Donor organizations and multilaterals require ways to measure progress toward the goals of creating an open internet, and condition assistance on recipient governments maintaining access to information online. Because the internet is increasingly becoming a leading tool for exchanging information, authoritarian governments around the world often seek methods to restrict citizens’ access. Two of the most common methods for restricting the internet are shutting down internet access entirely and filtering specific content. We conduct a systematic literature review of articles on the measurement of internet censorship and find that little work has been done comparing the tradeoffs of using different methods to measure censorship on a global scale. We compare the tradeoffs between measuring these phenomena using expert analysis (as measured by Freedom House and V-Dem) and remote measurement with manual oversight (as measured by Access Now and the OpenNet Initiative [ONI]) for donor organizations that want to incentivize and measure good internet governance. We find that remote measurement with manual oversight is less likely to include false positives, and therefore may be more preferable for donor organizations that value verifiability. We also find that expert analysis is less likely to include false negatives, particularly for very repressive regimes in the Middle East and Central Asia and therefore these data may be preferable for advocacy organizations that want to ensure very repressive regimes are not able to avoid accountability, or organizations working primarily in these areas.

The Comparative Survey of Freedom, first published by Freedom House in 1973, is now the most widely used indicator of democracy by both academics and the U.S. government alike. However, literature examining the Survey’s origins is virtually nonexistent. In this article, I use archival records to challenge Freedom House’s retrospective account of the indicator’s creation. Rather than the outcome of a scientific methodology by multiple social scientists, the Survey was produced by a single political scientist, Raymond Gastil, according to his own hunches and impressions. How, then, did this indicator rise to such prominence? I argue that the Survey’s notoriety can be attributed to its early promotion in both political science and American foreign policy decision-making, as well as the fact that it fit the dominant scientific and political paradigms of the time.