To what extent can de facto states act autonomously vis-à-vis their patron states and domestic societies? This article draws on theories of clientelism in international relations to develop a novel argument explaining the agency of de facto states. Examining two strategic triangles—Russia–Transnistria–Moldova and US–Taiwan–China—it demonstrates that interrelated domestic factors such as robust political competition, democratic pluralism, reimagined national identities, and big business shape the autonomy of de facto states in Eastern Europe and East Asia. Furthermore, the structured focused comparison of Transnistria and Taiwan indicates that the agency of de facto states declines when rising parent states and dissatisfied patron states challenge the status quo, engaging in great power competition. Their autonomy varies across areas of low and high politics, as patron states prioritize military-security issues and interfere less in the economic and cultural affairs of the de facto states.

In 2006, the authorities of the de facto state of Transnistria unilaterally held a sovereignty referendum. Almost all voters supported Transnistria gaining internationally recognized independence and subsequently integrating/associating with Russia. Despite such clear results, the poll was not recognized internationally and, consequently, not implemented. However, this was not a problem for the Transnistrian leadership, since the primary objective of the referendum was not to reallocate sovereignty, but to domestically empower Transnistria’s President Igor Smirnov. Based on the discourse of Transnistria’s next president, Yevgeniy Shevchuk, this article argues that the referendum was not placed in the dustbin of history. Analysis of the official Transnistrian news published during his presidency from 2011–2016 shows that Shevchuk re-exploited the 2006 sovereignty referendum. His aim was not to reallocate sovereignty either, but to reach the following goals: 1. procure legitimacy of the Transnistrian sovereignty cause internationally; 2. empower Transnistria vis-à-vis its parent state, Moldova; 3. boost relations with Transnistria’s patron, Russia; and 4. empower himself domestically. Arguably, the argument about the strategic use of past unilateral sovereignty referendums also works in cases of other de facto states, which can be analyzed using the analytical framework presented in this article.

This article compares the nation-building processes in four well-established Eurasian de facto states. Although all four pursue a set of identity politics that would legitimize the separatist cause, comparing them reveals important differences in boundary-making strategies. While maintaining the image of the enemy parent-state and of an imminent external threat is a common endeavor, they face different challenges and thus have pursued different strategies of identity-building. Transnistria and Abkhazia are two ethnically heterogeneous entities while Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia are more homogeneous since (forced) displacements, mostly of non-titular ethnicities, took place. The Abkhazs, Ossetians, and Armenians claim titular status in their respective regions, but only the latter two have kin in neighboring countries with whom they want to unify. Meanwhile, the “Transnistrian people” is a newly invented construct. Despite their lack of international recognition, the article demonstrates that – apart from a special emphasis on cultivating the image of the “enemy parent-state” – the nation-building mechanisms in the de facto states do not substantially differ from the processes at work in other post-Soviet states presented in this Special Issue.

This article explores nation-building processes in the Transnistrian imagined community. While some scholars describe Transnistria’s nation-building strategy as a civic, multicultural project, the analysis of recent demographic and educational data corroborated with the close examination of local media content and official discourses—all point to the emergence of a distinct political culture marked by the increasing use of the Russian language in the public sphere, and the politicization of the Moldovan identity. Discourses about ethnic and national identity in the region have evolved as the Transnistrian elites reimagine the political community as part of the Russkii Mir. These circumstances suggest that, in the long run, the breakaway region might function as the southeastern frontline of Russian irredentism with the elites of the Pridnestrovska͡ia Moldavska͡ia Respublika continuing to call on the Russian Federation to annex the parastate instead of seeking a peaceful reintegration into Moldova.

The contested nature of de facto states and their acceptance of dual citizenship results in the overlap of multiple citizenship regimes, leading to individuals living in de facto states possessing multiple citizenship statuses. Using the Most Similar Systems Design, this article explores the factors that influence the (divergent) citizenship regimes of Abkhazia and Transnistria; the former allows dual citizenship only with Russia, while the latter places no restrictions. The primary reason for the adoption of dual citizenship is for pragmatic reasons, as the secondary citizenship can compensate for the lack of benefits (such as international travel, diplomatic protection) afforded by the de facto state’s citizenship. This said, having an ethnicized national identity, in contrast to a civic (state-centered) national identity, can produce (dual) citizenship laws that give preferential treatment to the titular group and its diaspora. Additionally, the influence exerted by the patron state (Russia) and the severity of the conflict with the parent state (Georgia/Moldova) influences dual citizenship in becoming conditional and thus more exclusive.

This article addresses the reasons why ethnic diversity has never posed a challenge to the stability of Transnistria (also called the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic), an unrecognized state that broke away from Moldova during the collapse of the Soviet Union. We analyze the major societal and political patterns relevant to ethnic relations in the region and focus on the structure, content, and effectiveness of Transnistrian legislation concerning ethnic and linguistic diversity along with the practices of its implementation. In our view, formal and informal ethnic divisions do not hinder the political stability of Transnistria. We conclude that the stability of ethnic relations in Transnistria in part results from a deliberate policy aimed at managing diversity. This policy provides for the dependence of the populace on the state apparatus achieved through a dense plethora of government-orchestrated activities as well as the reproduction of nonconflictual, eclectic, and thus socially acceptable national narratives inherited from the Soviet past.

In 1941, thousands of Jews from the regions of Bukovina and Bessarabia were deported to ghettos and camps in Romanian-occupied Transnistria to join local Ukranian Jews and other deportees. This article is a case study of the Shargorod ghetto, one of the largest ghettos in Transnistria, that reveals how individuals interned there, and in similar ghettos, survived despite their different social, economic, and cultural backgrounds. An examination based on regions allows for a better understanding of the diverse Jewish communities in Romania and how these differences influenced the lives of local Jews and deportees during the formidable years in Shargorod. Their major successes, as well as their failures, present a picture of entangled community identity in the face of disease, starvation, and forced labor. The survival of the Jewish population of Shargorod from 1941 to 1944 is analyzed through the selection of leadership by the ghetto inhabitants (specifically, Meier Teich’s role as ghetto leader), the entrepreneurial actions and aid that arose, and the format and agenda adopted by the ghetto’s cultural institutions.

Even after the conflicts of the early 1990s that brought them to their de facto independence, both Abkhazia and Transnistria remained strongly multi-ethnic. In both territories, no single ethnic group is an absolute majority and Russian is the language that is mostly spoken on the streets of Sukhumi and Tiraspol. Legislators of both entities felt the need to deal with multi-ethnicity and multilingualism, including in their constitutions, in laws related to education, or more directly with specific language laws (1992 law “On languages” in Transnistria; 2007 law “On the state language in Abkhazia”). The protection of linguistic rights that is formally part of the legislation of both territories finds limitations in practice. The language of education has proved to be particularly contentious, in particular for Moldovan/Romanian language schools in Transnistria and Georgian language schools in Abkhazia. Why are language laws in Abkhazia and Transnistria so different, in spite of the fact that they are both post-Soviet, multi-ethnic territories that became de facto independent in the early 1990s? The different approaches found in Abkhazia and Transnistria represent remarkable examples of language legislation as a tool for nation-building in ethnically heterogeneous territories.