An article published in 2018 by J.D. Hamilton gained significant attention due to its provocative title, “Why you should never use the Hodrick-Prescott filter.” Additionally, an alternative method for detrending, the Hamilton regression filter (HRF), was introduced. His work was frequently interpreted as a proposal to substitute the Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter with HRF, therefore utilizing and understanding it similarly as HP detrending. This research disputes this perspective, particularly in relation to quarterly business cycle data on aggregate output. Focusing on economic fluctuations in the United States, this study generates a large amount of artificial data that follow a known pattern and include both a trend and cyclical component. The objective is to assess the effectiveness of a certain detrending approach in accurately identifying the real decomposition of the data. In addition to the standard HP smoothing parameter of $\lambda = 1600$, the study also examines values of $\lambda ^{\star }$ from earlier research that are seven to twelve times greater. Based on three unique statistical measures of the discrepancy between the estimated and real trends, it is evident that both versions of HP significantly surpass those of HRF. Additionally, HP with $\lambda ^{\star }$ consistently outperforms HP-1600.

Decarbonization is a momentous challenge for capitalism and makes one ask which changes in its morphology may be necessary to achieve that objective. The contribution by the French economist Albert Aftalion (1874–1956), with its emphasis on intermediate levels of aggregation (the “meso“ approach), the differentiated time profiles of economic actoivities, and their differential speeds of reaction to dynamic impulses, provides an invaluable heuristic for conceptualizing the structural transformations required by transition to a low energy regime. Aftalion’s analysis of industrial capitalism emphasizes that structural changes occur along multiple co-existing time horizons. This provides tools to analyze the time constraints on the sequencing of structural changes for different sectors on a decarbonization trajectory without neglecting the strict time requirements for implementing effective climate change mitigation. This interplay of time horizons is central to decarbonization, and it will require a new balance between the invisible hand of markets and the visible hand of states and other public bodies. Moreover, Aftalion’s emphasis on material constraints offers a novel approach to conceptualizing the importance of intermediate levels of aggregation in economic theory, thereby offering a new basis for sectoral policymaking and a fundamental challenge to institutionalist accounts of the morphology of capitalism.

Although it has a durable institutional shape, the operation of capitalism takes different forms across space and time with varying distributive effects. This article contributes to a growing literature considering the successive forms taken by capitalism in the developed democracies since World War II. It develops a distinctive conception of these forms as “growth regimes” that are mutually constituted by the core practices of firms and reinforcing public policies specific to each historical era. The movement of firm practices and government policies is then examined with a view to identifying the growth regimes of three postwar eras of modernization, liberalization, and knowledge-based growth.

This article argues that the relationship between capitalism and democracy is not immutable but subject to changes over time best understood as movements across distinctive growth and representation regimes. Growth regimes are the institutionalized practices central to how a country secures economic prosperity based on complementary sets of firm strategies and government policies. Representation regimes reflect conditions in the arenas of electoral and producer group politics that confer influence on specific segments of the population. The emphasis is on how economic experiences and changes in the structure of electoral cleavages alter the terms of political contestation, thereby giving voice to specific sets of interests and altering the balance of influence between capitalism and democracy. The analysis examines how the growth and representation regimes of the developed democracies have changed through three post-war eras to yield distinctive distributive outcomes in each era.

The expanding literature on growth regimes has recently been applied to explain the growth of populist movements across the OECD. Such applications posit a stand-off between debtors and creditors as the core conflict that generates populism. While insightful, the theory has problems explaining why, in some European countries, such movements pre-date both the global financial crisis and the austerity measures that followed, factors that are commonly seen as causing the rise of populism. This article takes a different tack. It derives shifts in both political parties and party systems from the growth regime framework. In doing so it seeks to explain the evolution of the cartel form of party that dominated the political systems of Europe from the late 1990s through to the current period and why that form proved unable to respond meaningfully to both the financial crisis and the political crisis that followed it.

This paper investigates patterns of variation in economic growth across and within countries using a time-varying transition matrix Markov-switching approach. The model developed here explains the dynamics of growth based on a collection of different states that countries pass into and out of over time; in addition, these states are characterized by their own submodels and growth patterns. The transition matrix among the different states varies over time—depending on the conditioning variables of each country—with a linear dynamic for each state. We develop a generalization of Diebold's EM algorithm and estimate a sample model in a panel with a transition matrix conditioned on institutional quality and the investment level. We find three states of growth: stable growth, miraculous growth, and stagnation. The results show that institutional quality is an important determinant of long-term growth, whereas the investment level plays a variety of roles: it contributes positively in countries with high-quality institutions but is of little relevance in countries with medium- or low-quality institutions.