The relationship between comparative law and sociology has been paradoxical for at least a century. Since the inauguration of modern comparative law as a distinctive field of scholarly practice, conventionally traced to the 1900 Paris Congress, the closeness and necessity of this relationship has been frequently asserted by comparatists. Comparative law and sociology of law have often been said by comparatists to be inseparable. Sometimes, as regards an important part of its activity or aspirations, comparative law has been claimed to be a type of sociology of law or even identical with sociology of law. Yet, the nature of this relationship has rarely been examined in detail. In general, the need to explore it rigorously has been avoided by both comparatists and legal sociologists.

In some ways, this avoidance is understandable. Few scholars claim detailed knowledge of the whole range of the literature of both comparative law and sociology. Few are likely to have sufficient interest in both fields to motivate such an inquiry. And the orientations of comparatists and legal sociologists are often significantly different. The theoretical and empirical concerns of legal sociology go beyond those that interest most comparatists. Comparatists do not necessarily share sociology's ambitions to explain theoretically social change or social stability or to characterize the nature of social life using abstract concepts such as ‘structure’ or ‘system’. They often prefer specific, seemingly far more practical, inquiries closely related to the detail of legal practice and legal doctrine in particular systems.