This chapter discusses the impact of particular policies at the global level. It turns out that coordination and common standards can make a big difference. First, it is shown that the global traceability of minerals can cut rebel funding significantly. Next, the role of monitoring multinationals is highlighted. Notably, recent studies have pinpointed the importance of corporate social responsibility of mining firms, revealing that the best-run mineral extractors may have a beneficial impact on the local population, while poorly run firms yield disastrous outcomes. Further, given that wars tend to trigger a series of vicious cycles, there is a powerful case for facilitating refugee admission. It is discussed how a well-coordinated refugee policy can reduce violence perpetuation over future generations. Next, we investigate what role international trade can play for fostering peace and what harmful effects arms trade can entail. It is shown how arms-producing countries can – without bearing large economic costs – reduce the ability of bad regimes to attack their civilians. Finally, the importance of a rule-based international order and a well-managed green transition is highlighted.

Chapter 5 looks at Chinese coercion regarding Taiwan, involving foreign arms sales to Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995 and 1996. China used moderate coercion measures toward the United States over arms sales to Taiwan until 2008. The cost-balancing theory does not perfectly explain the 1992 case of US weapons sales to Taiwan, which instead highlighted economic concerns. As for the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, China escalated to militarized coercion, the magnitude of which was the greatest among all cases of Chinese coercion concerning territorial disputes, Taiwan, and Tibet in the post-Cold War era, because Taiwan is a “core interest.” This chapter demonstrates the significance of the issue importance variable in issues involving Taiwan and shows that the cost-balancing theory travels beyond territorial disputes. This suggests that because Taiwan continues to be one of China’s core interests, it is highly likely China will resort to military coercion again in the future. In particular, if Taiwan decides to pursue judiciary independence, then it is highly likely that China will resort to military coercion, or even the use of force.

The 1958 Middle East crisis led to a change in the relations between the United States and Israel. The Eisenhower administration looked at Israel as a strategic ally in a region that fell under the sway of the Soviet Union. Hesitantly, the seeds for strategic cooperation between the two nations were being sown. The deepening strategic ties between the two nations led the American recognition that the Arab–Israeli conflict was conflated with the Cold War. Consequently, the United States recognized that Israel needed arms in order to maintain its strength whilst facing an Arab military challenge due to the Soviet military support for the Arab states. In a gradual process that began with President Eisenhower and culminated with President Lyndon Johnson, the United States became Israel’s main arm supplier. The 1967 June War further deepened the attachment between the two nations. Evangelicals cherished what they saw as the fulfilment of the prophecies about the restoration of the Jewish state, and the American people and politicians viewed the Israeli victory as additional proof of the Israelis’ high spirit and capabilities, especially when compared to the failing war in Vietnam. For Israel, which came to control more territories, the war provided an additional opportunity to deliver its messages to the United States through tourism diplomacy. The war also forced Israel to contemplate its place in the Middle East, with peace becoming a more plausible option.

This chapter analyzes the political debates in the United States about arms sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. When the United States “lost Iran” in 1979, the presidential administrations of Jimmy Carter and then Ronald Reagan identified regional instability as a threat to the security of the oil-rich Persian Gulf and “global economic health.” Both administrations turned to arms sales as a means to secure alliances in the face of American vulnerability. In this context, the burgeoning military sales relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia arrived through an Iranian workshop. Congressional debates about the sale of fighter jets and AWACS to both nations, as well as the corporate lobbying of the Bechtel Corporation, reveal important logical columns in this shift to a more aggressive foreign policy based on military relationships: the link between economic growth and US Cold War legitimacy, the importance of military sales to the US domestic economy, and the crucial place of weapons transfers in good relations with the ruling monarchies in Iran and then Saudi Arabia. When it came to the regional security of the Middle East and secure flows of its oil, this was the time when military force began to become the premier instrument of US diplomacy for a new global age.