In March 2018, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, California Department of Public Health, Los Angeles County Department of Public Health and Pennsylvania Department of Health initiated an investigation of an outbreak of Burkholderia cepacia complex (Bcc) infections. Sixty infections were identified in California, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maine, Nevada and Ohio. The infections were linked to a no-rinse cleansing foam product (NRCFP), produced by Manufacturer A, used for skin care of patients in healthcare settings. FDA inspected Manufacturer A's production facility (manufacturing site of over-the-counter drugs and cosmetics), reviewed production records and collected product and environmental samples for analysis. FDA's inspection found poor manufacturing practices. Analysis by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis confirmed a match between NRCFP samples and clinical isolates. Manufacturer A conducted extensive recalls, FDA issued a warning letter citing the manufacturer's inadequate manufacturing practices, and federal, state and local partners issued public communications to advise patients, pharmacies, other healthcare providers and healthcare facilities to stop using the recalled NRCFP. This investigation highlighted the importance of following appropriate manufacturing practices to minimize microbial contamination of cosmetic products, especially if intended for use in healthcare settings.

Information on the factors that cause or amplify foodborne illness outbreaks (contributing factors), such as ill workers or cross-contamination of food by workers, is critical to outbreak prevention. However, only about half of foodborne illness outbreaks reported to the United States’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have an identified contributing factor, and data on outbreak characteristics that promote contributing factor identification are limited. To address these gaps, we analyzed data from 297 single-setting outbreaks reported to CDC's new outbreak surveillance system, which collects data from the environmental health component of outbreak investigations (often called environmental assessments), to identify outbreak characteristics associated with contributing factor identification. These analyses showed that outbreak contributing factors were more often identified when an outbreak etiologic agent had been identified, when the outbreak establishment prepared all meals on location and served more than 150 meals a day, when investigators contacted the establishment to schedule the environmental assessment within a day of the establishment being linked with an outbreak, and when multiple establishment visits were made to complete the environmental assessment. These findings suggest that contributing factor identification is influenced by multiple outbreak characteristics, and that timely and comprehensive environmental assessments are important to contributing factor identification. They also highlight the need for strong environmental health and food safety programs that have the capacity to complete such environmental assessments during outbreak investigations.

Objectives: To describe current syndromic surveillance system response protocols in health departments from 8 diverse states in the United States and to develop a framework for health departments to use as a guide in initial design and/or enhancement of response protocols.

Methods: Case study design that incorporated in-depth interviews with health department staff, textual analysis of response plans, and a Delphi survey of syndromic surveillance response experts.

Results: All 8 states and 30 of the 33 eligible health departments agreed to participate (91% response rate). Fewer than half (48%) of surveyed health departments had a written response protocol, and health departments reported conducting in-depth investigations on fewer than 15% of syndromic surveillance alerts. A convened panel of experts identified 32 essential elements for inclusion in public health protocols for response to syndromic surveillance system alerts.

Conclusions: Because of the lack of guidance, limited resources for development of response protocols, and few examples of syndromic surveillance detecting previously unknown events of public health significance, health departments have not prioritized the development and refinement of response protocols. Systems alone, however, are not effective without an organized public health response. The framework proposed here can guide health departments in creating protocols that will be standardized, tested, and relevant given their goals with such systems. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S29–S36)

We conducted an epidemic investigation to discover the route of transmission and the host factors of an outbreak of post-injection abscesses. Of the 2984 patients who visited a single clinic, 77 cases were identified and 208 age- and sex-matched controls were selected for analysis. Injected medications per se were not found to be responsible, and a deviation from safe injection practice suggested the likelihood of diluent contamination. Therefore the injected medications were classified according to whether there was a need for a diluent, and two medications showed a statistically significant association, i.e. injection with pheniramine [adjusted odds ratios (aOR) 5·93, 95% confidence interval (CI) 2·97–11·87] and ribostamycin (aOR 47·95, 95% CI 11·08–207·53). However, when considered concurrently, pheniramine lost statistical significance (aOR 8·71, 95% CI 0·44–171·61) suggesting that normal saline was the causative agent of this outbreak. Epidemiological evidence strongly suggested that this post-injection outbreak was caused by saline contaminated with Mycobacterium massiliense without direct microbiological evidence.

The occurrence of a gastrointestinal illness among a class of 96 undergraduate veterinary students in New Zealand prompted laboratory and questionnaire-based investigations. Cryptosporidium parvum was the only enteropathogen identified in 4/7 faecal specimens analysed. The C. parvum isolates carried a rare IIa GP60 allele, indicating a point-source outbreak. The infection source could not be microbiologically traced, but the investigation suggested contact with calves during a practical class as the most likely exposure. A total of 25/80 respondents to a questionnaire were defined as cases using a clinical case definition (31% attack rate). The inferred median incubation period was 5 days (range 0–11 days), and the median illness duration was 5–6 days (range 2–23 days), corroborating previous observations in experimental cryptosporidiosis. Disease was self-limiting, characterized by abdominal discomfort, diarrhoea, and in some cases, vomiting. Originating from a rural area and having had previously handled ruminants were associated with a significant risk reduction in males. All the three students who reported chronic use of steroid inhalers for treatment of asthma were cases. This case highlighted, once again, the potential hazard for explosive outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis.

A case-control and a case-crossover study were performed to investigate a Campylobacter jejuni outbreak in Crete in 2009. Most cases originated from rural areas, served by a different water-supply system from that of the adjacent town. Thirty-seven cases and 79 controls were interviewed; cases were interviewed for two different time periods for the case-crossover study. Stool cultures, PFGE and MLST subtyping were run in human samples. Univariately, consumption of tap water was associated with C. jejuni infection. Stratified analysis revealed that water-supply system was an effect modifier of this association. In the multivariable analysis, the rural areas' water supplier and drinking tap water were risk factors. No risk factors were revealed in the case-crossover study. No Campylobacter were isolated in the tested water samples. There is strong epidemiological evidence that tap water was the vehicle of the outbreak.

Between October and December 2005, 16 cases of wound botulism were notified to the health authorities of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. All patients were injecting drug users (IDU) and the epidemiological investigations suggested contaminated injection drugs as the most probable source of infection. Clostridium botulinum was cultivated from clinical samples of six patients and molecular typing revealed that the different isolates were clonally identical. Two samples of heroin, one of them provided by a patient, were examined but C. botulinum could not be isolated. This outbreak demonstrates that IDU are at risk for acquiring wound botulism by injecting contaminated drugs. A greater awareness of this disease is needed by physicians and a close cooperation between public health authorities, street workers, operators of sheltered injecting facilities, and medical centres focusing on IDU is essential to prevent and manage outbreaks in IDU in a timely manner.