Australia devotes more diplomatic energy to its relations with the South Pacific states and Timor-Leste than their modest populations might seem to justify. Only Papua New Guinea (PNG) (6.6 million) and Timor-Leste (1.1 million) have populations of more than one million, followed by Fiji (840 000) and Solomon Islands (518 000), with the rest easily qualifying as microstates. The total population of the South Pacific region and Timor-Leste (fewer than ten million) is dwarfed by that of their regional neighbour Indonesia (240 million). Australia became more closely involved with this region and expended more diplomatic resources on it between 2005 and 2010 than at any time since the Pacific Island states first became independent. Australian troops were in continuous deployment to Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, and were briefly sent to Tonga. A coup in Fiji, the fourth in 20 years, created a nagging diplomatic problem for the Howard, Rudd and Gillard governments, which could not condone a Pacific dictatorship and yet sought to avoid a total breakdown in relations with a country of regional importance.

This chapter considers how Gary Jacobsohn’s concept of ‘constitutional identity’ can ‘travel’ from the discipline of law to that of international relations, with a particular focus on how it can inform analyses of the ‘ontological security’ of states. The concept of ontological security is used to understand subjectivity and focuses on managing anxiety in the constitution of self-identity. When a state is ontologically insecure this can challenge its ability to do, act, and be. Using a case study of Timor-Leste, this chapter argues that a constitution – and the constitutional identity it generates – can contribute to creating a sense of ontological (in)security for a state and its people. A constitution can provide answers to existential questions and help to define a state’s self-identity by narrating a sense of biographical continuity and by establishing the institutions and practices that build the routines required to create a protective cocoon for a state’s citizenry.

The earth’s oceans are expansive and cover nearly three-quarters of the planet. Historically, extracting resources from the sea-bed was considered impossible given the pressure of the ocean. However, extractive technologies have developed rapidly over the past 50 years, making offshore mining easier. This has intensified the commercial focus of offshore mining for energy resources such as petroleum and gas. The regulatory framework for this type of mining is, however, fundamentally different from that which applies to the onshore domain. The jurisdictional framework is unique, because projects may be subject to domestic or international laws depending upon their location. The ecological and environmental imperatives are diverse because offshore waters are the habitat of a vast array of marine eco-systems. Offshore waters are not inhabited and the absence of private property means that offshore projects are not subject to property interface concerns. Offshore drilling for petroleum and gas resources residing within the rock formations beneath the sea-bed has been made possible by drilling techniques capable of navigating the underwater environment.

Chapter 6 illustrates how ‘truth-seeking’ bodies, the TCs in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Timor-Leste, selected and reconstructed the facts of resource-driven wars, particularly their underlying causes and dynamics, as well as the responsibility for harms caused by extractive activities. The chapter also shows how different legal regimes were mobilised in support of the ‘truth’ produced by the three institutions, by identifying three paradigms of responsibility: the state-centered perspective of the Sierra Leonean TC, with its focus on local mismanagement and the need to reform resource governance; the economic crimes lens of the Liberian TC, which sought to hold business actors/public officials accountable for resource plunder and related atrocities through prosecution and vetting; and the socio-economic rights approach of the Timor-Leste TC, resulting in the recognition of breaches to the collective rights of the Timorese people to self-determination and recommendation of ecological restoration. Each paradigm captures and misses something about these conflicts and is associated with different reactions by relevant stakeholders to the findings/recommendations of the three TCs.

This chapter examines the case of Timor-Leste, the first peace settlement negotiated after the United Nations launched its anti-amnesty policy. As a UN-led process, initial acceptance of the anti-amnesty position was guaranteed: none of the resolutions that provided for the settlement of East Timor’s independence struggle included amnesties, and soon after independence a hybrid tribunal was established to prosecute perpetrators of human rights violations. However, this anti-impunity/pro-accountability stance quickly eroded in the post-conflict period with persistent calls for amnesties being translated into practical impunity measures. As this chapter demonstrates, both Indonesian and East Timorese leaders have emphasised the importance of state security, stability, and survival in justifying the use of impunity measures. For Indonesian, in particular, acceptance of impunity for human rights violations came in the context of the threat to state disintegration posed by separatist claims in other parts of the country. For both, resistance to the anti-amnesty norm was the result of a norm hierarchy that prioritises the survival of the state over individual human rights claims.

International crimes are alleged to have occurred in the colonial period, within separatist conflicts (including in relation to Timor-Leste’s independence), during 1965 and Suharto’s subsequent presidency, and more recently, including in Papua. This chapter focuses on Indonesia’s national laws and institutions for prosecuting international crimes committed in Indonesia (as well as in East Timor prior to its independence as Timor-Leste in 2002). It reflects on the politicised history of international criminal law trials in post-colonial Indonesia. It then analyses statements made by representatives of foreign states and international organisations, the Indonesian government, and civil society about approaches to international criminal justice. It considers how this engagement has resulted in the adoption of laws that reflect some aspects of the norm of international criminal justice, but also amplify other principles and remain the object of debate – including planned amendments to the Criminal Code.