While much has been written about the formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), less attention has been focused on the enforcement capability of the Court. As demonstrated by the history of the ad hoc international tribunals, one of the most pressing problems for international criminal courts is the arrest and the surrender of suspects, which often requires substantial bargaining between the court and the state in which the suspect resides. We develop a classification of the issues which have the greatest impact on the bargaining influence of the ICC to secure the arrest of indictees, and apply this classification scheme to a study of the four ongoing situations at the ICC in order to explore the bargaining environment in which the ICC operates. While many of the cases have features which should assist the ICC in bargaining with the state, the situation in Sudan represents the greatest challenge for the Court.

In the absence of police powers, the International Criminal Court, like the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, will depend on the co-operation of states in order to fulfil its mandate. Discussing the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals and the travaux préparatoires of the Rome treaty, the author compares the mandatory powers conferred on the respective institutions to this end. He concludes that the Security Council endowed the Tribunals with unequivocally binding powers, while under the Rome treaty regime, which resembles traditional inter-state co-operation in criminal matters, the ICC's powers are more limited and state obligations less stringent.