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Introduction
Alex Tuckness, Iowa State University
Book:

Morality as Legislation

Published online:

29 July 2021

Print publication:

12 August 2021, pp 1-30
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Summary

The Introduction to Morality as Legislation: Rules and Consequences explains the difference between a situated perspective where a person asks which act should be performed in a particular instance and a legislative perspective where one asks what rule should apply to a whole class of people in given circumstances. The legislative perspective seems to have advantages in terms of coming to more plausible moral conclusions but does not fit neatly into either consequentialist or Kantian categories as it uses consequentialist considerations to select among possible rules while being unable to explain why the question “which rule?” is the relevant question on purely consequentialist grounds. The Introduction describes four different dimensions along which conceptions of the legislative perspective can vary and two contextual dimensions as to where it is employed: political and nonpolitical contexts and legislative and nonlegislative contexts. The Introduction clarifies the goals of the book and provides summaries of the following chapters.

Rules and Consequences
Alex Tuckness
Published online:

29 July 2021

Print publication:

12 August 2021
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'What would happen if everyone acted that way?' This question is often used in everyday moral assessments, but it has a paradoxical quality: it draws not only on Kantian ideas of a universal moral law but also on consequentialist claims that what is right depends on the outcome. In this book, Alex Tuckness examines how the question came to be seen as paradoxical, tracing its history from the theistic approaches of the seventeenth century to the secular accounts of the present. Tuckness shows that the earlier interpretations were hybrid theories that included both consequentialist and non-consequentialist elements, and argues that contemporary uses of this approach will likewise need to combine consequentialist and non-consequentialist commitments.

Chapter 10 - Acquiring epistemic virtue
- By Heather Battaly
Edited by Abrol Fairweather, San Francisco State University, Owen Flanagan, Duke University, North Carolina
Book:

Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue

Published online:

05 April 2014

Print publication:

27 March 2014, pp 175-196
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Summary

This chapter develops the version of indirect epistemic teleology (IET) that is supported by pluralist teleology, and explores how it might answer at least some of the more important objections. It lays out the basic ideas of pluralist teleology. The chapter explains that IET is the view that results from applying pluralist teleology to the field of epistemic normativity. It explores IET in relation to both meta-epistemic issues and issues in normative epistemology. IET is structurally analogous to a kind of rule-consequentialism in ethics. The chapter discusses the concept of justified belief and other epistemic evaluative concepts. It evaluates the epistemic practices in all possible worlds, considered as hypothetical or counterfactual possibilities, relative to the actually optimal set of norms. The chapter considers objections to IET and briefly explores the ability of the theory to respond to the objections.