The Introduction sets the scene by describing the relevance of the idea of a symbiotic relationship between competition and democracy in the history of competition law and the contemporary policy debate. It identifies the gap in the literature, explains the research question and the purpose of the book, and presents the argument of the book in a nutshell. It starts with the observation that the idea of a link between competition and democracy is a recurrent theme in US and EU competition law. However, existing scholarship has so far struggled to clearly explain what the relationship between competition and democracy actually consists of. This knowledge gap is filled by this book which provides a clear, conceptually sound, and surprising answer to this research question. It argues that the idea of competition–democracy nexus is grounded in a republican understanding of liberty as non-domination which can be traced back to the political thought of the Ancient Roman republic and fundamentally differs from our contemporary negative concept of liberty as non-interference. The purpose of the book is to demonstrate how this republican concept of liberty explains the idea of a competition–democracy nexus in US and EU competition law.

This chapter summarises the main findings of the book and the trajectory of republican liberty as the central element of the competition–democracy nexus. The chapter also explores proposals for how the competition–democracy can be revived to allow competition law to address the contemporary challenges of industry concentration and the rise of corporate power. The chapter discusses different avenues towards a competition–democracy nexus 4.0 that would realign competition law with the parameters of republican antitrust. The chapter also casts light on the hard policy choices one such reform would involve.

This paper provides a framework for evaluating policy proposals aimed at invigorating competition and improving corporate governance amid a high and increasing level of common ownership of product market competitors. In particular, I propose that any effective proposal must have the effect of separating the level at which diversification is achieved from the level at which corporate governance is exercised. Several extant proposals are likely to have that effect. I also discuss conceptual breakthroughs on several issues that regulators and industry stakeholders considered necessary to address before changing policy, including (i) the joint recognition of vertical and horizontal common ownership links, (ii) agency problems, (iii) informational and organizational frictions, (iv) methods to infer causality, (v) a better understanding of how investors portfolio choice depends on firms’ strategic interactions, and (vi) improving data quality.