Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface
- 1 LAWS, BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DELEGATION
- 2 RATIONAL DELEGATION OR HELPLESS ABDICATION? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS
- 3 STATUTES AS BLUEPRINTS FOR POLICYMAKING
- 4 A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, DISCRETION, AND THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS
- 5 LEGISLATION, AGENCY POLICYMAKING, AND MEDICAID IN MICHIGAN
- 6 THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS SEPARATION OF POWERS SYSTEMS
- 7 THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
- 8 LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLICYMAKING PROCESSES
- APPENDIX A MMC LAWS USED IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX B POLICY CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX C PROCEDURAL CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX D THE FORMAL MODEL OF DISCRETION
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
- Titles in the series
6 - THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS SEPARATION OF POWERS SYSTEMS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface
- 1 LAWS, BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DELEGATION
- 2 RATIONAL DELEGATION OR HELPLESS ABDICATION? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS
- 3 STATUTES AS BLUEPRINTS FOR POLICYMAKING
- 4 A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, DISCRETION, AND THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS
- 5 LEGISLATION, AGENCY POLICYMAKING, AND MEDICAID IN MICHIGAN
- 6 THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS SEPARATION OF POWERS SYSTEMS
- 7 THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
- 8 LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLICYMAKING PROCESSES
- APPENDIX A MMC LAWS USED IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX B POLICY CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX C PROCEDURAL CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX D THE FORMAL MODEL OF DISCRETION
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
- Titles in the series
Summary
Our theoretical argument examines how four factors combine to influence the legislative design of bureaucratic discretion. We explored the role of two of these factors – policy conflict between the legislature and agency and conflict across legislative chambers – in the previous chapter. The issue of policy conflict has been central in studies of Congress and delegation, and our case study of Michigan confirms the importance of divided government. The second issue, bicameral bargaining, has received much less systematic attention, as have the other elements of our theory that could not be explored in the Michigan case study, such as the legislature's capacity to write detailed, constraining laws and the role of nonstatutory policymaking mechanisms.
In this chapter we conduct a systematic empirical test of the main arguments of our theory using a novel data set that looks at all bills affecting Medicaid recipients that were enacted by U.S. states over a two-year period. The data permit a test of the comparative elements of our arguments, as the U.S. states have considerable variation in the theoretical variables we have identified. In addition to using these data to test our theoretical argument, we test alternative hypotheses by operationalizing a number of other factors, including the degree of electoral competition, changes in the partisan control of government, and partisan preferences over the level of governmental activism, that might influence the level of discretion that legislatures choose to allow.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Deliberate Discretion?The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy, pp. 139 - 170Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002