This chapter analyzes the relationship between entrepreneurs and capitalists. It argues that the function of capitalists is to select entrepreneurs, and without capitalists there would be no entrepreneurs. The government can replace neither entrepreneurs nor capitalists. State-owned enterprises cannot produce entrepreneurs. The chapter also discusses corporate governance. Existing corporate governance theories focus exclusively on conflicts of interests between investors or shareholders and operators. In fact, there are two types of conflicts. One is the conflict of interests, and the other is the conflict of cognitions. Given that the future is uncertain and indeterminate, and that different people have different imagination and judgements, the conflict of cognitions is more challenging than the conflict of interests. The best corporate governance structure allows entrepreneurship to play the biggest role, as opposed to incentivizing and disciplining professional managers. The legal rules of corporate governance must be general, flexible, and entrepreneur friendly.

This chapter discusses the place of conflict in transitional justice. Building on a range of historical real-life examples, it argues that conflict is an important rather than incidental part of many, if not all, transitional justice processes. The chapter initially focuses on value conflicts and then turns to conflicts of interests (political power, offices, money, etc.). Drawing on recent realist work in political theory, the chapter argues that it is time to give politics its due and idealisation a rest in transitional justice. This is not an argument against ideals, but against an approach that is idealistic in the wrong sense, in such a way as to suppress, erase from view, real experiences of conflict. Towards the end, the chapter explores recent attempts in the transitional justice literature to take conflict more seriously, particularly Christine Bell’s account of transitional justice as bargaining.