Trump did not have an “inner circle” as this term is conventionally understood. That is, he was a lifelong loner, so did not have personal, professional, or political intimates. He did, however, of course, have some people around him to whom he was, relatively, close, most of whom stayed for the duration of his administration. Trump’s inner circle is divided into three groups: 1) outer ring: 2) middle ring; and 3) inner ring. In the outer ring were people such as longtime immigration maven Stephen Miller, as well as Hope Hicks and Kellyanne Conway. In the middle ring are key players such as Vice President Mike Pence and Don Jr. And in the inner ring are Trump’s well-loved daughter, Ivanka, and her indispensable advisor-husband, Jared Kushner. The First Lady, Melania Trump, is separately discussed.

Chapter 4 focusses on the local level in order to examine the way different parts of arenas lend themselves to varying forms of ordering. Within an inner circle, actors engage more regularly, revealing themselves to one another and thereby creating pressure for a stable order. An outer circle is more illegible, diffuse, and widespread, which allows actors to use it as a refuge for fluid ordering. The shape of an arena is not a deterministic structure but rather one that actors deliberately mould to support the forms of ordering that benefit them most. This line of research ascertains (1) why, how, and where actors create the dividing line between an inner and outer circle (drawing the line), (2) why and how actors enter or leave an inner circle (crossing the line), and (3) what forms of interactions make a line obsolete between inner- and outer-circle actors (erasing the line).

The Conclusion sums up by establishing patterns of how actors order different parts of an arena and create security. It presents the key findings along the four dimensions of the historical legacies of centre–periphery relations, distinctions between inner and outer circles, competition or complementation between stable and fluid ordering forms, and embedding or detaching interventions. My analysis contributes novel answers to questions about local security in conflict-affected countries and an original framework capable of facilitating future comparative analyses on the matter.

From a uniformitarian perspective, I interpret the emergence of Old English as the outcome of colonization and language contact. Likewise, I argue that its spread and speciation into so many varieties around the world, including creoles and pidgins, are consequences of different instances of colonization, which varied according to whether this involved settlement, exploitation, or trade. Each colonization style produced a different population structure, which in turn influenced how the language was appropriated and restructured by its non-heritage speakers. In England itself, one must invoke how the colonization of the land by other European nations subjected the language to the superstrate influence of the colonizers, who shifted to it. Ecological factors such as population structure (which determine patterns of social interactions and language transmission) and periodization (associated with particular moments of language shift or appropriation) help account for the differential evolution of English around the world.