Compared to previous secondary legislation, Article 11 of the Digital Covid Certificates regulations was remarkably explicit in its requirement for Member States to consider scientific evidence when restricting free movement for the certificate holders. However, we argue in this Article that the regulations achieved a partial codification of the existent case law of the CJEU rather than imposing any additional requirements. Namely, the case law had already required Member States to rely on scientific evidence that reflects the international consensus, that is relevant and up to date, and that the evidence had to demonstrate by means of a risk assessment a real risk to the public health. We also discuss these findings in the light of the proportionality and precautionary principles and suggest that understanding the evolution of the EU legal order’s evidentiary requirements is useful in the light of the legislator’s claim of objective and rational policy-making procedures in public health and other crises.

This Article provides an empirical analysis of all free movement of doctors cases decided by the CJEU. The aim of the Article is twofold: to provide a ‘characterisation’ of the type of doctors who rely on free movement law, and to make a link between their reliance on free movement law and the concept of medical professionalism. In what circumstances, and with what purpose, do doctors rely on free movement law? And does their reliance on free movement law pose a risk to medical professionalism? The analysis shows that most cases before the CJEU focussed on the expertise and qualifications of doctors. Many cases were brought by groups of doctors or medical professional associations. In most cases, the aim of the doctor's reliance on free movement law was to defend medical professionalism. Nevertheless, some recent cases show that doctors do rely on free movement law to restrict their accountability towards patients or national healthcare systems. Moreover, these cases show that arguments based on free movement law are relied on in a broader range of non-specialised courts or tribunals. This makes it important that national courts continue to engage in a dialogue with the CJEU.

One of the major pillars of the African Union is the integration of peoples and the ability for them to move freely from one member country to another, with the right to reside and practise their trade or profession. This aspect of integration found full expression in the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment, adopted in 2018. Upon operationalization, it will remove obstacles to the movement of people, capital and resources in the region and give expression to aspiration 2 of the African Union Agenda 2063. However, significant challenges lie on the path of its implementation. This article doctrinally reviews the protocol, looking at its prospects for promoting African integration and development, and anticipates some of the problems that the protocol will face. It concludes with recommendations for achieving its lofty but desirable ends.

Due to its severity, the COVID-19 pandemic is one of the greatest crises to have tested the European Union’s (EU) ability to take effective action. The restrictive measures adopted by the Member States to curb its spread affected in particular the free movement of people and partly of goods. This prompted the EU to take action inter alia to maintain essential travel, protect supply chains, enhance contact tracing and facilitate the coordinated resumption of travel. Building on the notion of “output legitimacy”, this paper assesses the EU’s success in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic in transport by looking at the four main initiatives between the end of 2020 and June 2022, namely: (1) the EU Digital COVID Certificates; (2) cross-border contact tracing through Passenger Locator Forms; (3) the “Green Lanes” for freight transport; and (4) the coordinated approach to facilitating safe and free movement. These initiatives are measured against the EU’s legal competence, economic interests, political pressure and the added value of EU action. While recognising the small set of cases, the results show that, although legal competence is a decisive factor for success, EU initiatives can achieve equivalent effect even in its absence, provided other conditions are met.

This paper explores the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) citizenship regime by investigating the institutional perceptions of five departments of the ECOWAS Commission. Creating a citizenship regime has been a central objective of the organisation's institutional framework but previous research has refrained from examining its multiplicity. The paper uses the concept of citizenship regime consisting of the dimensions rights, access, belonging and responsibility mix as the conceptual lens and draws on institutional documents and primary data from interviews conducted at the ECOWAS Commission. The paper contributes to current debates in citizenship studies and African regionalism and the literature on supra-national citizenship building, regional integration and governance research in Africa and elsewhere. The empirical data show that movement is central to the ECOWAS citizenship regime, whether formulated in terms of a right, as a way to facilitate access, or a way to establish a sense of regional belonging.

EU citizenship, now so central to the European Union's project, remains a highly contested concept in respect of its meaning, its scope, and its purpose. By considering the large body of legal texts and their travaux préparatoires from the 1972 Paris European Council until the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, we have explored what the original drafters had in mind in developing the concept of EU citizenship and, crucially, what they did not. The article argues that the notion of European citizenship was seen as a tool to define European identity, and thus to continue the building of the European Union as a whole. European citizenship was thus viewed through a constitutional prism from the outset. The constitutional approach to the concept of European citizenship fed into the wider constitutionalisation project under the Maastricht Treaty and, later, permeated the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. We wish to argue that this focus on the constitutional nature of EU citizenship overlooked the more practical implications of citizenship, such as how to manage immigration flows or the infrastructure changes needed in the host state to accommodate a significant number of arrivals of EU citizens (in particular in respect of housing and social welfare benefits). It took more than 20 years after the introduction of EU citizenship for the Court of Justice to become aware of the practical, as opposed to constitutional, implications of the direction of travel it had pursued. By that time, it was too late for the United Kingdom, one of the countries which had received the largest number of EU citizens; the UK voted by a narrow margin to leave the European Union.

EU legal geography concerns itself with the mutually constitutive relationship between EU law and space (also, and increasingly so, time). This requires reconstructing and systematizing the widely used concepts which reveal the geographical basis of EU law (such as movement and circulation), but also developing a particular viewpoint, indeed a specific “ethos of investigation”, which equips us with the tools to challenge and transcend the dominant ways of doing EU law. In particular, it is argued that a geographic turn in European legal studies will foster the study of how law works “on the ground” and will allow challenging taken-for-granted ideas about the relationship between law and political order, while throwing new light on the very technical concepts with which we reconstruct, analyse and assess EU law.

The present article investigates how begging performed by citizens of new EU-member states in Eastern Europe was debated in parliaments in Denmark, Sweden and Norway during the period 2007–2017. The empirical analysis shows significant cross-country divergences: In Denmark, efforts targeted controlling migration, either directly or indirectly, via various deterrence strategies. In Sweden, the emphasis was rather on alleviating social needs while migrants reside in the country and trying to decrease their incentives to migrate in the first place by ameliorating conditions in sending countries. In Norway, one predominant framing revolved around the issue of human trafficking of beggars. Despite substantial differences, the analyses show a gradual shift in a similar direction in all three countries. While a social frame was initially more commonly understood as the appropriate way to approach begging, over time a criminal frame has gained ground in all three countries. The article argues that this development must be understood in light of marginalized intra-EU migrants’ legal status as both insiders and outsiders in the Scandinavian welfare states. Due to these individuals’ “in-between status”, neither conventional social policy nor immigration control measures are perceived as available, making policymakers more prone to turn to criminal policy tools.

This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.