The final phase of Vichy’s dealings with Rome brought the sharpest divergence in its relations with the two Axis governments. The full occupation of France ended the last vestiges of French sovereignty. However, the power relationship between Vichy and Rome evolved very differently to that between Vichy and Berlin. Vichy’s negotiations between the conflicting demands of the German and Italian authorities were, characterised by opportunism, not fully appreciated when focusing exclusively on the German occupation. Whereas Vichy chose to work with Rome to offset Berlin’s demands on the Service du Travail Obligatoire, it resolutely chose collaboration with Berlin over the opportunities afforded by Rome when it came to the treatment of Jews. Vichy’s willing collaboration with Nazi anti-Semitic policies saw it oppose the Italian attempts to prevent the deportation of Jews in their occupation zone. The fall of Mussolini ended the prospect of any fruitful cooperation with Italy. With growing internal pressure from French collaborationist forces to engage in a more radical and ideological form of collaboration, Vichy’s alignment with Nazi Germany finally became definitive.

The period between July and December 1940 is usually characterised in terms of Vichy’s attempts to develop closer relations with Berlin which culminated in a new policy of collaboration. However, this picture obscures a second dimension to Vichy’s policy that saw Pierre Laval and Foreign Minister Paul Baudouin engage in concerted efforts at rapprochement with Rome to counter the domination of Berlin. Their efforts foundered upon Mussolini’s ideologically driven opposition, but their persistence suggests that it was not inevitable that French collaboration should have become exclusively directed towards Germany. At the same time, however, Vichy had two main concerns about Italian intentions. The first was that Italy’s encroachments upon French sovereignty in its occupation zone might lead to territorial annexation by stealth. The second was the need to protect the French colonial empire from Fascist claims, especially over Tunisia. Vichy, therefore, attempted to use collaboration with Germany to counter the threat from Italy.

The armistice logic combined a short war, Britain’s rapid capitulation, and the quick conclusion of a Franco-Axis peace to liberate French POWs. “L’homme providentiel,” Pétain, was embraced as “a substitute for politics and a barrier to revolution.” The Armistice transferred responsibility for defeat to the Republic and its combat-shy “citizen soldiers,” liberated the professional army from the tyranny of the levée, and transformed surrender into a collective rather than individual act. Vichy wagered that collaboration would place France in a position to play a major role in Hitler’s New Europe. The three departments that comprised Alsace-Moselle were incorporated into the Reich. But it also sealed the status of France as a second-tier power. Despite the armistice and the fact that many French soldiers remained incarcerated in Germany, France retained considerable latent military power, that included a 100,000-man Armistice Army, roughly the same number in French North Africa, a considerable air force sans avions, and a significant navy. However, rather than prepare clandestinely for la revanche as many of its supporters believed, Vichy’s energies were directed into collaboration. A paramilitary Chantiers de la Jeunesse, designed to build the character so lacking in French youth, was stood up, as well as various organizations like the LVF that provided a vehicle for recruiting Frenchmen to serve in German forces. The armistice, not the British attack at Mers-el-Kébir, took Vichy and its navy down the path of collaboration.

After following the retreat to Dunkirk, and the evacuation by sea of thousands of British and French soldiers, Chapter 4 examines the impact of Weygand’s command. Weygand’s organization of his so-called “hedgehogs” on the Aisne supposedly revived French resolve and resilience. In fact, examination of the archives reveals that these “hedgehogs” were improvized and most collapsed quite quickly. Second, more concerned with an imaginary communist uprising in Paris rather than prolonging French resistance to an inexorable German advance, Weygand’s defeatism and fear of popular insurrection became a major catalyst in France’s decision to request an armistice. The chapter concludes with a summary of the maneuvers and calculations in the French cabinet and High Command that scuppered the opportunity to fight on from the colonies and solidified support for the armistice.

Many of the war’s leading generals rose or fell during 1916. Germany refocused on the west, where Falkenhayn, chief of the high command since the initial defeat at the Marne, attacked at Verdun, seeking a bloodletting that would drive France from the war. The French persevered through ten months, during which generals Pétain and Nivelle eclipsed Joffre, who lost his post as commander late in the year. In the summer Haig’s British and Imperial forces, with French support, attacked the Germans at the Somme, where in September tanks first saw action. The battle there ended in a draw but also ensured the French a draw at Verdun. Meanwhile, on the Italian front, Conrad von Hötzendorf launched an Austro-Hungarian offensive from the Tyrol. This attack, like the German effort at Verdun, used troops pulled from the east, allowing a summer Russian offensive under Brusilov to break the weakened front. The Germans returned troops to seal the breach, but the debacle forced Falkenhayn to relinquish the high command to Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Amid the crisis the Central Powers made William II their supreme commander, sealing Austria-Hungary’s subordination to Germany. Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire joined them late in the year in crushing Romania shortly after it joined the Allies.