O presente artigo tem por objetivo demonstrar as relações transimperiais no extremo sul da América, entre os anos de 1722 e 1726, considerando as alianças das autoridades da América portuguesa, da espanhola, com as do reino e com os homens de negócio. Nessa perspectiva, como metodologia, tratou-se da análise da administração governativa de Pedro António de Vasconcelos, incluindo as indicações que fez para a ocupação de postos na alfândega criada na região, instituição da qual era autoridade máxima. Examinou-se, também, cartas, requerimentos, ordens, relação, verbetes de diversos agentes da administração, plantas e tratados, documentos que foram localizados nos arquivos brasileiros (Arquivo Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro), argentino (Arquivo Nacional de La Nación Argentina), portugueses (Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino) e espanhol (Arquivo Geral das Indias). Tendo em vista os aspectos observados, a governação na Colônia do Sacramento deve ser entendida como uma forma de garantia de trânsito, circulação de informações e de contatos de diferentes grupos sociais no sul da América.

This article explores the financial and geopolitical networks behind the independence of Gran Colombia. It shows that the failure to obtain official British government support for independence was compensated for by the development of a network of private individuals and partnerships that supplied large quantities of arms, equipment and men. A Colombian government document granting ‘Powers’ to London intermediaries was crucial to the construction of this network. We analyse who the key players were and how the network operated. By exploring the decisions and actions of merchants through the lens of risk, trust, credit and networks, we provide a fresh insight into the wider process of independence in Gran Colombia.

Revisionist historians have convincingly argued that Spanish American independence was not the result of simmering grievances that galvanised a national or Creole identity against Spain. Instead, this scholarship insists that Spanish American national identities did not exist at the time and that independence was an unforeseen process that must be understood in the context of the Napoleonic invasion of Iberia. But, if independence was undesirable before 1808 and if national identities arose at a latter period, how do we explain the early independence projects of ‘precursors’ like Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmán? By contextually reconstructing the logic behind Viscardo's projects, this article offers a new perspective on the intellectual conditions of possibility for Spanish American independence. It argues that though he certainly identified as a Creole from Peru, Viscardo actually deployed an Enlightenment global science of commerce, not Creole patriotism or nationalism, to legitimate Spanish American independence.

Literature published a decade ago reflected a pessimistic view of the market-oriented reforms that Latin America carried out in the 1980s and 1990s, and many politicians have attacked these reforms openly. Indeed, the atmosphere is so negative that it would be reasonable to assume that many of the reforms have been reversed. This paper will take a new look at the situation ten years later. Our argument is that the reforms have generally not been reversed. The reversal that has occurred has been with respect to privatisation in a few countries; negative public opinion is also concentrated on privatisation; and the reforms helped to enable Latin America to take advantage of favourable conditions leading to high growth in the 2004–8 boom period and a relatively strong performance during the 2008–9 crisis. While much remains to be done to raise growth and improve distribution, objective information about the reforms is needed when policies for the future are made.

China's rapid growth and increased integration with the global economy over the past three decades have significant economic impacts and political implications for Latin America. This paper reviews the debate over whether these impacts have on balance been positive or negative for the region. It argues that those who emphasise the positive economic impacts of China have been over-optimistic and underplay some of the negative impacts associated with Chinese competition in manufacturing and increasing Latin American specialisation in primary products. On the other hand, when focusing on the political dimensions, there has been a tendency to exaggerate both the extent of China's influence in the region and the fears to which this gives rise, particularly among US commentators.

In this paper the economic performance of post-independence Latin America is assessed in comparative perspective. The release from the colonial fiscal burden was partly offset by higher costs of self-government, while the opening of independent Latin American countries to the international economy represented a handmaiden of growth. Regional disparities increased after independence, so generalisations about the region's long-run behaviour are not straightforward. However, on average, per capita income grew in Latin America, and although the region fell behind compared with the United States and Western Europe, it improved or maintained its position relative to the rest of the world. Thus the term ‘lost decades’ appears an unwarranted depiction of the period between 1820 and 1870.