Directed migrations supported the Luso-Brazilian government’s efforts to navigate the geopolitical challenges of the post-Napoleonic world. In order to correct the perceived dearth of population in the new seat of an exiled Portuguese Court, government officials went to great lengths to jumpstart migratory flows to Brazil. Peopling served many purposes, allowing the prince regent to cement royal authority through subsidies and concessions while responding to pressures to curtail slavery. Yet, as various groups made their way to Brazil, they lay bare the challenges in long-distance migrant conveyance as well as the diplomatic liabilities involved in directed migrations. The Luso-Brazilian government thus began to defer migration drives to private, mostly German, individuals gearing for profits. This chapter traces the emergence of a strategic exchange between the Joanine government in Rio and foreign petitioners who began to shape peopling as a profitable business sphere, which allowed the Luso-Brazilian administration to quell pressures stemming from Vienna and London, but opened the way for numerous unforeseen consequences.

Although states of most types receive distinct advantages when they formalize their cooperation through public, legally binding agreements, we argue that absolute monarchs are uniquely able to capture personal benefits from secret, cartel-like cooperation. Domestic decision-making in absolute monarchies is unchecked, nontransparent, and highly personal, and these norms reproduce themselves at the international level when absolute monarchs cooperate with each other. We assess the explanatory strength of our theory through two in-depth case studies. First, we examine how the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian monarchs used informal agreements strategically during the Concert of Europe to suppress domestic unrest. Second, we explore how the Iraqi, Jordanian, and Saudi monarchs used secret agreements to counter domestic pro-republican sentiment in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Irrespective of geography, religion, and time period, the nontransparent and unilateral manner with which absolute monarchs implement domestic policies facilitates and encourages this type of informal cooperation.

While the focus of the book is on the interstate use of force post-WWII, this chapter holds a rear mirror and offers a perspective of evolution of restraints that started long before states came into being. It recounts how human societies over the centuries became states free from widespread internal use of armed force and how great powers sought to avoid major armed conflicts through policies of balance of power and multilateral conferences. It describes how they developed common rules by concluding conventions and built institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations to create a rule-based order and mechanisms and methods to prevent the interstate use of force.

The function of intervention, in this context, was to act as a corrective in international politics. Fundamental questions posed by this practice of intervention by force in the internal affairs of a sovereign state are addressed in Chapter 2, which locates them in the context of the Vienna order. What can be observed here is, first, the emergence of an anti-revolutionary paradigm of intervention, by means of which the ‘Holy Alliance’, made up of the continental powers Russia, Austria and Prussia, made a collective attempt to prevent and suppress internal unrest and revolutionary movements. Second, and in parallel to these efforts, the British struggle to suppress the Atlantic slave trade gave birth to a further-reaching conception of intervention centred on the military enforcement of an internationally agreed humanitarian norm.

The European peace and security system established in the course of the Congress of Vienna is presented here as a more complex arrangement than conveyed in the traditional political model of the balance of power. The statesmen and diplomats who drafted the settlements of 1814-1815 genuinely and succesfully sought to ban war and to establish a lasting peace after the long and bloody wars against Napoleon, a peace which endured until the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853. Instead of a balance of power based on mutual military deterrence, they arrived at a balance of negotiation, a compromise based on active cooperation. As such, the order of Vienna, though imperfect, was a definite refinement compared to the traditional paradigm of the balance of power inherited from the Treaty of Utrecht. It created a Concert of Europe, which even beyond its impact throughout the nineteenth century still frames a European political ethos up to this day.