Over the last century, the United States has witnessed three approaches to achieving better regulatory outcomes: the removal of “economic” regulations in certain sectors; regulatory impact analysis (RIA) of new “social” regulations; and retrospective analysis of existing regulations. This article reviews the rationale for each approach, the results to date, and the remaining challenges. It finds that both institutional and technical factors influence the success of reform efforts.

Regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) weigh the benefits of regulations against the burdens they impose and are invaluable tools for informing decision makers. We offer 10 tips for nonspecialist policymakers and interested stakeholders who will be reading RIAs as consumers.

1. 1. Core problem: Determine whether the RIA identifies the core problem (compelling public need) the regulation is intended to address.

2. 2. Alternatives: Look for an objective, policy-neutral evaluation of the relative merits of reasonable alternatives.

3. 3. Baseline: Check whether the RIA presents a reasonable “counterfactual” against which benefits and costs are measured.

4. 4. Increments: Evaluate whether totals and averages obscure relevant distinctions and trade-offs.

5. 5. Uncertainty: Recognize that all estimates involve uncertainty, and ask what effect key assumptions, data, and models have on those estimates.

6. 6. Transparency: Look for transparency and objectivity of analytical inputs.

7. 7. Benefits: Examine how projected benefits relate to stated objectives.

8. 8. Costs: Understand what costs are included.

9. 9. Distribution: Consider how benefits and costs are distributed.

10. 10. Symmetrical treatment: Ensure that benefits and costs are presented symmetrically.

Applying benefit-cost analysis in the White House regulatory oversight process served as a basic mission of the Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS) during its seven-year lifespan (1974–1981). This paper reviews that CWPS experience, which involved filing comments in over 300 proceedings at more than 25 federal regulatory agencies. The paper draws on those CWPS public comments (filings), identifying persistent and pervasive deficiencies in the economic analysis regulators then and now often use as support for new regulation. CWPS filings fostered greater acceptance of benefit-cost analysis in regulatory decisions; such analysis is now required by executive order.

Because of excessive water impairment, federal and state agencies have enacted regulations to reduce water pollution from animal feeding operations. Many of the regulations are based on numbers of animals rather than the potential of an operator to impair water quality. To enhance efficiency, critical production indicators and location screening factors might be used to exempt operations that are not significantly impairing water quality. In this manner, regulations could avoid imposing unnecessary costs on the regulated public and more effectively target monitoring and enforcement resources of the regulatory agency.

After California voters decided in a state initiative to ban gestation crates and battery cages, some are asking whether other states will host similar initiatives and if they will pass. This study addresses this question by using voting data in California to predict how voters in other states would respond to a similar initiative. Results suggest that a number of states allow such initiatives and possess a demographic profile favorable to the initiative's passage. However, because these states host only a small portion of the livestock population, the impact of such initiatives on the well-being of farm animals is questionable.

In recent theories of comparative development, the role of institutional differences has been crucial. Yet, what explains comparative institutional evolution? We investigate this issue by studying the coffee exporting economies of Latin America. Although homogeneous in many ways, they experienced radically different paths of economic (and political) development, which is conventionally traced to the differential organization of the coffee industry. We show that the different forms that the coffee economy took in the 19th century was critically determined by the legal environment determining access to land, and that different laws resulted from differences in the nature of political competition and the backgrounds of political elites. Our analysis suggests that explanations of institutional differences that stress economic fundamentals can only be part of the story. At least in the economies that we study, while geography, factor endowments and technology are clearly important, their implications for the institutional structure and thus development are conditional on the form that political competition takes in society. For interesting variations in economic outcomes, endowments are not fate.

Let k be a number field and let X be a smooth, projective and geometrically integral k-variety. We show that, if the geometric Néron-Severi group of X is torsion-free, then the Galois cohomology group is finite. Previously this group was only known to have a finite exponent. We also obtain a vanishing theorem for this group, showing in particular that it is trivial if X belongs to a certain class of abelian varieties with complex multiplication. The interest in the above cohomology group stems from its connection to the torsion subgroup of the Chow group CH2(X) of codimension 2 cycles on X. In the last section of the paper we record certain results on curves which must be familiar to all specialists in this area but which we have not formerly seen in print.

The paper addresses the issue of who pays for the cost of creating artistic works and other forms of intellectual property. It examines the effect of current legal structure on regulatory performance in markets for intellectual property; specifically the effects of sequential and partial regulation. These entail the regulation of multiple market intellectual property on a “market-by-market” basis (sequential regulation) where the performance in other markets for the same intellectual property is taken as given (partial regulation). The analysis demonstrates that this form of regulation is sub-optimal and creates an incentive for copyright and antitrust laws to be employed strategically by consumers, firms and regulators. In particular, it creates an incentive to use domestic regulation as an international strategic device. The theoretical exposition is augmented by an analysis of two regulatory decisions relating to the US market for music performance rights which reflect the strategic implications of partial and sequential regulation.