This chapter considers one popular way to account for cases of resistance as cases of evidence one should have had, where the normative failure at stake is taken to be either (1) a breach of social normativity (Goldberg 2018) or (2) a breach of moral normativity (Feldman 2004). I argue that the social normative option is too weak, in that it allows problematic social norms to encroach on epistemic normativity, and that the appeal to moral oughts fails both on theoretical grounds – in that it cannot accommodate widely accepted epistemic conditions on moral blame – and on extensional adequacy.

Chapter 3 makes the case for classifying five grey area examples as hate speech in the ordinary sense of the term based on the global resemblance test. We also argue that Facebook’s community standard on hate speech is ambiguous, inconsistent, and incomplete in relation to these examples, and so recommend specific reforms. Section 3.2 looks at hybrid attacks, which, like personal insults, target specific individuals, but, like prototypical hate speech, also attack the groups to which targeted individuals belong and, go beyond standard protected characteristics. Section 3.3 investigates selective attacks, which are derogatory or insulting words that refer to only a subset of a group or else to an amalgamated set of people who belong to multiple groups. Section 3.4 scrutinises reverse attacks, which involve words used by members of groups typically perceived as victims against groups more usually considered perpetrators. Section 3.5 examines righteous attacks, which we associate with attacks in pursuit of some righteous cause. Finally, Section 3.6 assesses indirect attacks, wherein the speaker intentionally uses a derogatory word to address or target someone whom the speaker knows or presumes to be not a member of the group referred to by the word under its literal or primary meaning.

In Chapter 3, we focus on the women we interviewed, specifically paying attention to their expectations about first-time motherhood as compared to the reality of motherhood after the birth of their child. To do this, we explore three areas that for many of the women provided a stark contrast between expectation and reality. The first pertained to conceiving a child, with this being more difficult for some women. The second pertained to navigating breastfeeding, with some women experiencing significant challenges. Third, we focus on experiences of postnatal mental health issues, and how this related to idealised expectations about new motherhood. As a whole, these three areas speak to normative moral claims that are often associated with new motherhood, and how the women we interviewed grappled with these.

Here I argue that both the desert-based and value-based desiderata for a normatively adequate account of reactive blame can be met. First, adopting a victim-centered approach highlights the importance of blame for appropriately valuing other persons, and reactive blame is the variety of blame uniquely suited to serve this function. Thus the value-based desiderata for a normatively adequate account of reactive blame can be met. I then offer two arguments for thinking that the desert-based desiderata can be met. The first is a parity of reasons argument. Given epistemically relevant similarities between the negative reactive attitudes and a privileged subset of our moral judgments, we ought to extend the same privileged status to beliefs about the objects of the negative reactive attitudes. The second argument appeals to a similarity between our emotional experiences and perceptual experiences. Attending to this relation suggests that we have good reason to think some of our emotional experiences – those constitutive of the negative reactive attitudes in particular – provide indirect evidence for the existence of moral reasons that would render their content correct. Thus we have at least some good reason for thinking that the desert-based desideratum for normatively adequate reactive blame can be met.

Catholic Social Teaching is just Catholic moral teaching with emphasis upon the political and economic realms. This premise is in tension to the way many envisage the Church’s moral teaching, separating – even to the point of opposing – the Church’s commitment to “social justice” and its teachings on matters of life and sex. After a brief elaboration of the nature and purposes of CST and its dominant “principles,” the chapter reflects on why the disassociation between CST and Catholic moral teaching has come about. It argues that as a body of ethical instruction CST would be much more coherent and pastorally effective by explicitly incorporating the exceptionless moral norms taught and defended by the Church. The final section contains suggestions on how this incorporation might take place.

Catholic Social Teaching is just Catholic moral teaching with emphasis upon the political and economic realms. This premise is in tension to the way many envisage the Church’s moral teaching, separating – even to the point of opposing – the Church’s commitment to “social justice” and its teachings on matters of life and sex. After a brief elaboration of the nature and purposes of CST and its dominant “principles,” the chapter reflects on why the disassociation between CST and Catholic moral teaching has come about. It argues that as a body of ethical instruction CST would be much more coherent and pastorally effective by explicitly incorporating the exceptionless moral norms taught and defended by the Church. The final section contains suggestions on how this incorporation might take place.