Previous research suggests that innovation is heavily informed by strategic management theories and that there is little engagement with practice-based approaches. A case study of a public sector organization identified as doing something innovative is presented. Four main themes emerged. Two themes, the ‘importance of a mandate’ and the ‘development of trust’, had their foundations in traditional management practices. The others, ‘capacity to challenge the norms’ and ‘boundary spanning’, emerged from practice. It is suggested that a managerial approach that developed a supportive setting for innovation enabled the development of practices whereby innovation was effectively recognized, nurtured and sustained.

The human dimension of weed management is most evident when farmers make decisions contrary to science-based recommendations. Why do farmers resist adopting practices that will delay herbicide resistance, or seem to ignore new weed species or biotypes until it is too late? Weed scientists for the most part have ignored such questions or considered them beyond their domain and expertise, continuing to focus instead on fundamental weed science and technology. Recent pressing concerns about widespread failure of herbicide-based weed management and acceptability of emerging technologies necessitates a closer look at farmer decision making and the role of weed scientists in that process. Here we present a circular risk-analysis framework characterized by regular interaction with and input from farmers to inform both research and on-farm risk-management decisions. The framework utilizes mental models to probe the deeply held beliefs of farmers regarding weeds and weed management. A mental model is a complex, often hidden web of perceptions and attitudes that govern how we understand and respond to the world. One's mental model may limit ability to develop new insights and adopt new ways of management, and is best assessed through structured, open-ended interviews that enable the investigator to exhaust the subjects inherent to a particular risk. Our assessment of farmer mental models demonstrated the fundamental attribution error whereby farmers attributed problems with weed management primarily to factors outside of their control, such as uncontrolled weed growth on neighboring properties and environmental factors. Farmers also identified specific processes that contribute to weed problems that were not identified by experts; specifically, the importance of floods and faulty herbicide applications in the spread of weeds. Conventional farmers expressed an overwhelming preference for controlling weeds with herbicides, a preference that was reinforced by their extreme dislike for weeds. These preferences reflect a typical inverse relationship between perceived risk and benefit, where an activity or entity we perceive as beneficial is by default perceived as low risk. This preference diminishes the ability of farmers to appreciate the risks associated with overreliance on herbicides. Likewise, conventional farmers saw great risk and little benefit in preventive measures for weed control. We expect that thorough two-way communication and a deeper understanding of farmer belief systems will facilitate the development of audience-specific outreach programs with an enhanced probability of affecting better weed management decisions.

We propose a stochastic model describing a process of awareness, evaluation, and decision making by agents on the d-dimensional integer lattice. Each agent may be in any of the three states belonging to the set {0, 1, 2. In this model 0 stands for ignorants, 1 for aware, and 2 for adopters. Aware and adopters inform its nearest ignorant neighbors about a new product innovation at rate λ. At rate α an agent in aware state becomes an adopter due to the influence of adopters' neighbors. Finally, aware and adopters forget the information about the new product, thus becoming ignorant, at rate 1. Our purpose is to analyze the influence of the parameters on the qualitative behavior of the process. We obtain sufficient conditions under which the innovation diffusion (and adoption) either becomes extinct or propagates through the population with positive probability.

This article investigates the conditions under which government officials who implement policy integrate the best available science into regulatory practice. It examines the adoption of rapid wetland assessment tools, a type of science policy innovation, by street-level bureaucrats in six US Mid-Atlantic states. These bureaucrats operate in relatively opaque and discretion-laden institutional settings. The analysis of an original survey of state wetland officials shows that these officials are more likely to adopt tools when they have more opportunities to learn tool-related information and practice norms. Bureaucrats’ adoption of this class of science policy innovations appears facilitated by peer communication via network ties, on-the-job experience and incentives and disincentives associated with bureaucrats’ organisational contexts and operating environments.

Objectives: Although increasing effort is being devoted to developing strategies to increase knowledge transfer and the uptake of health technology assessment (HTA) by various stakeholders, very little is known about the utilization and dissemination of HTA findings by patient and consumer organizations. The goal of this study is to understand how and why patient and consumer organizations use HTA findings within their organizations, and what factors influence how and when they communicate their findings to members or other organizations.

Methods: We examined the use and dissemination of four controversial HTA reports by sixteen patient and consumer organizations in Ontario and Quebec. We gathered data from semistructured interviews conducted between December 2006 and April 2007.

Results: Although HTA findings are often used by the patient and consumer organizations, key differences were observed in exactly how the four HTA reports were used. Three types of use (instrumental, conceptual, and symbolic) are reported and illustrated. We highlight the importance of the organization's mission and knowledge base in explaining the types of use observed.

Conclusions: We contend that the use and dissemination of HTA reports by specific groups could help in widening the debate around controversial health technologies. The implications and opportunities for HTA agencies relate to the following: (i) identification of “lay” organizations that could help in disseminating results; (ii) acknowledgement of a “lay” audience for HTA findings; (iii) strategic inclusion of advocacy groups during the assessment process for highly controversial technologies; and (iv) contribution of these organizations to the push efforts of knowledge transfer.

Studies of creativity have tended to focus on isolated individuals, under the assumption that it can be defined as a characteristic of an extraordinary person, product, or process. Existing computational models of creative behavior have inherited this emphasis on independent generative processes. However, an increasing multidisciplinary consensus regards creativity as a systems property, and extends the focus of inquiry to include the interaction between generative individuals and evaluative social groups. To acknowledge the complementarity of evaluative processes by social groups, experts, and peers, this paper presents experimentation with a framework of design as a social activity. This model is used to inspect phenomena associated with creativity in the interaction between designers and their societies. In particular, this paper describes the strength of social ties as a mechanism of social organization, and explores its potential relation to creativity in a computational social simulation. These experiments illustrate ways in which the role of designers as change agents of their societies can be largely determined by how the evaluating group self-organizes over time. A key potential implication is that the isolated characteristics of designers may be insufficient to formulate conclusions about the nature and effects of their behavior. Instead, causality could be attributed to situational factors that define the relationship between designers and their evaluators.