Political democratization does not necessarily lead to democratic policing; rather, authoritarian legacy always poses a challenge for the integration between democracy and coercive policing. This chapter presents a case study of Taiwan to unveil such authoritarian legacy. After its democratization in the late 1980s, Taiwan has been gradually transformed its authoritarian policing into democratic policing subject to judicial review. However, as Taiwan’s peaceful democratic transition did not come with radical political changes, authoritarian legacy persists and continues to affect policing practices. Nonetheless, throughout both authoritarian and democratic periods, the police in Taiwan have obtained strong legitimacy and been perceived as one of the most trustworthy government agencies. As such, questions to explore in this chapter include: Why has authoritarian policing been this adaptive in Taiwan? How has the coexistence between authoritarian legacy and liberal democracy been made possible? What are the impacts on democratic governance and efficacy of legal reforms?

This chapter examines narrative management as a core function of the police in Vietnam, tracing how this function evolved as an intimate expression of the regime’s politics and ideologies. Narrative management here refers to efforts by policing institutions to guide public opinion in accordance with the vision set forth by the party-state—a practice with a long tradition in socialist regimes. While much has been written about the hard measures of coercion, crackdowns, and punishment that are prevalent in authoritarian policing (and, arguably, in all policing), less is known about the soft public relations campaigns that play a sizable role in the work of Vietnamese policing institutions. The close relationship between the party-state, police, and civil society, down to the household and individual levels, is multifaceted. As analyzed herein, while police work on ideological education is deeply rooted in a desire to control civil society, the Vietnamese police’s grassroots service throughout the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates that a close state–society relationship can also be used for a productive end when the state acts with legitimacy and transparency.

This chapter investigates affinities between Bolsonarismo (the discourse of groups supporting Jair Bolsonaro’s government and ideas) and Lavajatismo (the discourse of groups supporting the Lava Jato investigation) both online and offline from 2015 to 2019. The analysis shows the links between the denial of rights, the push for accountability through the courts, and the far right, combining two original data sources. First, semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of the so-called verde e amarelos (“green and yellow”) during mass anti-corruption demonstrations in 2015 and 2017. Participants at these rallies were characterized by the use of the Brazilian yellow jersey as a symbol of nationalism, “anti-communism,” and anti-corruption. Second, the results are presented of a lexical analysis of 13,800 posts on Facebook pages supporting Lava Jato, between April 2016 to February 2019. This period included former President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment, former President Luiz Inácio “Lula” Da Silva’s imprisonment, and Jair Bolsonaro’s rise to power.

This chapter proposes a theory of legal instrumentalism – contextually, a more explanatory framework than either Marxist or Confucian legal theories – to explain the function and role of law in Chinese society. This kind of instrumentalism, which differs from the debate over this theory in the Anglo-American tradition, is situated in China’s authoritarian regime, where a primary concern is the maintenance of political stability through strengthening authoritarian legality for the ruler. On this premise, economic development, as well as other social goals – such as efficiency of the government – for which the law can undoubtedly be placed in an instrumental position may become a priority in the ruler’s political agenda. When it comes to dispute resolution, the primary matter of concern is not the achievement of the formalist justice of Western tradition via either a formal or informal process but rather the settlement of disputes for which the law primarily plays a facilitative role as a tool, regardless of what strategies it may use. Instrumentalism of this kind, which is suitable for Chinese society both culturally and historically, shows that law is visible and does matter in China, although it cannot be completely understood through the lens of other legal traditions.

This chapter discusses the background, thesis, significance and implications of researching the theme of the sources of Chinese law in both comparative and Chinese legal scholarship. It also identifies the significant components of positive law in China’s legislative system and provides a general overview of China’s legislative system, along with the theoretical claims and interdisciplinary analysis involved in the detailed discussion presented in the following chapters.

Support for a common cause typically engenders a high degree of collegiality amongst lawyers but, even when united in pursuit of a political goal, closer examination tends to reveal internal divisions along the familiar fault-lines of race, ethnicity, class, age, and gender. Reflecting on what Jessie Bernard refers to as the ‘stag effect’ in much of the existing literature on cause lawyers – a disproportionate focus on the activities of men and ‘masculine’ causes – this chapter places a particular spotlight on gender. It draws mainly (though not exclusively) on interviews with female lawyers to explore personal motivation; paradoxical opportunities; the gendered consequences associated with ‘taking on’ legal work; how gender intersects with other variables for women lawyers in such contexts; and the ways in which gender equality is imagined and sometimes manipulated by the state during periods of conflict, authoritarianism and transition. In the final section, we reflect on how the women lawyers we interviewed asserted their agency in the face of significant structural and gendered constraints.

The transition of Taiwan’s authoritarian legality transformed not only the authoritarian rulers’ strategic commitment to law, but also the authoritarian regime itself. The experience of this transition resonates with those in other parts of the world in that civic activism is necessary for the transformation of authoritarian legality. This chapter suggests that student activism is one crucial dimension for understanding the dynamics of the authoritarian legality transition in Taiwan. Student activism in Taiwan is higher law-centric, institutionalized, and dialectic, with collaborative efforts across generations within and outside the legal system and the state apparatus. It blurs the boundary between the state and society as well as the one between social and student movements. However, common to many young democracies, this transition mechanism appears to be a slippery slope to populism, and thereby paradoxically weakens the function of positive law and the legislative body, especially amid heavily polarized politics. The post-transition struggles in this young democracy are similar to the democratic crises nowadays in the USA and Europe, where populism, divided society, and a growing tide of discontent toward liberalism and democracy have significantly diminished the functions of liberal and democratic legal institutions.

Since Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012, the party-state has moved to increase its control over virtually every important element of Chinese public life, including the media, the Internet, academia, civil society organizations, rights activists and lawyers, the legal profession, and arts and culture. The crackdown on civil society has been particularly damaging. Many of the top rights advocacy organizations in China have been targeted: some have been forced to scale back their work, while others have been shut down. In other words, whereas in the past, the party was willing to tolerate some degree of activity outside of party-sanctioned zones, it now wants a less crowded playing field, one in which it plays a larger role. At the same time, the CCP has also sought to tightly constrict foreign influences. Whereas law was once seen as a tool to facilitate foreign engagement in China, it is increasingly being used to control – or even block – international engagement that the Party sees as problematic. The passage of the Foreign NGO Law, which heavily regulates the activities of international NGOs and foundations, represents a new chapter of China’s engagement, both with domestic civil society, and with the international community.

Authoritarian legality is widespread, diverse, and enduring in East Asia. This chapter first addresses definitions of authoritarian legality in East Asia. Authoritarian legality falls between liberal rule of law and lawless autocracy. Cases include Hong Kong, Singapore, and more indisputably authoritarian polities in the region. Although exhibiting considerable variation, East Asian authoritarian regimes generally score relatively high in rule-of-law metrics and share several regionally distinctive legal–political characteristics.This chapter then turns to the paradox of why authoritarian rulers and regimes in East Asia would incur the risks and costs associated with increases in, or relatively high levels of, legality. It considers several functions that legality can perform for authoritarian rulers, and discusses examples from historical and contemporary East Asian cases: managing threats to order and security; fostering economic development; strengthening state capacity; legitimating authoritarian rule; and responding to demand for greater legality (from society and from elites, including within the regime).Finally, the chapter considers possible future trajectories for authoritarian legality in East Asia, again drawing on past and current examples: resilience and adaptation; transformation to democratic legality; regime political and legal decay; authoritarianism without legality; and lingering elements of authoritarian legality in a democratized polity.