The application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to the Member States has given rise both to a controversial phraseology and a controversial case-law. This paper offers a reconstruction of the constitutional intent and proposes a conceptualization in conformity with the structural function and the constitutional contemplation of the pouvoir constituent. As to the phraseological debate, it demonstrates that the Charter’s application to the Member States may occur by reason of either “implementation” or “interpretation” of EU law and the two strands are embraced but not synthetized by “scope” as a collective term. As to the substantive debate, it demonstrates that the CJEU’s case-law on “implementation” is not only amorphous but also inconsistent with the Charter’s constitutional mandate. The paper proposes a novel approach based on the notion that the application to the Member States is accessory to the supremacy of EU law. The paper’s argument is presented in the following steps. First, the paper presents the pristine rationale and constitutional function of the application to the Member State through its emergence and historical context. Second, it provides a taxonomy and critical overview of the CJEU’s amorphous case-law and presents the Court’s futile attempt to create a coherent doctrine that faithfully reproduces the constitutional contemplation behind the diagonal application and that reflects the division of competences between the EU and its Member States. Third, it sets out the proposed doctrine of “displacement.”

This contribution analyses the current situation of the implementation of the Rule of Law in the EU focusing on three essential aspects: the role of Article 2 of the TEU as a legal paradigm, the issue of effectiveness of secondary law to strengthen Supranational mechanisms for the defense of the Rule of Law; and the thorny issue of the primacy of EU Law in the current Era of European Integration.

This article argues that constitutional pluralism is not a theory merely for times of equanimity, but crucially, in times of constitutional conflict. Given that it rests on the premise of regarding law as a dynamic, incrementally developing creature, constitutional conflict is no exceptional event, and represents an important element of the system's functioning. However, this does not mean that every point of conflict necessarily means progress for the pluralist system as a whole: it is possible to distinguish constructive from destructive conflict. In this respect, this piece will put forward a normative argument concerning the limits to which the auto-correct function of constitutional pluralism can stretch. In so doing, this piece will look at the recent jurisprudence of constitutional conflict at the EU and national level to demonstrate the limits of constructive conflict, as well as show how the example of Poland falls into the category of destructive conflict.

The judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) announced on November 19, 2019 in response to a preliminary reference from the Polish Supreme Court is of fundamental importance for the independence of courts and judges in EU countries, establishing a pillar on which subsequent CJEU decisions have been based. The CJEU concluded that a national court is not an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of the European Union (EU) law where the objective circumstances in which that court was formed, its characteristics, and the means by which its members have been appointed are capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to the imperviousness of that court to external interference. In particular, a court may cease to be seen as independent or impartial when it appears to be under the direct or indirect influence of the legislature and/or the executive, or where doubts emerge about their neutrality with respect to the interests before them. Such circumstances threaten the trust that justice in a democratic society must inspire in subjects of the law.

There is no point in denying the significance of the Right to be forgotten for the state of judicial dialogue in Europe. It vindicates the position of the BVerfG as a court deserving international recognition for advancing the law in the crucial field of data protection. Nevertheless, restricting the scope of analysis to the narrow context of judicial dialogue misses the wider context of the rise of authoritarian constitutionalism in certain EU Member States. In this respect, it is of the highest significance that the decisions on the Right to be forgotten effectively eliminate the imagined normative hierarchy between domestic and EU law that provided the basis for the BVerfG’s jurisprudence ever since Solange I and Maastricht. Moreover, by reasserting the primacy of EU law, the BVerfG strengthens the position of embattled judges in Poland facing disciplinary action for implementing the primacy of EU law. The concern shown by some members of the First Senate for the situation in Poland corroborates this reading.