The opening chapter provides the necessary context for both the development of British prize law and how law has, or has not, been treated in maritime strategic thinking. It provides a conceptual analysis of how and why law should be incorporated into maritime strategic thought. The conceptual part of the chapter argues that law and sea power cannot be divorced for two principal reasons. First, sea power is the vehicle through which a state is able to transform domestic maritime law into international maritime law. Second, the maritime strategic considerations of a nation drive negotiations over international maritime law in an attempt to either constrain, or expand, the rights of a sea power. The extent to which maritime nations are able to influence those negotiations depends on the relative qualities of their sea power.

Chapter 3 expands the examination of war’s great theorists and theories to include “small war,” maritime, and airpower theorists like Callwell, Galula, Trinquier, Lawrence, Mahan, Corbett, Douhet, Mitchell, Trenchard, and Slessor. This chapter emphasizes the subordinate relationship between subtheories of war and general theory and asserts that in some cases subtheories are the result of inadequacies in general theory. The chapter examines the human, political, and combat aspects of small wars from both strong and weak perspectives. Additionally, the chapter evaluates maritime and airpower subtheories and defines three tasks for domain theorists: characterize the domain in abstract terms, explain how to control it, and then show how control advances the aims of war. Finally, it synthesizes material from Chapters 2 and 3 by evaluating each theorist for balance relative to war’s twenty dialectics.

This chapter assesses the role of maritime power and global logistics in the outcome of the naval war in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. Theories of sea power and land power: Mahan and Mackinder. Blockade in Allied and Axis strategy. The vital importance of the British merchant fleet. New German submarine tactics, and Allied counter-measures. The US Navy in the Atlantic before the formal outbreak of war. Success of the U-boat attacks in early 1942. Allied anti-submarine warfare, including communications intelligence and radar. Large-scale Allied construction of escort ships, and growing role of long-range patrol aircraft and escort carriers. Admiral Dönitz recalls U-boats from the North Atlantic in May 1943. Inability of the German forces, including the U-boats, to oppose amphibious operations. Failure of new U-boat types. Limited success of the Japanese submarine fleet against Allied supply lines. Japanese failure to develop effective escort forces. The American submarine campaign develops after torpedo problems are solved. Global importance of Allied construction of new merchant ships and port facilities; this is crucial for Allied survival and then for successful global counter-attack. Advantages of the oceanic powers over the continental ones.