Following failure of the stimulatory policies post the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting instability of the Euro, national fiscal consolidation with real sanctions for non-compliance has become a key focus of most governments as they address escalating budget deficits and rapidly rising public debt. The problem is that agreement by central governments to adopt national fiscal rules, whether self-imposed or imposed by some supranational institution, leaves unaddressed how such rules and sanctions should be adopted by (or imposed on) sub-central and local governments. To date, the primary focus has been on whether the encouragement given over recent decades to fiscal decentralisation has worsened public debt levels and made national fiscal consolidation by central governments more difficult. This article argues that what is missing from this discussion is attention to the intergovernmental institutional arrangements and how they and their reform are potentially crucial to both national fiscal consolidation and ensuring retention of the benefits of fiscal decentralisation.

Debate around Wales’ place in the United Kingdom has intensified over recent years, with radically differing visions for the union of the Welsh and UK governments emerging alongside growing (though still minority) support for Welsh independence. This article argues that these constitutional debates must be considered alongside Wales’ current fiscal position. Wales’ estimated fiscal deficit is reflective of long-standing economic underperformance as part of the UK, which we argue is unlikely to be addressed under current economic, fiscal and constitutional arrangements. On the other hand, it also suggests a difficult economic outlook for an independent Wales, which would require tough fiscal and economic choices to address Wales’ apparent balance of payments deficit.

The part of the UK fiscal framework which determines how UK government funding is allocated across the four home nations has undergone profound change since 2012, given tax and social security devolution. The UK government’s post-Brexit plans for regional development funding, state aid, regulation and trade negotiations have led to significant disagreements about the nature of the devolved fiscal and constitutional settlement. And the COVID-19 pandemic provided a major shock to a fiscal system with limited flexibility for the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish devolved governments. This paper reviews the changes and challenges faced during these reforms and policy shocks. We find that: tensions about reforms to funding arrangements reflect the inconsistency of principles guiding the reforms; that the UK government’s post-Brexit plans do reduce the policy autonomy of the devolved governments, but reflect powers central governments often have in even highly decentralised countries; and that temporary changes to rules and the nature of the COVID-19 pandemic prevented a subnational fiscal crisis, but that more systematic change may make the system more robust to future shocks. This suggests that a review of the principles underpinning the UK’s subnational fiscal and economic policies would be highly worthwhile.

The equilibrium size of a nation state is, in part, the result of a trade-off between the gains from scale economies in the provision of public services and the costs of applying uniform policy to heterogeneous cultural, institutional and geographical fundamentals. Changes in such fundamentals can thus place pressure on states to reform over time. We consider this dynamic state formation process in the context of Scotland within the United Kingdom. First, we review the recent research in economic history on the persistence and evolution of such fundamentals. Second, we consider the history of Scotland both before and after the 1707 Act of Union in the light of that broader economic history literature. We conclude with some implications of fundamental persistence for current debates on the place of Scotland within the United Kingdom.

United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has regulated drinking water since the 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Congress directed it to achieve three conflicting goals: (i) establish stringent nationwide standards, (ii) ensure that these standards are both technologically and economically feasible, and (iii) accommodate significant differences in cost among water systems of different sizes with different water sources. USEPA chose to emphasize goal (i) at the expense of (ii) and (iii). In 1986, Congress intensified its preference for (i), was silent concerning goal (ii), and criticized USEPA for failing to achieve goal (iii). In lieu of economic feasibility, the Agency substituted “affordability,” defined as expenditures up to 2.5 % of national median household income irrespective of the benefits. This imposed deadweight losses, and substantial inequities on rural areas, low-income communities, and low-income households generally. In 1996, Congress directed USEPA to use benefit-cost analysis positively and normatively. Regulations issued since 1996 do not appear to comply, however. A review of post-1996 drinking water standards indicates that most were certified by USEPA as having benefits that justified costs, but these determinations were unsupported by the Agency’s own regulatory impact analyses. This article proposes that USEPA define by regulation that “economic feasibility” means marginal benefits exceed marginal costs for the smallest water system subject to SDWA, and that all future drinking water standards must be economically feasible. Economic efficiency would be greatly enhanced and the pervasive inequities of “affordability” greatly diminished. Unlike “affordability,” this definition is objective and compatible with lay intuition about the meaning of key regulatory terms.

EU Member States, particularly in the Euro Area, have been pushed to adopt more extensive and intrusive fiscal rules, but what is the evidence that the rules are succeeding? The EU level Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been – and remains – the most visible rule-book, but it has been complemented by a profusion of national rules and by new provisions on other sources of macroeconomic imbalance. Much of the analysis of rules has concentrated on their technical merits, but tends to neglect the political economy of compliance. This paper examines the latter, looking at compliance with fiscal rules at EU and Member State levels and at the rules-based mechanisms for curbing other macroeconomic imbalances. It concludes that politically driven implementation and enforcement shortcomings have been given too little attention, putting at risk the integrity and effectiveness of the rules.

The Scotland Bill 2015–16 would make the Scottish government one of the most powerful sub-central governments in the OECD in terms of its control over spending and taxation. The UK government has also announced plans to introduce ‘English Votes for English Laws’ (EVEL), where the support of a majority of English MPs would be necessary to pass legislation deemed to impact on England only. The objective of this paper is to examine the potential for spillovers to arise in monetary unions of asymmetric nations where fiscal policy choices are taken locally. We extend a model of Chari and Kehoe (2008) to show the sub-optimal consequences of devolved fiscal policy in a moneteary union with a dominant member state. Because England is so much larger than the other constituent nations of the UK, its fiscal policy choices will have a commensurately stronger impact on UK monetary policy. As a result, UK monetary policy might be inappropriate for the smaller nations, calling into question the economic efficiency of EVEL. This is a general result which arises from the asymmetry of nations rather than specific UK funding arrangements or behavioural responses.

This article describes the centralised nature of the UK, briefly describes the changes now under way in Scotland and Wales and then analyses differences in output per head as between nations and regions. It then considers the scope for devolution, including fiscal devolution within England. The United Kingdom today is one of the most fiscally-centralised of all OECD countries, but there will soon be reform in Scotland and Wales, with significant devolution of tax-raising powers to Edinburgh and Cardiff. In England, there is currently no ‘state’ or ‘regional’ tier of government. There have been significant differences in GDP/GVA per head of the nations and regions of the UK for many decades. Efforts to ‘rebalance’ the GDP/GVA totals shown above have involved public expenditure and investment programmes over several decades. The results of the UK's centralised distribution of resources, if any, on changes in regional and sub-regional performance are little studied. A highly-centralised system of taxation and public expenditure is not, it would appear, a guarantee of territorial economic equalisation. In a potentially radical policy departure, George Osborne has moved further than any minister in recent times towards a form of city-regional devolution within England. In the first instance, any devolved power is likely to be over public expenditure, though in the longer term fiscal devolution may become possible. The move towards a quasi-federal UK is now well under way.

Economic issues will be key determinants of the outcome of the Scottish referendum on independence. Pensions are a key element of the economic case for or against independence. The costs of funding pensions in an independent Scotland would be influenced by mortality risks, the costs of borrowing and the segmentation of costs and risks (i.e. pricing to Scotland's experience rather than pooled across UK experience). We compare the overall costs of providing pensions in an independent Scotland against the resources that are available to cover these costs. Scotland has worse mortality experience than the UK as a whole, and Scottish government debt is likely to attract a liquidity premium relative to UK government debt. An independent Scottish government would have to create a bond market for public debt. The liquidity premium would make pensions cheaper to buy, but taxpayers or the consumers of public services would have to pay the cost.

Ce papier examine l'externalité verticale provenant de l'imposition d'une même base par des gouvernements aux territoires gigognes, phénomène récurrent observé dans la plupart des organiations étatiques et ayant fait l'objet d'un éclairage moins soutenu que celui de concurrence fiscale horizontale. Le modèle étudie un système comportant plusieurs niveaux de dèci-deurs et utilise la théorie des multiprincipaux pour analyser l'optimalité du degré de taxe lorsque plusieurs autorités exercent leur pouvoir fiscal sur une même assiette imposable. Cette théorie permet en effet d'appréhender et de décrire les mécanismes de concurrence entre différents décideurs poursuivant des objectifs propres. Il ressort que le comportement non coopératif de collectivités appartenant à différents niveaux administratifs et partageant une même base fiscale conduit à une hausse du taux de taxation auquel cette base est soumise. Chacun néglige en effet la perte de recettes fiscales qu'il inflige aux autres niveaux de gouvernement etdéfinit donc une taxe supérieure à celle qui correspondrait au coût marginal social. Le taux final d'imposition excède celui qui résulterait de l'exercice par un seul décideur public de la politique fiscale à mettre en oeuvre. Il apparaît en outre que la prise en compte d'une asymétrie d'information exerce un effet dépressif sur le niveau global d'imposition en conauisant chaque échelon à accorder une rente aux firmes, et donc à modérer sa pression fiscale, afin qu'elles révèlent leur information privéeet que puissent être mises en oeuvre les politiques les plus proches d'un optimum social.

Policy towards asylum seekers has been a controversial topic for more than a decade. Rising numbers of asylum applications have been met with ever-tougher policies to deter them. Following a period of policy harmonisation, the EU has reached a crucial stage in the development of a new Common European Asylum System. This paper seeks to shed light on what form this should take. It summarises the development of policy to date and it argues that these policies have been too tough, even from the point of view of EU citizens. Using an economic framework, it examines scenarios with different degrees of policy harmonisation and integration among EU countries. Finally, it argues that there is an important role for enhanced burden-sharing arrangements.

We examine proposals to introduce national insurance against unevenly distributed shocks in the European Community. This insurance would operate differently from tax and government spending activities that now yield regional insurance within countries, since these activities are mainly designed for other purpose such as income redistribution and general revenue-raising. According to our evidence, the appeal of such insurance is very limited because the risks are too highly correlated and there is an excessive chance that a country in difficulty would not receive aid. The costs of a continuing programme are likely to exceed the benefits.