The dramatic impact of the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington sharply intensified relations between Australia and the USA. The bilateral relationship was reconfirmed as the two states joined in war against an elusive, and unexpected, enemy. As the war on terrorism broadened, Australia enthusiastically joined the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’, sending troops to fight in Afghanistan and, more controversially, deploying forces alongside the USA in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. From late 2001 commentary in Australia invariably accepted that ‘relations with the United States dominated Australian foreign affairs’ or more subtly observed that ‘the central dynamics of Australian foreign policy revolved around the issue of relations with the superpower, and the implications of this relationship’ for the broader exercise of Australian foreign policy.

When planning for this volume commenced in 1997, few signs were present of the turbulence that was to engulf Australian policies in the last years of the twentieth century. Prime Minister John Howard’s desire that Australians should feel ’comfortable’ seemed to have been realised in the foreign policy arena. To reinforce this sense of comfort, the new government, which assumed office in March 1996, sought to reinforce relations with ’great and powerful friends’, particularly the United States. The relationship with traditional friends in Europe was also given a boost: the government characterised its new policy direction with the catch-phrase ’Asia first, but not Asia only’.

Australia’s extraordinary economic boom continued throughout the period covered by this volume. By the end of 2005, the economy had enjoyed fifty-seven quarters of consecutive economic growth: Paul Keating’s ‘recession we had to have’ was a distant memory. Unemployment fell to slightly more than 5 per cent, the lowest rate for three decades. The government’s budget was enjoying record surpluses. Australia’s economic growth rate in the period was substantially above that of the average for the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the grouping of leading industrialised economies. Australia’s ranking in the OECD on per capita income rose from eighteenth in the early 1990s to eighth by 2005. Astute intervention by the Reserve Bank of Australia through the imposition of a marginal increase in interest rates in early 2005 appeared to have succeeded in deflating the housing bubble and in ensuring a soft landing for the economy.

Ever since diplomatic relations were normalised by the Whitlam government in 1972, maintaining a constructive and productive relationship with China has been a challenge for successive Australian governments. The period under study here – from 1996 to 2000 – is further evidence that Australia’s relationship with China is shaping up as the toughest foreign policy task in the twenty-first century. There are three reasons for this. First is the growing power asymmetry between the two countries and the fact that while Australia is essentially a status quo power, China is non-status quo, dissatisfied with the current distribution of power in the region. Second, the nature of Australia’s relations with China has now come to depend increasingly on Beijing’s self-perception of its future role and interests in the region. Last but not least, the wide divergence in the two countries’ philosophical approaches to governance, political culture, and values introduces an element of uncertainty and unpredictability in the bilateral relationship.

Foreign policy in the period covered in this volume was largely dominated by the Australian response to the events of 11 September 2001 and its consequences. A federal election campaign was keenly anticipated at that time, but foreign policy issues – beyond the question of the treatment of asylum seekers – were not expected to be a major concern. Little that had happened so far in that year prefigured what was to come. The new George W. Bush administration in Washington had signalled its intention to adopt a distinctive and less internationalist stance, refusing to adhere to the Kyoto Protocol (intended to restrain the global emission of greenhouse gases) and taking a much more critical view of the rising power of China. Although there were signs that on these issues Australia was likely to follow the US lead, and the initiation of studies on the impact of a free trade agreement with the USA was a further indicator of the potential similarities in outlook of the two governments, the closeness post-11 September of the Howard Government’s alignment with its Washington counterpart surprised even some conservative commentators.

As 2001 opened, security and defence issues were already more central to Australia’s national agenda, both domestically and internationally, than had typically been the case over the previous three decades. Only a few weeks before the start of 2001, on 6 December 2000, Prime Minister John Howard had tabled in Parliament a new Defence White Paper. Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force committed his government to a new and more expansive conception of Australia’s strategic interests and military objectives and to substantial and sustained increases in defence funding. These decisions were in part a prudent policy response to long-term strategic and fiscal trends stretching back a decade or more. But the tone and style as well as the content of the White Paper clearly showed that, for Howard, security was also at the centre of the government’s political agenda at the start of what was certain to be a federal election year.

The nature of Australia’s economy and ecosystem ensures that Australian governments have taken a continued interest in the negotiations for, and implications of, most of the world’s multilateral environmental agreements. Australia has an energy-intensive economy. Agriculture and extractive industries, both of which have had severe environmental consequences, contribute significantly to export earnings. The country is both highly urbanised (around 85 per cent of the population lives in cities) and the world’s only industrialised ’mega-diverse’ country, custodian of about 10 per cent of the world’s biodiversity. Australia is also one of the few industrialised countries that suffers extensive desertification – over half of the country’s land area is in need of some form of repair. Australia’s exclusive economic zone – 11 million square kilometres of marine waters – is one of the largest in the world. Australia’s environmental role in world affairs includes its domestic responses to environmental treaty obligations and its commitment to sustainable development both at home and abroad.

The prospects for Australia’s relations with its most immediate region at the beginning of the decade seemed bleak indeed. On the surface at least, they continued to be troubled as the rise of terrorism and people smuggling as major security issues, and Australia’s participation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, introduced new sources of tension into Australia’s relations with its northern neighbours. Yet by 2005 the picture had changed remarkably. John Howard’s government, despite being dogged by diplomatic gaffes and pilloried by its critics, had achieved some remarkable successes in Australia’s relations with South-East Asia. Bilateral trade agreements had been signed or were under negotiation with the region’s major economies. Talks had begun on a new security agreement with Indonesia, and the Australian Prime Minister seemed to have forged a close rapport with the first directly elected Indonesian President. Perhaps most significantly, Howard was invited to two meetings crucial to the development of a new East Asian regional institution: the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in November 2004 and the inaugural East Asia Summit in December 2005.

The Australian economy performed surprisingly strongly throughout most of the five-year period under consideration. The performance was surprising, that is, given the troubles – concentrated in the years 1997–99 – that afflicted most East Asian economies, which together account for more than half of Australia’s exports. By the end of the five-year period, however, the triumphalism that had accompanied Australian official reaction to the Asian economic crisis began to look premature. In 1999–2000, the government had to apply the brakes (in the form of higher interest rates) to the economy largely because of external constraints: a worsening current account deficit and a depreciating currency. The economy was showing all-too-familiar signs of the stop–go pattern that had choked off growth in earlier periods. Fears were mounting that the economic growth that had occurred throughout the period – the country’s longest boom since the 1960s – was drawing to an end.

Asylum seekers, the war in Iraq, and the threat of terrorism dominated foreign policy in the first years of the twenty-first century not only in the political arena but also in the polls. Not since the 1980s and the debate about Asian immigrants had questions of immigration loomed so large; not since the Vietnam War had the deployment of Australian troops in a US-led invasion of a distant land proved so divisive; and never before had Australia had to grapple with the threat of international terrorism. Border protection and terrorism figured prominently in the run-up to the 2001 election; security issues and, to a lesser extent, the war in Iraq were factors in the election held in 2004.

Over the last quarter-century, the relations between Australia and Latin America, while not intense, clearly have thickened and deepened. And the pace of this thickening and deepening is quickening. The most obvious manifestation is in the economic realm, in trade and investment. But our research indicates that in more obscure areas, such as cultural exchange, education, and environmental issues, much is happening and there is every reason to expect that the contact will expand. That said, any informed observer of Australia’s relations with Latin America would be struck by how little each knows about the other, how recent and relatively superficial the contacts are, and consequently how tenuous they could remain unless both the Australians and the Latin Americans invest further substantial effort. This effort cannot be limited to the material – trade and investment – but must include education at all levels to overcome the barriers of language and culture, of limited transport, of competing economies, of stereotypes.

During the first five years of the twenty-first century the Howard Government took on a more activist role in the South Pacific. This trend was influenced by the ‘war on terror’, particularly the Bali bombings, which struck home in a manner that the 11 September attacks could not, but it also firmly reflected policy orthodoxies. This is not to say that responding to terrorism closer to home has not become a justification for intervention in the region, but it must be acknowledged that declaratory policy was not always matched by operational realities. The ‘war on terror’ opened up the political space in which increased intervention in the South Pacific could be undertaken, but events within the region itself were the central factor contributing to intervention. In particular, domestic crises in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, and to a lesser extent Nauru, presented major challenges for Australia, and the creation and maintenance of an environment conducive to intervention was a significant foreign policy shift by the government.

The Australian Federal Parliament stands magnificently atop Constitution Hill in Canberra as a symbol of the importance Australia attaches to its long and strong democratic tradition. The semiotic message of the Parliament’s architecture is that this is a people’s place, ‘a publicly accessible monument’, a place where its visitors will be as much a part of the fabric of its business as the business of the legislature. The Parliament has used technology to match this physical accessibility such that never has there been a period when greater access to the business and deliberations of the Parliament has been more possible. This accessibility has, however, been matched in the period under review by increasing physical constraints and barriers to access never envisaged at its creation: for the first time in the history of the Commonwealth, the Parliament was closed to the people – on the occasion of the visit of President George W. Bush in October 2003. In this way, the Parliament stands also as a symbol of the way the world has changed since the bombings of the twin towers in September 2001.

Before the events of the later 1990s, if there was one issue in Australia’s external relations on which there existed unalloyed bipartisan agreement it was East Timor. Governments of both persuasions had regarded the question of positive relations with Indonesia to be of far greater moment than the right to self-determination of the East Timorese, irrespective of the extent to which their Indonesian governors observed or denied their human rights. A Coalition government initiated the negotiation of the Timor Gap Zone of Co-operation Treaty, and a Labor government signed and ratified it. Though some thirty-two states indicated in one way or another that they accepted Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, only the positive affirmation of that sovereignty by Australia in that treaty resulted in litigation before the International Court of Justice. Prime Minister Paul Keating had expressed the sentiment that there was no country more important than Indonesia to Australia, and later Foreign Minister Alexander Downer had repeated it. But by 2000, this constant in Australia’s regional posture had changed completely.

Following two centuries of white settlement and several ’waves’ of immigration, many Australians retain a sense of identification with European cultures and societies. This is despite understandable and fairly successful efforts to focus on cultivating a national identity and diminished support among political élites for the project of fostering cultural links with Europe. The Australian tendency to associate immigration with waves of European immigrants landing on Australian shores picks up on only part of the story. There has also been movement in the opposite direction, with many Australians migrating to Europe. This trend may well increase among those able to apply their skills in European labour markets. It reflects a degree of cosmopolitanism, and the capacity of many Australians to adapt to different cultures. For most Australians this adaptation appears to be easiest in English-speaking cultures, particularly the United Kingdom. There is also a strong resonance for Australians with aspects of North American culture, and powerful incentives to migrate to that continent among those with marketable knowledge-based skills.

By any criterion, Australia’s international human rights policy between 1996 and 2000 was fraught with contradiction. On the one hand, the Coalition government reversed decades of myopia by actively supporting self-determination for the people of East Timor, and was commended by the UN Secretary-General as a leading facilitator of the UN’s new regional strategy for enforcing the principle of humanitarian intervention. On the other hand, it adopted a regressive stance towards the traditional emphases of post-1972 Australian human rights policy by rejecting multilateralism, bipartisanship, self-criticism, and the right of UN human rights bodies to monitor Australia’s human rights conditions. Critical to this regressive mood was the government’s inability to become reconciled with the indigenous population and to respond to its demands for a national apology to the Stolen Generations of Aboriginal children.

As 2001 began, Australia’s relationship with West Asia could be characterised as one between perfect strangers. Despite regular military forays into the region, largely in support of the USA, and a burgeoning commercial relationship, the region had never been considered part of Australia’s primary area of strategic interest nor had political relations between the Australian Government and its regional counterparts ever really moved beyond occasional visits and diplomatic courtesies. Meanwhile, to the extent that Australia entered the consciousness of regional elites and the broader population, it was mainly as a supplier of primary products, such as sheep and wheat, and as a steadfast, if somewhat lower-profile, ally of the USA. In effect, there was a degree of mutual, if largely happy, ambivalence between Australia and the region.