This paper is about an Old Indian judicial institution called paṇa (“wager”). Within a court proceeding, a judicial wager is a certain sum of money that a conflicting party offers to pay if he ends up losing his case. This paper explains the rationale of judicial wagers by showing that they may signal truthfulness.

Rationing health care by ordeals is likely to have different effects on women and men, and on distinct groups of women. I show how such putative effects of ordeals are relevant to achieving gender justice. I explain why some ordeals may disproportionately set back women’s interest in discretionary time, health and access to health care, and may undermine equality of opportunity for positions of advantage. Some ordeals protect the interests of the worse-off women yet set back the interests of better-off women in equal opportunities. I suggest how we can use ordeal design to advance particular aims of gender justice.

This paper addresses how to think about the permissibility of introducing deadweight costs (so-called ‘ordeals’) on candidate recipients of goods in order to attain better outcomes. The paper introduces some distinctions between different kinds of value dimensions that should be taken into account when such judgements are made and draws from the literature on comparisons across different value dimensions in order to canvas what sort of situations one might arguably face when evaluating ordeals. In light of the distinctions drawn and the possibilities canvassed, the paper proceeds to outline what circumstances indicate which of the possible situations one is in.

This essay begins by summarizing the reasons why unregulated health-care markets are inefficient. The inefficiencies stem from the asymmetries of information among providers, patients and payers, which give rise to moral hazard and adverse selection. Attempts to ameliorate these inefficiencies by means of risk-adjusted insurance and monetary incentives such as co-pays and deductibles lessen the inefficiencies at the cost of increasing inequalities. Another possibility is to rely on non-monetary incentives, including ordeals. While not a magic bullet, these are feasible methods for addressing the inadequacies of market provision of health care, such as moral hazard.

Ordeals (by fire, by water, etc.) are a judicial institution in which defendants try to prove their innocence by divine judgement. In a recent law and economics paper, Leeson (2012) suggests that (medieval) ordeals “work” because, and if, ordeal takers have sufficient belief in them and because the priests administering ordeals “manipulate” them in an appropriate manner. We find that Leeson's theory also helps us understand Indian ordeals. Interestingly, some dharma texts require that the accuser agrees to the ordeal too, a requirement absent in Leeson's theory. We extend Leesons's model accordingly.