The first conclusion that I want to emphasise is the understanding of human rights as a democratic feature. As Chapter 3 concludes, democracy, as a system, cannot be limited to a simple election method cloistered within borders. Democracy must be interpreted and enforced with a human rights baseline.

The five examples of legal violence expounded in this book demonstrate that constitutional enforcement is violent because it is illegitimate. In this sense, state or constitutional illegitimate force is plain violence. My point is that we cannot assume the legitimacy of the state (Schmitt) or constitutional violence (Kelsen) based on theological theories. Twenty-first-century society needs to overcome political theology as a source of constitutional legitimacy. Kantorowicz, Taubes, Brecht, Schmitt and Cover, too, defined the depth of theological influence in political and legal theory. This influence is clear in constitutions and constitutionalism.

It is important to note that violence may be considered legitimate and necessary, but not every sort of violence is acceptable. Regardless of where the violence originates, it must respect democracy and human rights in a broad sense. There is no contradiction between democracy and human rights, because the two issues are related in several ways. The interrelation is summarised in three connections. International legal commitments are now increasingly made by governments that can be held accountable for their commitments by their own people.