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Edited by
Daniel Benoliel, University of Haifa, Israel,Peter K. Yu, Texas A & M University School of Law,Francis Gurry, World Intellectual Property Organization,Keun Lee, Seoul National University
In a prior study, one of the authors uncovered a striking degree of imbalance with respect to rates of copyright registrations between men and women. Although women made up roughly half of the population between 1978 and 2012, they authored only one third of all registered works. If the U.S. Copyright Office is to properly “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” then we must seek to understand what may be contributing to lower rates of creative authorship and copyright registration by women. This chapter discusses several factors that may contribute to the historic inequality in rates of copyright authorship by men and women. Far from exhaustive, the chapter provides a snapshot of some of the structural and economic factors that may discourage authorship by women. Specifically, the authors consider whether the gender disparity in rates of authorship is reflective of gender dynamics in other intellectual property holdings, property ownership more generally, and gender disparity within various creative professions.
The United Nations International Labour Organization (ILO) has recently incorporated driver pay into its guidelines on the promotion of safe and decent work in road transport. ILO guideline 73 states that ‘the remuneration of … CMV [commercial motor vehicle] drivers should be sustainable and take into consideration the attractiveness and sustainability of the industry’. In the spirit of this, we explore the relationship between truck drivers’ relative income and intrastate motor carrier safety performance. We utilise the United States (US) Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment and Wage data for heavy and tractor-trailer truck driver median annual incomes and the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey estimates of median household incomes to construct county level relative income ratios for truck drivers. This information is merged with public safety data to analyse the relationship between truck drivers’ relative pay and motor carrier safety performance. We find that, all else constant, carriers located in counties where driver earnings are relatively high tend to experience fewer crashes. This provides evidence that safety performance is better when driver pay is more attractive in the truck driver labour market and, consequently, validates the ILO’s assertion under guideline 73.
In recent decades enterprises that used new digital technology to sell information increased in importance. Some of these enterprises became among the most profitable enterprises in the world. Possession of information replaced to a large extent the possession of tangible commodities and capital to determine the market value of an enterprise. A new elite group of rich individuals was created. To a large extent that elite group acquired much influence, on both the economy and the politics of countries, because they could influence politicians and citizens. They could influence the work of regulators. Therefore, the main goal may have changed, from the need to control the state, as in the past, to that of controlling the market operations.
Growing popularity of welfare policies after the Second World War but opposition to them continued by pro-market economists, such as Milton Friedman, Robert Lucas, and economists at the Chicago School. Others strongly supported redistributive policies, including Amartya Sen. There was important work by John Rawls, a philosopher. He introduced two popular redistributive principles. Rawls’ “second principle” justified some income inequality if it made the market more efficient, and if it helped those at the bottom of the income distribution by creating good jobs for them. Still, redistribution of income remained controversial and continued to be strongly opposed by some. Skepticism vis-a-vis a large government role remained strong among some groups, and it would lead to market fundamentalism in the 1980s. There was debate as to how well the market was performing. Some harmony between the market and government role was approached only rarely, and for short periods.
Proponents of a basic income (BI) claim that, on top of many other benefits, it could bring significant reductions in financial poverty. Using microsimulation analysis in a comparative two-country setting, we show that the potential poverty-reducing impact of BI strongly depends on exactly how and where it is implemented. Implementing a BI requires far more choices than advocates seem to realise. The level at which a BI is set matters, but its exact specification matters even more. The impact of a BI, be it a low or a high one, also strongly depends on the characteristics of the system that it is (partially) replacing or complementing, as well as the socio-economic context in which it is introduced. Some versions of BI could potentially help to reduce poverty but always at a significant cost and with substantial sections of the population incurring significant losses, which matters for political feasibility. A partial BI complementing existing provisions appears to make more potential sense than a full BI replacing them. The simplicity of BI, however, tends to be vastly overstated.
It is arguable that the most important event in the world economy in recent decades has been the rise of China, from being on a par with Sub Sahara Africa at the start of economic reform to being an economic superpower today. That rise remains under-researched. Moreover, the great structural changes which accompanied economic growth require examination. The nationally representative China Household Income Project (CHIP) surveys, conducted for the years 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, 2013, and 2018, permit a detailed examination of many important aspects of a country's economic development. Much of the analysis of this Element is closely related to, and largely caused by, China's remarkable economic growth and income distribution over the thirty years. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This chapter deals with long-run equilibrium analysis. We first introduce a classical AD-AS model to analyze how the total output is determined in equilibrium under classical assumptions. Next, to analyze frictional unemployment, we discuss a model of the natural rate of unemployment. Then we introduce a representative-firm model to analyze real factor prices and income distribution. Then we introduce a classical model of real interest rate and discuss how the model may be employed to explain economic phenomena and conduct virtual experiments. Next, we introduce the quantity theory of money. We provide a case study of China’s hyperinflation in the 1940s. Finally, we introduce open-economy models to analyze the long-run equilibrium of exchange rates.
The neoclassical aggregate production is ubiquitous in the macroeconomic literature, despite the theoretical weaknesses exposed by the Cambridge capital controversy. This chapter gives an overview of the controversy and subsequent attempts to provide an empirical justification for the aggregate production function. These attempts are unconvincing, and the function is not needed to explain the reconciliation of the natural and warranted growth rates in mature economies. Kaldor's neo-Keynesian models and an older Marxian tradition explained this outcome by endogenizing the distribution of income and assuming that the saving rate is increasing in the profit share. But capitalist economies contain both stabilizing and destabilizing forces. Depending on the balance of these forces, the result may be endogenous cycles, as in Goodwin’s formalization of Marx’s general law of accumulation. This model has weaknesses, but the presence of endogenous cycles is in line with empirical studies which find evidence of local instability.
The baseline model in this chapter combines destabilizing Keynesian-Harrodian mechanisms with feedback effects from the labor market to firms’ output and investment decisions. The aggregation of micro-level output and investment decisions is analyzed explicitly and, following a Keynes-Marshall tradition, prices and profit shares adjust to clear the goods market. The flex-price assumption is empirically motivated: evidence shows that goods prices are much more flexible than commonly believed. The model produces limit cycles around a locally unstable steady growth path. A variant of the model that may fit parts of the service sector takes output as perfectly flexible, while the real wage is fixed. The reduced-form relations and dynamic patterns of this variant are virtually identical to those of the flex-price model, suggesting that these reduced-form equations may be a good starting point for analyzing business cycles in the aggregate economy. Reinforcing this conclusion, simulations of an extended version that uses empirically plausible parameters and includes fiscal and monetary policy shows a remarkable correspondence to cyclical patterns for the US.
Given the increasing sensitivity of buyers in the richer countries towards quality of goods they consume, low-quality exports largely constrain export-growth of the developing countries. This Element documents the attempts to estimate cross-country quality variations and reviews the demand side and supply side explanations for the low-quality phenomenon. It examines how trade policies can incentivize export-quality upgrading, and discusses the underlying channels through which a reverse causality from export-quality upon within-country income or wage inequality may develop.
This article explains a curious redirection of economic policies that uses the policy framework of Kalecki and Keynes only to undermine it. It does not negate their theory of demand management, but reformulates it to serve the powerful interests of finance in the era of financial globalisation. As a result, accountability to finance rather than to the citizens becomes more important for democratic governments, and credit rating dominates democratic performance.
This historical paper analyses the distributional consequences of computerisation on the wage share of income in United Kingdom (UK) workplaces in the first decade of this century. The reasons why computerisation might increase a firm’s income but reduce the share assigned to wages are still not well understood. The uniquely rich Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 2004–2011 includes firm-level measures of the main production inputs and outputs, and thus allows an analysis of the main mechanisms through which increased computer usage influenced the wage share of income in UK workplaces over this period. This analysis shows that the proportion of employees using computers impacted the wage share in ways that were at odds with two mainstream views: that computers complement capital, and that labour can be easily replaced by capital. The results show that the proportion of employees using computers reduced the wage share by disproportionally increasing the productivity of the least skilled employees, who were not proportionally compensated for their increase in productivity. The stability of the wage share, over the period of interest, is explained by the rise in a workplace’s share of professional employees and by a rise in work effort. This positive contribution to the wage share was counteracted by an increased share of employees using computers and by a reduction in the share of employees whose pay was negotiated by unions, thereby contributing to a decline in the wage share of firm income.
This article examines real wage-earning, productivity and earning inequality in Indonesia, focusing on differentials among provinces and economic sectors. The post-1997 Asian crisis and democratic Indonesia mimic the global trend of disconnection between wages and productivity: labour productivity continues to rise while real wage-earning stagnates or declines. This disconnection has three consequences. First, it affects income or earning distribution as confirmed by rising overall earnings inequality. Second, while it explains the conventional wisdom of an economy-wide negative relationship between real wages and employment, it is of concern that these two variables do not move in the same direction as the productivity improvements that have occurred in large and medium establishments in the manufacturing sector. Third, the disconnection between productivity and earnings growth opens a new discussion on the broader issue of quality of growth, as the data show that robust economic growth in the post-crisis Indonesia has not been accompanied by parallel improvements in the quality of employment.
Despite growing interest in proposals for a universal basic income, little advance has been made in implementation. Here we explore policy options for an Australian Basic Income. Our analysis responds to concerns that Basic Income is both too expensive and too radical a departure from existing welfare state structures to be a feasible policy option. Drawing on policy and Basic Income scholarship we identify changes to Australia’s current means-tested benefits structures that move substantially towards Basic Income while remaining consistent with historic policy norms, which we call ‘affluence testing’. Using microsimulation we explore fiscal and distributional trade-offs associated with the implementation of an affluence-tested Basic Income. Our results suggest Basic Income has the potential to significantly reduce inequality and poverty while also requiring taxes to rise substantially. Placing these trade-offs in international context we find the policy would reduce inequality to levels similar to Nordic welfare states while increasing overall taxation to approximately the OECD average.
Australian social policy has seen apparently contradictory developments over the period of economic restructuring. Social spending has increased based on a highly redistributive model while inequality has grown. This article explores the relationship between Australia’s experience of economic restructuring and the political dynamics of an emerging ‘dual welfare state’. Importantly, the article argues that Australian reformers did not reject the state per se, nor egalitarianism as an objective. Instead, reform sought to combine greater competition with compensation, generating larger inequalities in market incomes alongside growing social spending. The article explores how Labor combined neoclassical ideas about competition with a commitment to a ‘small state’ version of social democracy. This did moderate inequalities through the period of restructuring, but it also altered the dynamics of political contestation. The article provides two typologies to understand this political dynamic, arguing forms of marketisation opened the door to a political contest over the nature, rather than the extent, of public provision, while the model of targeting reinforced paternalist tendencies inherent in neoliberal reform.
The trade union movement around the world remains in the throes of a prolonged and deep decline, whether measured by membership and density, bargaining power in relation to employers or political influence over the ubiquitous neoliberal narrative that underpins the policies of many governments. Decline has not been arrested or reversed by the many strategic initiatives undertaken in recent years such as organising campaigns or coalition building, although it is possible that the state of the unions would be even more parlous if these initiatives had not been pursued. Against this bleak backcloth, there are some positive signs: unions representing specific occupations, such as school teachers, nurses and airline pilots, have retained high levels of density; and union confederations in many parts of Europe have launched successful general strikes against unpopular government reforms to pensions and welfare benefits. Unions need to position themselves as agencies that can help deal with the growing problems of wage stagnation, low wages, income inequality and insufficient economic demand. That in turn requires a coherent challenge to the dominant neoliberal narrative.
This article examines trends in social disadvantage in Australia over the decade to 2018 using two approaches: a monetary approach using poverty and a living standards approach using deprivation. We compare the two approaches, highlight their implications and assess whether the evidence produced by each is consistent with trickle-down effects. The estimates allow for variations in thresholds, the treatment of housing costs and relative and absolute measures. The findings indicate an overall decline in poverty that is dependent on the treatment of housing costs and a more consistent decline in deprivation but with little or no improvement for many experiencing poverty or deprivation. Poverty and deprivation among unemployed households were above those for people in other labour force states throughout the period and while these differentials have narrowed, the findings suggest that trickle-down effects did not reach many of those highly disadvantaged or are subject to long delays.
The extent of material inequality and its relationship to economic development are central questions for historians of all periods. In recent decades, historians of ancient Greece have sought to provide the basis for answering those questions by attempting to estimate the distribution of wealth and income in Athens (and to a lesser degree in other Greek poleis) by reference to statements in ancient texts, proxy data, and simple models. While there remains much room for debate on specifics, we suggest that, for certain periods of Athenian history, very rough, but nonetheless suggestive, estimates can be offered of the distribution of wealth across the citizen population and the distribution of income across the entire population. The chapter briefly sketches ancient Greek economic performance before discussing material inequality in Greece, with special reference to Athens, and in comparison with other premodern economies. It explains how Greek political institutions and competition among individuals and states drove comparatively high levels of growth, while inequality remained comparatively low. Finally, it tests this hypothesis against some more and less familiar facts about Greek history.
Although the Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA) did not include any environmental tax provisions, numerous tax policy discussions in the United States have considered implementing a carbon tax, giving rise to concerns about such a tax‘s potential negative effects on economic growth and the distribution of income in the US economy. This chapter examines the macroeconomic and distributional effects of implementing a representative carbon tax under several assumptions about recycling resulting tax revenues. It simulates these effects using the Diamond-Zodrow (DZ) dynamic overlapping generations computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Earlier literature and our results confirm that: (i) the negative effects of a carbon tax are moderate on the level of future GDP and negligible on the rate of economic growth; and (ii) the regressive effects of a carbon tax can easily be offset with judicious use of the resulting revenues. Policies that use carbon tax revenues to finance uniform per-household rebates and to enact policies favorable to capital formation, such as elimination of both personal taxes on dividends and capital gains, and national debt, can have a highly progressive net impact.
In search of justice in income distribution and easy access to necessities by everyone, basic income (BI) has become one of the main topics of conversation. However, there is no comprehensive study on the cost and effect of BI in Turkey. This study aims to set a theoretical framework for BI, compare different views on the topic, evaluate implementations from the world, and analyze the feasibility of a BI program in Turkey by estimating its costs and distributional consequences using a tax–benefit microsimulation. The results show that, although it improves the income distribution, implementing a basic income scheme financed by income tax would impose a significant burden on the upper half of the income distribution due to widespread poverty and income inequality. In the baseline, individual-based scenario, every individual aged 15 or above is granted a BI equal to the poverty line, while children below age 15 are granted 30 percent of this amount. This plan costs 17.77 percent of the gross domestic product and it is covered by multiplying current income tax by 3.54. Implementation of this plan decreases the poverty rate from 12.43 percent to zero and the Gini index from 0.388 to 0.181.