The aim of our paper is to study some aspects of the textile industry of the city of Segovia and its land in the second half of the 16th century, interpreting them through spatial economy theories and specifically the industrial district approach. It is about seeing the competitive advantages of the integration and diffusion of the business organization in its geographical framework. The district's competitive advantages are linked to both transaction and production costs. One of them is to maximize the benefits of labor market segmentation with the emergence of a primary market for skilled labor. Another is the ease of diffusion of both technology and organizational and commercial techniques.

This article uses the leading firms of the German chemical industry as a case study to provide a detailed example of how companies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century used internal financing as an instrument of corporate finance. It traces the at first diverse significance of internal financing for the industry and identifies two moments of market concentration that triggered a convergence of corporate finance by a harmonisation of accounting standards that were not predefined by legal frameworks. The article argues that secret reserves and further ways of internal financing were key components of this harmonisation. The industry-wide creation of secret reserves cloaked the companies’ actual financial strength from outsiders who were merely left with an image of the respective firms that was carefully drafted by companies’ managers.

El artículo se enmarca en las líneas de investigación actual sobre la mujer en la economía marítima preindustrial. Se trata de un estudio de caso centrado en las capitanas y las patronas durante el auge del corso en Mallorca entre 1635–80. En él se destaca la labor de las mujeres de mar como procuradoras de sus maridos mientras permanecían ausentes, especialmente cuando la situación les exigió demostrar iniciativa e ir más allá de lo estipulado en la procura. Asimismo, se constata un mayor protagonismo en cuatro áreas de la empresa corsaria, mientras ésta se rigió por un modelo de corte familiar.

This scoping paper addresses the role of financial institutions in empowering the British Industrial Revolution. Prominent economic historians have argued that investment was largely funded out of savings or profits, or by borrowing from family or friends: hence financial institutions played a minor role. But this claim sits uneasily with later evidence from other countries that effective financial institutions have mattered a great deal for economic development. How can this mismatch be explained? Despite numerous technological innovations, from 1760 to 1820 industrial growth was surprisingly low. Could the underdevelopment of financial institutions have held back growth? There is relatively little data to help evaluate this hypothesis. More research is required on the historical development of institutions that enabled finance to be raised. This would include the use of property as collateral. This paper sketches the evolution of British financial institutions before 1820 and makes suggestions for further empirical research. Research in this direction should enhance our understanding of the British Industrial Revolution and of the preconditions of economic development in other countries.

This article offers a new interpretation of the Baring crisis, the most dramatic financial collapse of the nineteenth century, by focusing on how information brokerage allowed Barings to abandon its risk-averse practices in the mid 1880s. I argue that the mediators who bridged structural holes (gaps between social clusters) shaped actors’ access to information as well as their expectations regarding its quality. Information brokers who enjoyed philos ties with at least one of the parties connected by the bridging relationships could promote collaborative arrangements more likely to survive an environment of heightened uncertainty. The performance of such brokers in the 1880s enabled cooperation between Baring Brothers & Co. and the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas and supported the London house's growing association with the Anglo-Argentine firm of S. B. Hale & Co. in the second half of the 1880s. Cooperation gave Barings an illusion of security amid the costs of increasing competition and supported the house's growing engagement in South American affairs. Nevertheless, the strategy proved ineffective at barring the entry of new players. By the late 1880s, ties produced by brokerage connected Barings to the house's former competitors, producing a cohesive social cluster. Barings thereafter had access to redundant information, which hindered the house's ability to assess risk.

Recently, new research has challenged the traditional narrative; Spain did not suffer from a ruler that threatened his subjects’ property with excessive taxes and forced loans. Instead, Spanish economic development was held back by decentralised and non-predatory governance, unable to solve the coordination problems blocking the way to more integrated markets. Through the analysis of the governance and loan portfolios of an ecclesiastical order, this paper examines the extent to which mortgage credit markets were fragmented in early modern Spain. This order not only collected resources that it subsequently lent but also pooled them. Indeed, it developed into a nationally integrated organisation able to offer everything from small loans to farmers to substantial amounts to the king and the Madrid elite.

This study demonstrates the existence of a private, informal and lively credit market in rural Sweden during the 1840s, a period that predates the development of a modern banking system. The market, mainly based on private promissory notes, was concentrated in the hands of a limited number of wealthy farmers who specialized in lending, They facilitated access to credit to well-off farmers, regardless of whether they owned their farms or leased taxed land. By using information from probate inventories, the article analyses the wealth portfolio and characteristics of the lending business of the largest creditors (‘parish bankers’) in a judicial district of southern Sweden in 1841–5. The heart and soul of their business was an intimate knowledge of borrowers’ creditworthiness and mutual trust, as typical of local credit networks. The article also explores the existence of an intergenerational transmission of parish banking business – a dimension of private lending that opens an original path of research on local credit markets in early modern Europe.

In this article, we analyse geographical, occupational and kinship ties amongst apprentices and their masters of the London Goldsmiths’ Company in the second half of the seventeenth century, at a time when the profession was undergoing radical change, thus forming the cradle of British banking. Systematic comparisons of social capital of the guild's two subgroups (the ‘Bankers’ and the ‘Craftsmen and Retailers’) show few such ties at entry and only slightly more amongst office-holders. Overall, ‘Bankers’ display slightly greater social ties in the company overall. Hypotheses for such patterns are discussed, including activity specificity, wealth and position in the guild and households’ economic strategies. The article calls for a household-based approach to economic choices as opposed to one focusing on the guild.

This article discusses the use of private promissory notes in the sixteenth-century commercial metropolis of Antwerp. Students of financial history tend to look for first instances of financial techniques and institutions such as bills of exchange, share trading, sovereign debt and banks. However, financial innovation can also be found in the piecemeal adaptation of an older, existing technique, institution or instrument as the result of changes in the market and of demands exerted by particular groups within that economy. The outcome of this process is determined by the structure of the economy in question, its institutional arrangements and the willingness of authorities to adapt the rules.

This paper deals with Anglo-Spanish trade and finances for the period c. 1810-1850. It concentrates on the business activities of a London merchant bank (Huth & Co. or Huth) with Spain during this period by paying special attention to the support given by Huth to the many bilateral trades between Spain and Britain in which the company participated. It also focuses on the support given by Huth to much trade in and out of Spanish ports but which did not go through British ports. This overall support included the provision of credit facilities, exchange rate brokerage, insurance services and commercial intelligence. In addition, the article covers the links between Huth and the Spanish crown, thanks to which the bank became an important conduit of Spanish investments in American securities before 1850. Huth was also the paymaster abroad for the Spanish state. In view of Huth's close connections to the Spanish economy during this period, it is perhaps surprising that this is the first study of this «Spanish» house in London.

Miguel de Cervantes placed some passages of his masterpiece in Catalonia. Nevertheless, the features he uses to approach the Catalan reality -halfwaybetween 16th and 17th centuries- are obviously influenced by Don Quixote's personality. At that time, the Catalan economy was making its way in every sphere of activity which could operate at a profit. Far away from that magnificent Middle Ages, agriculture had to be rearranged and it was necessary to promote the most competitive products and to try to find markets for them. New generations devoted themselves to this purpose, people who were equally distant from the old patrician oligarchies and from the fickleness of the marginal nobility. They were laying, perhaps without knowing it, the path to modernity.

This article makes a plea for a joint study of intellectual and economic history. Mental perceptions affect economic decisions and variables, while economic realities influence the evolution of ideas. We use the case of Castilian noblemen and their management of landed property to illustrate these interrelations. This was driven to a large extent by the «moral economy» of the group, which provided a moral justification of its privileged place in society. However, during the early modern age new ideas and economic difficulties eroded these concepts and attitudes, and led to an increasing interest of nobility towards an efficient management of their properties. The delicate equilibrium between gains and prestige –intended as an indirect means to acquire wealth– as well as the intermingling of religious worries make it difficult to get a balanced view of the real situation and its evolution, which is none the less necessary.

This article presents a comparative analysis of the productive performance of the modern Spanish iron and steel industry from its origins up to the Spanish Civil War. Three aspects are examined: the extent to which the industry had the potential to compete in world markets, whether or not Spanish mills applied new technologies to re-establish or maintain their competitivity and which elements limited or increased the advantage of their products. The analysis shows a revealed advantage in products intensive in iron ore. Part of this advantage can be traced back to preferential ore supply contracts. The limits to these preferential contracts introduced incentives for maintaining the reduced scale of Spanish installations. The attempt to gain control over home markets on behalf of Altos Hornos de Vizcaya may be related to these contractual limitations. The high profits reaped through the cartelisation of the industry and the wide margin of benefit obtained by producing within the scale of the preferential ore supply contracts provide an alternative explanation for the industry's performance in the period.

This article clarifies the means whereby the Catalan cotton industry attained independence from imported yarn in a critical stage of its development between the 1790s and the War of Independence. It does so by tracking the origins, and early diffusion, of the Arkwright technology in Catalonia in the form of a machine-making and spinning company formed between an Olotí stocking frame knitter, a Barcelona silver-smith and an Ávila trained machine-maker. The spinning and weaving initiatives of the Company inform on the circumstances conditioning the Catalan industry's incorporation of the spinning processes. Light is also thrown on the character of machine-making at this stage of Catalan industrialization in a pilot-enterprise anxious to restrict technical diffusion.

Through the case of one family from the regional nobility, this paper examines the adaptation of the old landowner elites to the new board carried by the Liberal Revolution. Despite the large struggle against the manorial power and other contingencies, the Magallón procured to repair their fortune on a new basis. With a double strategy such as lessors and husbandmen, their incomes rose during the second half of the XIX century. Indeed, they were very far from the arguable Spanish stereotype of the absent landowner.

El artículo describe la transformatión de la venta al por menor a través de diversas botigues de teles de Barcelona con el fin de arrojar luz sobre la compositión de la oferta textil, por una pane, y, por otra, la evolución del crédito comercial y al consumo. Se pone de relieve que a lo largo del periodo estudiado aumentó y se diversificó la oferta de tejidos y creció la capacidad del botiguer para destinar recursos a financier la venta al fiado a sus clientes, entre los que se fue reforzando el protagonismo de los grupos menestrales.