Sadat had envisioned replacing Iran as a Middle East gendarme, but in 2006–2008, Egypt looked more like a small town sheriff's deputy. Bush administration officials did not seriously consult with Mubarak on matters of war and peace, and they regarded Minister of Defense Mohammed Hussein Tantawi as more of a nuisance than an asset. Obsessed with state-on-state warfare, the field marshal demurred from retooling his forces to meet post–Cold War challenges. Meanwhile, intelligence chief Suleiman was tackling terrorism and the other twenty-first-century threats that troubled Washington. Politicians from the White House and Congress relied on Suleiman for managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and fighting al-Qaeda. Many preferred him to Gamal Mubarak as a presidential successor. Meanwhile, they relegated the Egyptian military to border duty.

After Palestinians freely elected a Hamas-led government, U.S. politicians demanded the Egyptian regime work harder to secure the Gaza Strip and prevent Palestinian attacks on Israeli towns. Even as U.S. officials wanted to bolster Mubarak and prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from replicating Hamas's achievement, some members of Congress argued Mubarak was not doing enough to weaken Hamas and pacify Gaza. The debate on Capitol Hill culminated in the first attempt to condition post-1979 U.S. military aid on the behavior of the Egyptian regime.