In an era marked by the ‘technologization’ of modern warfare and the privatization of military supply chains, numerous items possess dual-use potential, capable of serving both civilian and military ends. Concurrently, governments increasingly view the acquisition of specific goods, materials, services, and technologies by rival states as a threat to their security. As a result, economic restrictions imposed on dual-use items, including export controls, have proliferated in recent years. These measures have elicited concerns regarding disguised protectionism and potential non-compliance with trade agreements. Central to the debate is the difficulty to strike a balance between addressing legitimate security imperatives and preventing economic protectionism. This article delves into the intersection of trade and security in the regulation of dual-use goods. It offers a focused examination of Article XXI(b)(ii) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) concerning trade restrictions on products destined for military use. The paper first reveals limitations of this provision in governing the regulation of dual-use items. Furthermore, it introduces the concept of a ‘purpose test’ provided by the provision as a safeguard against abusive invocation. Lastly, it sheds light on the challenge posed by the standard of proof issue, which complicates the review and mitigation of bad-faith invocations of security exceptions.

This article examines the determination of cultural objects as “national treasures” in the United Kingdom and proposes a heretofore unidentified theoretical space in which such designations are made. Utilizing Foucauldian genealogies of the museum posited by both Tony Bennett and Eilean Hooper-Greenhill as a frame for spaces in which cultural and national identities are curated (which some commentators suggest are outdated, but prove very helpful in the current enterprise), this article develops the argument that designations of items as “national treasures” are made within a specific institutional space – hereinafter termed the “National Treasure Space.” Through the interpretation of the object in this institutional space, it is possible to characterize it as other than the sum of its parts; certain aspects of the object that exist when it is outside of this space are suspended once it is within. As a result, the problematic determination of the object as a national treasure is exacerbated, impacting important relational elements of the object to its owner(s) (both private and public) and the understanding of the object as significant in its representation of the nation.

While Japanese business interests support the export of high-technology items and the transfer of technology from Japan to China, these economically motivated actions may have direct and indirect impacts on Japan's national security. First, the transfer of dual-use technology to China may directly help China's military buildup. Second, high-tech exports and technology transfers may have an indirect effect by eroding Japan's technological advantages vis-à-vis China. In this article I place these concerns into a historical context and analyze the current challenges to Japan's export control policies. I offer an overview of the Japan-China trade relationship, with a special focus on high-tech trade. I then discuss changes in Japan's export controls regarding China, based on heightened security concerns. Evidence indicates that the Japanese government is ill equipped to deal with “technology leakage,” which is accelerating the erosion of Japan's technological supremacy and is not covered by its current export control regime.

Technological ties between Israel and China have always been a central and constant element of their relationship. Defense contracts played a leading role here but were also responsible for the severe crisis that erupted between the countries in the early 2000s after Israel, capitulating to US pressure, backed off from its commitment to provide China with military technologies. This not only forced Israel to sever its defense relations with China but also made US-Israel relations a principal factor in the Sino-Israeli connection and imposed tight constraints on Israel's technology transfers to China generally. For Israel, this placed the dilemma of commercial versus political and national security interests at the forefront, since technology connections allowed it to promote its economic, political, and strategic causes through China. Indeed, while technology ties between the states have not stopped entirely—they have shifted to the civilian sphere—technology transfers to China are subject to heavy limitations, and Israel's export control mechanism faces greater challenges to screen them. As China's economic and political influence is ever increasing, Israel's cautious approach to technology transfers to China may be expected to come under mounting pressure.