This chapter considers the interaction of the Security Council with other international organizations in relation to the use of force and the role that international organizations may play in implementing Council authorizations to use force. This is an area where the Security Council, the international organizations concerned, and member states have shown great flexibility, with the provisions of the UN Charter (both Chapter VII and Chapter VIII) and of the constituent instruments of the regional and other organizations being developed through extensive practice. A difficult question, however, arises where member states grant regional organizations the authority to carry out such interventions without the target state’s consent to the specific action and without Council authorization, in particualr in light of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. The chapter concludes that it cannot be said that Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act or similar provisions allow for the use of force without Security Council authorization. The Council remains the body vested by member states with the power to authorize ‘enforcement action’.

This chapter focuses specifically on the Council’s contribution to the international law on the use of force (the jus ad bellum), an area of international law that is central to the Security Council’s role in the maintenance of international peace and security and the collective security system of the United Nations. The chapter addresses, first, the general state of the rules of international law on the use of force (the jus ad bellum). It then outlines the rules themselves. This is followed by sections relating directly to the Security Council: the prohibition of the use of force; the use of force by or authorized by the Council; the Council and the right of self-defence; and the Council and ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘responsibility to protect’.

This chapter advances the argument that religious and ethical reasoning have a role to play in policy debates about patent law, and also in some patent law cases. We begin at the most general level, by arguing that in democratic, pluralist societies, moral and religious argument have a legitimate contribution to make to public discourse tout court. We then make a case for the relevance of religious and moral deliberation for patent law in particular, given that inventions and new technologies that seek patent protection sometimes have significant repercussions for wider society, and patent protection is a way of encouraging and supporting their development. We also consider ways in which religion and ethics might be said to count as relevant evidence not only in patent policy debates, but also in patent proceedings. We address this against the background of the ‘politics of knowledge’ that has arisen in Europe and the United States, and include reference to the explicit immorality exclusion found in European patent legal systems. Given that the interpretation and application of the immorality exclusion has been controversial with lawyers, we finally propose an alternative, potentially more fruitful approach to the exclusion, treating it as a ‘policy lever’.

Article 53 of the European Patent Convention prohibits the grant of patents for plant or animal varieties and for inventions whose commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality. These provisions are therefore both criteria for the grant of patents and grounds for opposing granted patents. The interpretation of these provisions and their application to particular cases lies ultimately in the hands of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office which have considered both patent applications and oppositions against granted patents on these grounds. This chapter begins with a summary of the law, the procedure for opposing patents on these grounds and the principal decisions in this field. It then reviews the manner in which opponents of patents other than commercial parties – such as pressure groups, political parties and churches – have organised themselves as opponents. Lastly, it considers how these non-commercial opponents have conducted their cases, their degree of success, whether they could do more to question the grant of life form patents – and whether, as the author considers they should, churches and other organisations with ethical credentials should actively question life form patents.