We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The involvement of unhealthy commodity corporations in health policy and research has been identified as an important commercial determinant contributing to the rise of non-communicable diseases. In the USA, health professional associations have been subject to corporate influence. This study explores the interactions between corporations and the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics (AND), and their implications for the profession in the USA and globally.
Design:
We conducted an inductive analysis of documents (2014–2020) obtained through freedom of information requests, to assess key AND actors’ dealings with food, pharmaceutical and agribusiness corporations. We also triangulated this information with publicly available data.
Setting:
The USA.
Participants:
Not applicable.
Results:
The AND, AND Foundation (ANDF) and its key leaders have ongoing interactions with corporations. These include AND’s leaders holding key positions in multinational food, pharmaceutical or agribusiness corporations, and AND accepting corporate financial contributions. We found the AND has invested funds in corporations such as Nestlé, PepsiCo and pharmaceutical companies, has discussed internal policies to fit industry needs and has had public positions favouring corporations.
Conclusion:
The documents reveal a symbiotic relationship between the AND, its Foundation and corporations. Corporations assist the AND and ANDF with financial contributions. AND acts as a pro-industry voice in some policy venues, and with public positions that clash with AND’s mission to improve health globally.
In this chapter, I explain how fear of a public backlash shapes how companies engage in the political system. I outline a probabilistic chain of events that can lead from a company engaging in advocacy to being noticed and criticized by activists, to that criticism spurring a larger public response, to eventual damage to a company’s brand and reputation. Certain attributes of companies and advocacy strategies change the probability of each of these events happening, which means that (a) some companies are inherently more vulnerable than others and (b) companies can take intentional steps to reduce these probabilities in order to engage in advocacy while skirting damage. This chapter produces a set of expectations I test in the remainder of the book – that public backlash to corporate advocacy is a form of political speech and signaling rather than a statement about consumer behavior; that companies fear this backlash and “boycotts” primarily because of fear of brand damage, not necessarily sales; and that companies engage in particular strategies to either hide their political advocacy or defuse the public anger over it.
There are concerns that some non-profit organisations, financed by the food industry, promote industry positions in research and policy materials. Using Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, we test the proposition that the International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI), one prominent non-for profit in international health and nutrition research, promotes industry positions.
Design:
U.S. Right to Know filed five FOI from 2015 to 2018 covering communications with researchers at four US institutions: Texas A&M, University of Illinois, University of Colorado and North Carolina State University. It received 15 078 pages, which were uploaded to the University of California San Francisco’s Industry Documents Library. We searched the Library exploring it thematically for instances of: (1) funding research activity that supports industry interests; (2) publishing and promoting industry-sponsored positions or literature; (3) disseminating favourable material to decision makers and the public and (4) suppressing views that do not support industry.
Results:
Available emails confirmed that ILSI’s funding by corporate entities leads to industry influence over some of ILSI activities. Emails reveal a pattern of activity in which ILSI sought to exploit the credibility of scientists and academics to bolster industry positions and promote industry-devised content in its meetings, journal and other activities. ILSI also actively seeks to marginalise unfavourable positions.
Conclusions:
We conclude that undue influence of industry through third-party entities like ILSI requires enhanced management of conflicts of interest by researchers. We call for ILSI to be recognised as a private sector entity rather than an independent scientific non-profit, to allow for more appropriate appraisal of its outputs and those it funds.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.