Diplomacy is a political performing art that informs and determines the decisions of other states and peoples. It shapes their perceptions and calculations, so that they do what we want them to do, because they come to see that doing so is in their own best interests. Sometimes diplomacy rearranges their appraisal of their strategic circumstances–and, when needed, the circumstances themselves. Ultimately, it aims to influence their policies and behavior through measures short of war. Diplomacy succeeds best when it embraces humility, and respects and preserves the dignity of those to whom it is applied. Most of what diplomats do is unseen, and it is relatively inexpensive. Diplomacy’s greatest triumphs tend to be preventing bad things from happening, but gaining credit for something that was avoided is difficult.

Chapter 8 provides a brief history of US air power doctrine development after World War II, along with a synopsis of the modern air wars since Vietnam. Four operational and five environmental factors that impacted air operations in Vietnam are introduced to help explain when air power is likely to be effective. These nine factors are air superiority, air-to-ground capability, friendly ground force capability, enemy ground force capability, weather, lighting, geography and terrain, civilians, and concealment and cover. A summative assessment follows, which correlates these conditional factors with the military and political outcomes for the twenty-three modern US air campaigns. Finally, nine general observations are provided as to the overall effectiveness of modern air power.

The chapter examines the recent changes in the nature of modern warfare. It argues that most recent military conflicts take the form of “low-intensity conflict,” “gray-zone competition,” “asymmetric warfare,” “fourth-generation warfare,” and “irregular warfare.” Given the huge military spending gap between Iran and its regional and global adversaries, Iranian leaders have articulated and adopted an asymmetric warfare doctrine since the 1979 revolution.

This chapter shows that, under the Pahlavi monarchy, the country had one of, if not the, best-equipped and best-trained military in the Middle East and North Africa region. In this chapter, the focus is on how the Imperial Armed Forces changed following the revolution. Attention is drawn to the structure of the Islamic Republic’s military machine and to the historical and strategic forces that have come to determine the shape, doctrine, and capabilities of the country’s armed forces. The impact of the revolution itself on the armed forces was significant, compounded by the role-defining war with Iraq (1980–8). As a consequence of developments since 1979, the Sepah has emerged as the republic’s most powerful fighting force, the establishment’s trusted weapon against domestic dissent, and the regime’s leading weapon in regional conflicts. This centrality is largely attributed to the IRGC Command Network.

This chapter explores the organizational culture of Iraq’s army between its founding in 1921 and its collapse by the time of the American invasion in 2003. During this eighty-two-year history, the organizational culture of the Iraqi Army moved from the face of a foreign occupation in the 1920s, to a political tool of internal social and political coercion, to “probably the most potent military ever wielded by an Arab government.” However, by the time American troops pulled down the statue of Saddam in Baghdad’s Firdos Square, the army’s organizational culture was but a faint echo of not only its Iran-Iraq War pinnacle but also its historic norm. Saddam’s role was the critical factor in this change. Saddam needed professional military officers competent in developing and employing a large modern armed force, but he preferred the counsel of “violent and ignorant personalities.” Saddam could never reconcile the fundamental difference between what he called tribal and civilized (or state) warfare and the professional elements of the Iraqi armed forces could not survive in his shadow.

The American Civil War presented an exceptional state of affairs in modern warfare, because strong personalities could embed their own command philosophies into field armies, due to the miniscule size of the prior US military establishment. The effectiveness of the Union Army of the Tennessee stemmed in large part from the strong influence of Ulysses S. Grant, who as early as the fall of 1861 imbued in the organization an aggressive mind-set. However, Grant’s command culture went beyond simple aggressiveness – it included an emphasis on suppressing internal rivalries among sometimes prideful officers for the sake of winning victories. In the winter of 1861 and the spring of 1862, the Army of the Tennessee was organized and consolidated into a single force, and, despite deficits in trained personnel as compared to other Union field armies, Grant established important precedents for both his soldiers and officers that would resonate even after his departure to the east. The capture of Vicksburg the following summer represented the culminating triumph of that army, cementing the self-confident force that would later capture Atlanta and win the war in the western theater.