Implicit in C. I. Lewis's conceptual pragmatism is an account of how our ideas undergo a process of social development. Lewis's account of that process resolves a problem with Josiah Royce's theory of ideas. Royce holds that there are both sensuous and symbolic ideas. It is, however, possible for someone to have only a sensuous idea of how middle C sounds and for another person to have only the symbolic idea that middle C is 261.63 Hz. In what sense, if at all, can these two persons have the same idea, namely, the idea of middle C? On Lewis's account, while ideas in individual minds are typically constituted of both sensory correlates and pure concepts, ideas are also social products that individuals inherit through education and language acquisition. For two people to have the same idea is for them both to be heirs to the social development of the idea.

The basis for developing future products in the automotive industry is finding creative and innovative solutions. Ideas can be found by means of creativity methods that support product developers throughout the creative process. Product developers are provided with a variety of different and new methods. This leads to a “method jungle” in which it is difficult for product developers to find the most suitable path. The successful use of methods in product development goes hand in hand with the acceptance and implementation of the methods. Despite the added value, only a low use is observed in the development process. The field of Creativity Support Tools also offers a wide variety of different tools that support the creativity process. Although a chasm exists between the many CSTs that are developed and what creative practitioners actually use. Therefore, previous studies iteratively developed a user-centered tool called “IDEA” that tries to provide a tool that responds to users' needs. The question arises how the developed tool IDEA performs in “real life setting” regarding its UX and usability as well as the creativity method acceptance and level of mental workload.

Where Terence Penelhum sees a deep continuity between John Locke's theory of ideas and David Hume's theory of perceptions, I argue that the two philosophers disagree over some fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind. While Locke treats ideas as imagistic objects that we recognize as such by a special kind of inner consciousness, Hume thinks that we do not normally recognize the imagistic content of our perceptions, and instead unselfconsciously take ourselves to sense a shared public world. My disagreement with Penelhum over Hume's debt to Locke helps to explain our disagreement over the nature of Hume's scepticism.

This is a reply to Donald Ainslie's discussion of Terence Penelhum's work on Hume, Locke and the nature of consciousness; although agree on many points about the differences between Locke and Hume, I take issue with Ainslie's views about the epistemic status Hume accords to introspective acts.

In speaking of the divine ideas or God's creative act in general, Aquinas's favorite analogy is that of the artist. Hence, understanding the finite artisan, especially in the way his idea functions as an exemplar, is key to understanding the mentem Thomae on a whole host of issues most especially exemplar causality. This paper asks a question seeking specificity on the causality of the artist's idea and thereby exemplar causality in general. Is an exemplar cause in its primary instance (the idea) an instrument? Does an exemplar idea always cause in an instrumental mode? This paper, after delineating exemplar and instrumental causality separately, argues the affirmative. All ideas which function as exemplars also necessarily function as instruments, the objections of mediation, temporality, the relation of intellect/will, and efficient causality notwithstanding. In concluding the paper identifies three possible implications for this finding including a slight qualification of Aquinas's mature rejection of instrumental creation.

Kant emphasizes that moral philosophy must be divided into two parts, a ‘purely rational’ metaphysics of morals, and an empirical application to individuals, which Kant calls ‘moral anthropology’. But Kant gives humanity (die Menschheit) a prominent role even in the purely rational part of ethics – for example, one formulation of the categorical imperative is a demand to treat humanity as an end in itself. This paper argues that the only concepts of humanity suited to play such a role are the rational idea of humanity, and the rational ideal derived from this idea, which Kant discusses in Critique of Practical Reason and other texts.

Design creativity involves developing novel and useful solutions to design problems. The research in this article is an attempt to understand how novelty of a design resulting from a design process is related to the kind of outcomes, described here as constructs, involved in the design process. A model of causality, the SAPPhIRE model, is used as the basis of the analysis. The analysis is based on previous research that shows that designing involves development and exploration of the seven basic constructs of the SAPPhIRE model that constitute the causal connection between the various levels of abstraction at which a design can be described. The constructs are state change, action, parts, phenomenon, input, organs, and effect. The following two questions are asked. Is there a relationship between novelty and the constructs? If there is a relationship, what is the degree of this relationship? A hypothesis is developed to answer the questions: an increase in the number and variety of ideas explored while designing should enhance the variety of concept space, leading to an increase in the novelty of the concept space. Eight existing observational studies of designing sessions are used to empirically validate the hypothesis. Each designing session involves an individual designer, experienced or novice, solving a design problem by producing concepts and following a think-aloud protocol. The results indicate dependence of novelty of concept space on variety of concept space and dependence of variety of concept space on variety of idea space, thereby validating the hypothesis. The results also reveal a strong correlation between novelty and the constructs; correlation value decreases as the abstraction level of the constructs reduces, signifying the importance of using constructs at higher abstraction levels for enhancing novelty.