This chapter examines the sense of uncertainty fostered by postwar geopolitics. It looks at how the political orientations shaped during the interwar period were dislocated from postwar Italo-Egyptian relations and from emergent Mediterranean constellations. The fall of the fascist government in Rome in 1943 and the creation of the Egyptian republic in 1953 made uncertainty a defining condition of life for Italian residents in Egypt after the war. Their experiences no longer resonated with the political aspirations of the post-fascist state, nor did they align with Egypt’s accelerating movement towards national sovereignty. The material and symbolic exchange of two deposed kings – Vittorio Emanuele III in 1946 and Faruk in 1953 – and the establishment of the Italian and Egyptian Republics paved the way for new industrial and economic ties. Political-economic relations tightened around this kinship of exchange, and the Italian state sought to reinforce Egypt’s military government. Yet, as this chapter demonstrates, many Italian residents fell into greater duress, coming to understand departure as their only possible future.

The Economic Consequences of the Peace was first published in 1919 and, since then, changed the economic discourse surrounding reparations and Carthaginian peace. This chapter specifies how three elements hinted at in the introduction of the Economic Consequences of the Peace – social classes, national sovereignty, and the international political system – can explain Keynes’ assessment of Carthaginian peace. The chapter analyses the optimality of reparations in the context of these three elements.

Chapter 4 demonstrates that the recommendations that favoured state intervention were coupled with a different way of thinking about political power: its nature, its sources and its organisation. The intellectual éminence grise behind this was Nikolaos Saripolos, who, after coming to Greece and being elected to the Law School in 1846, was to become the country’s leading constitutional and international law scholar. Being mindful of the revolutionary tradition and fusing together several different intellectual currents (Rousseau, Doctrinaires, the monarchiens, Benjamin Constant), Saripolos changed the terms of constitutional thinking by drawing on the revolutionary idioms of natural rights and national sovereignty. This was a liberal, governmental discourse that spoke in terms of sovereignty as self-rule and of the state as a moral person with rights in the international arena. As the chapter demonstrates, for Saripolos – as well as for the economist Ioannis Soutsos – the state in the form it then took had become an obstacle to the formation of the nation and was undermining social cohesion.

This is a case about racial exclusion from the border. Specifically, this case concerns the constitutionality of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (CCA) and subsequent amendments to that provision enacted by Congress,2 which ban the return of a noncitizen permanent resident of this country on the basis of his race – because he is Chinese. As we explain below, this immigration racial ban violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and, thus, must be deemed unconstitutional. We therefore invalidate the CCA and hold that the Constitution prohibits Congress from passing laws that exclude noncitizens on the basis of race.

In contrast to CDR, the institutions seeking to govern emissions reductions seem poorly suited to govern SRM and specifically SAI. SAI does not fall squarely under the jurisdiction of any existing international treaties, and even domestic laws provide few constraints. Voluntary norms such as the Oxford Principles are not yet codified into agreed obligations. Harvard’s intended SCoPEx experiment demonstrates the great trepidation with which SAI is perceived. Attempts to curtail pre-deployment field research generally rest on faulty assumptions, including a presumed slippery slope, technological lock-in, fears of covert or non-state deployment, weaponization, and a blurry line between research and deployment. Without robust research, there is a danger that future climate emergencies may be met with rash and risky deployment. Therefore, global institutions are needed to encourage, fund, and vet research and ensure its transparency. Deployment itself would require new, empowered international institutions to coordinate the program and monitor its effects. While sovereign national deployment efforts by major powers are a salient paradigm, a better outcome for both nature and humanity would be a single global monopolist deployer acting on behalf of the world. Such a unitary global effort would have enormous implications for the international order.

Although France is theoretically a monist State that places its Constitution on the top of the hierarchy of norms and attributes to international law a supra-legislative authority, in French case law, the interaction between international and domestic law is rather complex. This contribution will focus on the Conseil Constitutionnel and its role in controlling the executive as far as adoption of international treaties is concerned. Its jurisprudence on “limitations of sovereignty” clearly reflects, notwithstanding its numerous ambiguities, the strong role that the Council wishes to play in foreign relations law. The “limitations of sovereignty” doctrine has allowed the Council to develop its own foreing relations law approach regarding international undertakings by France and to enjoy an important discretion while doing so. The result is that the Council can prevent the organs in charge of France’s foreing relations from undertaking some international engagements considered by it as incompatible with “national sovereingty”.

In this chapter, I endeavor to weave together a complex series of European legal developments connected with the emergence of intellectual property. I begin by tracing the emergence of intellectual property in France, focusing on the context for this development in the revolutionary processes through which a new French nation was formed, and on the ambivalent implications of national codification for intellectual property in France. I then go back to the Reformation, pointing out the significance of Calvinist and Lutheran legal dcotrines for jurisprudential traditions carrying new conceptions of sovereignty and natural rights. Shifting to the legacies of these traditions for legal and administrative theories that developed in German-speaking lands, we see early foundations for a new jurisprudential narrative that becomes vital to the substantive rationale of intellectual property in our own time: progressivism. The upshot of these complex developments is a paradoxical linkage between bureaucratic impersonalism in the formal application of legal doctrines and an idealizing personalism in the agentive capacities of individual human beings: the idolizing of "genius."

The UN and its Charter, despite the many laudable aims, legal principles and values it enshrines, is today too heavily constrained by the commitments it makes to uphold outdated notions of state sovereignty; it is saddled by the veto; it is inadequately resourced; it has not succeeded in establishing a genuine international system of rule by law; and it has consistently proved incapable of controlling or preventing abuses of power and other forms of internationally dangerous state behavior. Nevertheless, we argue that the more sensible approach in developing the foundations of an enhanced global constitutional order is to build on the existing institutional infrastructure associated with the United Nations: it has universal membership; it has accumulated over the past 70 years a body of texts and practices that have precipitated important changes in selected areas; it has participated, however ineffectively, in most of the peace and security debates of the postwar period; and the Security Council has the power to enforce binding international law. More importantly, the UN Charter can be amended, modernized and adapted to the needs of the present. We discuss the possible ways ahead, suggesting the most workable mechanisms for next steps in our evolving governance system.

This chapter focuses on the debates over fundamental principles of state organization that took place in the Constitutional Conciliation Commission ‘Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu, AUK’ during Turkey’s 2011–2013 constitution-making process. It discusses the failure of popular constitution making as well as the most recent constitutional changes in the context of a tradition of statist, authoritarian constitutionalism in Turkey. We assess the extent to which disagreements over the fundamental nature of principles of state organization contributed to the failure of popular constitution making in 2013. Our inquiry shows that the diverging conceptions of democracy, separation of powers, and the rule of law of the different parties involved led to extreme tensions. Deep disagreements over these issues and others made compromise impossible. Therefore, the contested subjects subsumed under the principles of state organization contributed significantly to the failure of popular constitution making in Turkey, and cleared the path to majority imposition by the ruling party in subsequent constitution-making and amendment processes.

The Constitution of Poland does not use the term ‘constitutional identity’, but this concept has been developed and expounded by the Constitutional Tribunal. The chapter argues that the constitutional identity has become both a normative and a descriptive concept in the constitutional jurisprudence. On the one hand, the Tribunal used the concept of constitutional identity to determine the limits of the competence for conferring power to the European Union, excluding certain subject matters from the scope of the conferral. On the other hand, references to constitutional identity in the Tribunal’s case law denote axiological similarity, equivalence, or convergence between the EU and the national legal order. Moreover, the descriptive notion of constitutional identity has been used to signify the distinctiveness of the Polish constitutional order, which has recently been employed by the populist government to claim the right to introduce reforms undermining the rule of law as an aspect of national sovereignty.

Ireland’s practice of holding referendums to approve European treaties has operated as a significant political barrier in the European integration process. This chapter explains how the practice derives from quite distinctive interpretations of the principles of national sovereignty and popular sovereignty enshrined in the Irish Constitution. In particular, it explains both how popular sovereignty in Irish constitutional law receives a largely procedural and plebiscitary expression, and how national and popular sovereignty have become conceptually intertwined. Although both versions of sovereignty have become integral components of constitutional identity in Ireland, this chapter explains various anomalies and contradictions that arise from each.

The author presents a necessarily brief summary of Catholic Social Teaching (CST) regarding immigration, featuring especially Pius XII's much neglected apostolic constitution Exsul familia. He also sets out some of the philosophical presuppositions of CST as it pertains to immigration. These presuppositions are to be found, he maintains, especially in the writings of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. He then examines in some detail Francisco de Vitoria's ideas regarding immigration, based as they are upon Aristotelian and Thomistic principles. Finally, he offers answers to questions that have arisen over the course of the essay.

The common good (bonum commune) has, since antiquity, referred to the aim of social and political association, and was particularly prominent in medieval Christian political theology. Since St. John XXIII’s 1961 encyclical letter, Mater et magistra, ecclesiastical statements about social teaching have employed a formulation of the common good, usually in the version that appeared in the Second Vatican Council’s 1965 Pastoral Constitution for the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et spes, as “the sum of those conditions of social life that allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment.” This chapter discusses the origins and development of this formulation as well as the ways that it has been used in subsequent Catholic Social Teaching. While it has sometimes been interpreted as an “instrumental” account of the common good, the sources and uses of the notion suggest that it is the particularly modern political component of a fuller notion of the common good continuous with the tradition. In particular, the recent formulation is concerned to limit the power of the modern state and protect the dignity of the human person in the challenging conditions of political modernity.

“Globalization has transformed the inner workings of societies, and produced a new emerging cleavage between cosmopolitans and communitarians, affecting the working of our party system and democracy as a whole. The chapter summarizes the most crucial empirical findings of the book, moving from descriptive to more normative issues and asks: What does the struggle over borders mean for the quality of democracy? What understandings of democracy do the cosmopolitan and communitarian positions draw on? What are their flaws and virtues from a democratic point of view? Our core answer is the following: Both normative positions have become politically more prominent during the last decades of globalization, but both provide answers that exhibit considerable weaknesses when measured against the criteria of democratic quality. Nevertheless, both concepts have more room to forge compromises than the cosmopolitan and communitarian theoreticians themselves often assume. Cosmopolitan communitarianism or communitarian cosmopolitanism appear to represent the most promising compromises to overcome the democratic shortcomings of both pure narratives.”

“Globalization has transformed the inner workings of societies, and produced a new emerging cleavage between cosmopolitans and communitarians, affecting the working of our party system and democracy as a whole. The chapter summarizes the most crucial empirical findings of the book, moving from descriptive to more normative issues and asks: What does the struggle over borders mean for the quality of democracy? What understandings of democracy do the cosmopolitan and communitarian positions draw on? What are their flaws and virtues from a democratic point of view? Our core answer is the following: Both normative positions have become politically more prominent during the last decades of globalization, but both provide answers that exhibit considerable weaknesses when measured against the criteria of democratic quality. Nevertheless, both concepts have more room to forge compromises than the cosmopolitan and communitarian theoreticians themselves often assume. Cosmopolitan communitarianism or communitarian cosmopolitanism appear to represent the most promising compromises to overcome the democratic shortcomings of both pure narratives.”