This chapter will examine how a transdisciplinary approach to curriculum design provides a context for the development of intercultural awareness, fosters conceptual understanding and places the learner at the heart of the educational experience. A theoretical basis for transdisciplinary learning will first be presented. This will be followed by an analysis of the nature of the individual in the learning process and how this relates to the development of a global mindset. The chapter will conclude by offering practical considerations for the planning, teaching and assessing of learning through a transdisciplinary approach.

The introduction outlines the volume’s main impetus: to encourage historians, global and not, to reflect on ‘their daily task’, as Marc Bloch put it – on their methods, craftsmanship, and conceptual basics. It is an invitation to rethink the field’s forms of inquiry and argumentation and the tacit assumptions underlying its practice, at a time when the ground under global historians’ feet – with globalisation in crisis – is moving fast.

Global history and other relational approaches to history, the introduction holds, have methodological implications and require theoretical reflection: because many of the classic analytical instruments commonly employed by historians require some reduction of complexity – to explain, to periodise, or to compare – a task naturally more difficult when scholars deal with an unusual abundance of factors; because the field’s assault on Eurocentrism requires reflection on the matter of perspective and authorial vantage point; or, indeed, because of the field’s inherent teleology, with its understanding of history inseparable from the telos of continuously increasing global integration.

The chapter ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on Concepts’ by Frans A. J. de Haas takes up another aspect of concept theory, that is, the endeavour to define what a concept is. Furthermore, he explores the interactions between the Peripatetics and the Stoics, as they are evidenced by Alexander, on ontological as well as psychological and epistemological issues. De Haas also offers a systematic study of part of Alexander’s rich vocabulary denoting concepts, thoughts, and universals, and of a correspondingly rich collection of verbs referring to the human activities of abstracting or constructing concepts. Importantly, this analysis sheds light on Alexander’s understanding of ennoia and noêma, and on Alexander’s views concerning the epistemic reliability of concepts and the unity of concepts in the human soul.

“Staging The Magic Flute” examines the production history of Mozart’s opera over more than two centuries, from its 1791 premiere to 2019. It focuses especially on productions of The Magic Flute since 1970 and the critical reactions they have provoked, and asks if there can ever be a definitive staging of this iconic work. Productions discussed in detail range from Barrie Kosky’s radical “silent movie” version for the Komische Oper Berlin to August Everding and David McVicar’s long-running fairytale-Enlightenment stagings for (respectively) the Bavarian State Opera and The Royal Opera. Among the many other directors and designers discussed are Marc Chagall, Ingmar Bergman, David Hockney, Peter Sellars, Pierre Audi, Julie Taymor, Peter Stein, and Simon McBurney.

In this chapter, I explore the role of the concept of inner purposiveness in the final section of Hegel’s Logic and also the Philosophy of Nature. Hegel defends the claim that the concept is meaningfully applied to living organisms, particularly animals. The concept is actually used precisely where we should expect it, given the argument of ‘Teleology’, both when talking about the internal organisation of animals in parts-organs and when talking about the self-repair or regeneration processes by which they stay alive. By contrast, the concept no longer dominates the description of the natural process that Hegel designates ‘process of the genus’ (or ‘generic process’), in which he considers that natural life is ultimately submitted to externality. I argue that this application and lack of application taken together confirm my views on ‘Teleology’.

This stage of the journey focuses on concepts as candidates for word meaning. It contains a discussion of several versions of the mentalistic/representational approach to word meaning, also assessing them for candidacy for a general theory of meaning in language that covers words, sentences, utterances, and discourses, pursued in the upcoming stages. It foregrounds the role of context in determining lexical content and the associated ‘food for thought’ questions.

This chapter considers Hegel's treatment of the further subtopics of traditional logic, concept, judgment and syllogism. It demonstrates how Hegel resolves the logocentric predicament by deriving the subject matter of logic, and its diverse forms, from a more primative foundation that does not already presuppose them. It aso considers the alternative views of Kreines and Stern and the role of empiricism in Hegel's system and of Ancient and modern forms of skepticism.

This overview chapter introduces philosophical tools that can be used to aid managers in making decisions in situations which go beyond simple cost/benefit analyses. Value terms such as right, wrong, fair, justice, beneficence, responsibility, eco-consciousness, and discrimination are discussed and illustrated using real-world examples. Starting with the world’s worst industrial disaster in Bhopal, India and the contemporary aftermath, it examines the complexities such situations present and assesses the usefulness of creating a theoretical framework that can lead to principled and defensible policies and actions. The challenges of exclusive self-interest and ethical relativism are examined, where morality simply echoes personal preference. Immediate profit maximization is compared to a more subtle long-term and more encompassing stakeholder approach. Reliance on the law is shown to be an insufficient ethical guide, while principle-based approaches that can be applied across a wide range of cases are more successful in working out what we should do in novel and difficult situations.

This chapter discusses one of the most basic putative cognitive kinds, concept, arguing that it should be considered a real kind based on our current state of knowledge, contrary to what some philosophers have urged. After surveying empirical work on concepts in cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology, the chapter tries to show that this work is pitched at different levels of explanation. Much recent work on concepts using neuroimaging techniques should not be expected to reveal the neural correlates of concepts because the research has different explananda and is investigating different causal processes. Other work on concepts in cognitive science reveals psychological structures (prototypes) associated mainly with automatic processing rather than deliberative reasoning. By contrast, concepts proper can be understood as functional kinds, which are individuated partly etiologically and partly with reference to the thinker’s discriminatory and inferential abilities. Many research programs in cognitive science individuate concepts in this way, combining diachronic and synchronic factors.

Humans have two kinds of beliefs, intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. Intuitive beliefs are a fundamental category of cognition, defined in the architecture of the mind. They are formulated in an intuitive mental lexicon. Humans are also capable of entertaining an indefinite variety of higher-order or "reflective" propositional attitudes, many of which are of a credal sort. Reasons to hold reflective beliefs are provided by other beliefs that describe the source of the reflective belief as reliable, or that provide an explicit argument in favour of the reflective belief. The mental lexicon of reflective beliefs includes not only intuitive, but also reflective concepts.

To the extent that we can make education a science, we will gain some power to predict future directions for educational improvements. This chapter begins with quotations from some famous people that indicate that in the past, we have not learned from our mistakes. If we can succeed in creating a viable science of education and apply this in all educational settings, we may change the course of history in a positive way. This chapter presents a critique of some of the things we have done, and a description of more promising alternatives.

The chapter begins with a description of the first chance experience that shaped the future of my career, a meeting with a former Cornell PhD student, Bruce Dunn, who was interested in collaborating on research and invited me to do a sabbatical leave at the University of West Florida in 1987-1988. This in turn led to conversation with Dunn’s friend, Kenneth Ford, a new faculty member interested in artificial intelligence. We found that the use of concept mapping was highly facilitated for capturing expert knowledge in a fashion that rendered the knowledge easily applied in artificial intelligence settings. Ford became the director of the Institute for Human and Machine Cognition (IHMC) and he invited his friend, Alberto Cañas, to serve as associate director and to lead a team to create computer software for making concept maps electronically. We soon had available to us software that would work on almost any computer and that would not only allow the construction of concept maps, but also permit attaching digital resources to any map that could be accessed by simply clicking on icons on individual concepts. The software suite created became known as CmapTools, and this software suite is now used all over the world in virtually every field where organized knowledge is important.

In part to illustrate the slow progress in secondary school facilities and programs, I introduce findings from a study done some 50 years ago. Most of the positive changes that occurred in the last 100 years are the result of an occasional creative administrator or school leader. To the best of my knowledge, none of these innovations were introduced on the basis of a comprehensive theory of education. I present evidence to suggest that this situation is changing.

The chapter begins by addressing the question: Why do young children learn so quickly? The short answer is that they are learning names for objects and events they are experiencing directly. These words are concept labels and they are engaged in what we call meaningful learning. In contrast, school learning is too often rote learning where the concepts and principles children are learning are not related to direct experiences with objects and events. David Ausubel’s cognitive psychology was introduced in 1963 and we immediately applied this new psychology as the foundation for all of our future work. We rejected totally the behavioral psychology that had dominated the field of education for some one hundred years. We also rejected positivist epistemology in favor of the emerging constructivist epistemology. It was not until the late 1980s that cognitive psychology and constructivist epistemology became widely adopted.

This chapter opens with the question: Can education become a science? I seek to answer to answer this question by asserting that education is a human activity and like any other human activity, it can be studied scientifically. This means that we can construct concepts, principles, and theories that explain how human beings acquire, use, and construct new knowledge. A comprehensive theory of education must address the question of the nature of knowledge and how human beings build new knowledge, and how to organize education to facilitate these processes. I argue that the major problem with education in the past has been the use of faulty theories of learning and invalid theories of knowledge and knowledge creation, resulting in inadequate instructional practices.

The logic of the Concept has three parts. The first (“The subjective concept”) examines (apparently following the divisions of traditional logic) the concept as-it-is, the types of judgement and the reasoning (“syllogism”) constructed from judgements; but the notions of judgement and syllogistic reasoning are as deeply transformed as that of the concept itself. Far from any formal approach, how thought informs reality should be examined. The second part (“The object”) examines how this conceptual shaping of the real happens. It occurs at three levels, seemingly corresponding to the great divisions of classical science: mechanism, chemism, teleology. The third part concerns “the idea”, a notion that is completely transformed, being defined as “the absolute unity of the [subjective] concept and objectivity” (Encyclopedia §213). Hegel describes how subjectivity and objectivity, thought and reality, interfere, to the extent that it becomes impossible to separate them, except at the cost of a great abstraction, that of the “understanding”. Hegel calls this interpenetration of thought and being the “absolute idea”, thus redefining the terms in which philosophy had hitherto been thought.