This article examines the moralistic language and arguments used in relation to genetics. The focus is on three practices: (1) the claims that there is a duty to know about one’s own genetic makeup, (2) assertions that genetic information should be used to inform reproductive decisions, and (3) the proposition that there are moral reasons to participate in biobank research. With these three, the author contends that there are equally good, if not better, arguments to challenge them from a Millian perspective. Furthermore, especially in the current political climate, there is a need to respect people’s privacy concerns.

Concern that advances in predictive genetic testing might result in increased numbers of individuals being denied access to life assurance has led many countries to restrict insurers’ historic ‘right to underwrite’. Critics of the insurance industry present genetic discrimination as a threat to the social values of equality and inclusion. However, by unpacking the foundational principles of private insurance, and adopting a more critical approach to genetic information, discrimination, fairness and inclusion, this article suggests that the normative values underpinning life assurance in Britain are unlikely to engender widespread exclusion in an age of increased genetic knowledge, but over-regulation of industry might itself create unacceptable inequity within the market. This suggests that we ought to link the legitimacy of regulatory constraint to the type of social good particular forms of insurance exemplify, and instead of focusing narrowly on genetic information consider the broader implications of risk assessment for the privatization of welfare.

The John Moore case in the United States and the Alder Hey scandal in Britain raised many urgent questions about the legal and ethical status of human tissue collections. This article intervenes in the current debates by posing an ontological question about tissue banking. The present discussions of the regulation of tissue archiving often rely upon a crisp, yet ill-defined, distinction between bodily ‘material’ and medical ‘information’, each bringing with it different legal and ethical considerations. Arguing that the distinction is actually difficult to draw and in urgent need of clarification, we propose that the term ‘information’ is too broad and vague to do the necessary work and suggest replacing it with a carefully theorized account of the precise ontological differences between material and textual resources. In the second half of the article we explore one particular case of the extraction of information from human tissues—the DNA sequence. We conclude by deploying the definitions reached in the first section in an effort to clarify some of the legal and ethical concerns about ‘genetic information’.