Egalitarian theories assess when and why distributive inequalities are objectionable. How should egalitarians assess inequalities between generations? One egalitarian theory is (telic) distributive egalitarianism: other things being equal, equal distributions of some good are intrinsically better than unequal distributions. I first argue that distributive egalitarianism produces counterintuitive judgements when applied across generations and that attempts to discount or exclude intergenerational inequalities do not work. This being so, intergenerational comparisons also undercut the intragenerational judgements that made distributive egalitarianism intuitive in the first place. I then argue that egalitarians should shed distributive egalitarianism: relational and instrumental arguments against inequality likely suffice to capture egalitarian concerns – including across generations – without encountering the problems produced by distributive egalitarianism.

Luck egalitarianism is a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. Its application to health and healthcare is controversial. This article addresses a novel critique of luck egalitarianism, namely, that it wrongfully discriminates against those responsible for their health disadvantage when allocating scarce healthcare resources. The philosophical literature about discrimination offers two primary reasons for what makes discrimination wrong (when it is): harm and disrespect. These two approaches are employed to analyze whether luck egalitarian healthcare prioritization should be considered wrongful discrimination. Regarding harm, it is very plausible to consider the policies harmful but much less reasonable to consider those responsible for their health disadvantages a socially salient group. Drawing on the disrespect literature, where social salience is typically not required for something to be discrimination, the policies are a form of discrimination. They are, however, not disrespectful. The upshot of this first assessment of the discrimination objection to luck egalitarianism in health is, thus, that it fails.

I offer two objections to luck egalitarianism. The no-adequate-account objection takes note of the egalitarian insistence that the disvalue of inequality is only one of a plurality of values or disvalues that needs to be considered in arriving at a judgment about the ranking of alternative distributions of welfare. This turn to pluralism places a reasonable demand upon luck egalitarianism to provide an account of how the different sorts of values or disvalues that are supposed to attach to available distributions of welfare are to be aggregated or weighed against one another in that ranking procedure. I contend that the prospects for developing such an account are dim and that some salient responses to this objection misfire. The churlishness-envy objection against luck egalitarianism is that this doctrine countenances envy directed toward the faultless good fortune of others. This objection places a reasonable demand on luck egalitarians to formulate a version of their doctrine that does not underwrite envious responses toward those who gain through brute good luck. I contend that the most auspicious path toward satisfying the demand not to underwrite churlish envy advances a luck egalitarianism that asymmetrically affirms the badness of arbitrary disadvantage rather than the badness of both arbitrary disadvantage and arbitrary advantage. Since this is the strategy pursued in Shlomi Segall’s Why Inequality Matters, I offer critiques of Segall’s initial and revised versions of asymmetrical egalitarianism in support of my conclusion that luck egalitarianism seems unable to rebut or sidestep the churlishness-envy objection. I conclude that luck egalitarianism seems unable to satisfy either of the two reasonable demands upon it that I raise.

There are three distinct forces that conspire to produce a great deal of economic misery. We can refer to them, for convenience, as misfortune, unfairness, and improvidence. Political philosophers have often shown an interest in one or another of these, but seldom all three. Furthermore, those who do acknowledge all three have often felt driven to collapse them into one root cause of inequality. My goal in this essay will be to argue that the three are independent of one another, but more importantly, that they each require distinct remedies. This is important for egalitarians because it defeats any attempt to develop a “one-size-fits-all” policy aimed at creating a more equal society. This analysis helps us to understand several of the tensions that arise in our attempts to combat inequality that are often obscured by an overemphasis on the power of redistributive taxation as well as generalized inattention to the way that successful welfare states achieve meaningful progress in promoting greater equality.

This paper begins with a simple illustration of the choice between individual and population strategies in population health policy. It describes the traditional approach on which the choice is to be made on the relative merits of the two strategies in each case. It continues by identifying two factors—our knowledge of the consequences of the epidemiological transition and the prevalence of responsibility-sensitive theories of distributive justice—that may distort our moral intuitions when we deliberate about the choice of appropriate risk-management strategies in population health. It argues that the confluence of these two factors may lead us to place too much emphasis on personal responsibility in health policy.

In A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, Kyle Johannsen maintains that the strongest version of John Rawls’s theory of justice is one that incorporates the luck egalitarian conception of fairness developed by G.A. Cohen. He also contends that, once the theory is modified in this way, it becomes clear that the original position doesn’t yield principles of justice but rather what Cohen calls ‘rules of regulation.’ I argue that the minimal conception of fairness that Rawls favours is the right one for his purposes, and that bringing in luck egalitarian fairness would render the outcome of the original position indeterminate.

In this paper, I explain the arguments my critics target and I respond to their criticisms. Some of my replies further expand upon the ideas covered in my book—A Conceptual Investigation of Justice—and some cover matters that weren’t discussed there. This paper thus substantially contributes to the arguments made in my book.

In his A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, Kyle Johannsen suggests a theory of disability that holds that to have a disability just is to be worse off, sometimes referred to as the ‘medical’ or ‘individual’ model of disability. I argue that Johannsen’s understanding of disability might force some of his key claims into an uncomfortable position. In particular, for his theory to avoid the thrust of Elizabeth Anderson’s criticisms of luck egalitarianism, the assumption of the medical model of disability must be dropped, but this comes at the cost of his criticism of John Rawls’ difference principle.

This paper provides a critical rejoinder to some themes in Kyle Johannsen’s A Conceptual Investigation of Justice. The discussion focuses on Johannsen’s analysis of fundamental value pluralism and identifies a number of challenges to the form of value pluralism defended by Johannsen. I suggest that Johannsen’s analysis fails to explain how conflicts between fundamental values can be resolved, and that there is greater harmony between fundamental values than Johannsen recognizes.

In this paper, I introduce the articles contained in this special issue, and I briefly explain some of the main arguments presented in my book A Conceptual Investigation of Justice. A central claim in my book is that a verbal and yet also philosophically substantial disagreement over the word ‘justice’ lies at the heart of a number of issues in contemporary political philosophy. Over the course of introducing my book’s arguments and the commentaries in this issue, I also offer an account of what it means for a dispute to be verbal, but not merely verbal.

This paper argues that extortion is a clear threat in intergenerational relations, and that the threat is manifest in some existing proposals in climate policy and latent in some background tendencies in mainstream moral and political philosophy. The paper also claims that although some central aspects of the concern about extortion might be pursued in terms of the entitlements of future generations, this approach is likely to be incomplete. In particular, intergenerational extortion raises issues about the appropriate limits to the sway of central values such as welfare and distributive justice. We should be wary of ways in which such values invite us to buy off, or perhaps to join, an intergenerational climate Mafia.

Pluralist egalitarians think that luck and relational egalitarianism each articulates a component in a pluralist account of egalitarian justice. However, this ecumenical view appears problematic in the light of Elizabeth Anderson’s claim that the divide arises because two incompatible views of justification are in play, which in turn generates derivative disagreements – e.g. about the proper currency of egalitarian justice. In support of pluralist egalitarianism I argue that two of Anderson’s derivative disagreements are not rooted in the disagreement over justification she identifies, and that the disagreement over justification cuts across standard disagreements between luck and relational egalitarian justice.

McCabe and Turner raise a number of perceptive points concerning my treatment of John Stuart Mill's political economy of progress and its relation to socialism. In giving context to their points this article first tries to clarify Mill's understanding of socialism as anchored in his positive classical economics. Mill the utilitarian philosopher endorses socialism, but he anticipates its arrival based on his materialist understanding of history. In this materialist context, the article argues that Mill expects the economy of worker cooperatives to advance from one focused on relational equality to one focused on luck egalitarianism. This shift is again supported by Mill's own utilitarian principles, but it is ultimately the product of what he anticipates will be the political economy of the cooperative mode of production.

The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can’t be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what’s known as the neutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid this objection are unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete.