for some rights the determination of the scope of the right is merged with the determination of its strength, while for others questions of scope and strength are sharply delineated; some rights are seemingly absolute, yet others allow for overrides; some rights are universally applicable within their jurisdictional scope, while others apply only to some people, or at some times, or in some places; and some rights are non-derogable, while others are subject to suspension in cases of catastrophe, or in circumstances of emergency or crisis.

Although such differences in the architecture of rights pervade the topic of constitutional and human rights, the architectural issues have been especially visible and especially contested with respect to the rights variously described as freedom of speech, freedom of communication and freedom of expression, and including the freedom of the press, the right of assembly, the freedom of association and various other rights (academic freedom and artistic freedom, for example) commonly associated with or part of the cluster of communicative rights. In part because the concepts of speech, communication and expression are themselves so capacious, and in part because the countervailing interests often both appear and are especially weighty, there has been an explicit concern with the design of freedom of communication rights in virtually all countries with sophisticated constitutional or human rights cultures and legal protection.