This chapter introduces the reader to the topic studied in the book, factual misinformation and its appeal in war. It poses the main research question of who believes in wartime misinformation and how people know what is happening in war. It then outlines the book’s central argument about the role of proximity and exposure to the fighting in constraining public misperceptions in conflict, and the methods and types of evidence used to test it. After clarifying some key concepts used in the book, it finally closes with a sketch of the manuscript’s main implications and an outline of its structure and contents.

The online sphere is a relatively new space and as such is much less regulated and policed than the offline world. This also means that rights are less protected online than they are in the physical world. Online harassment, hate speech, and misinformation via echo chambers, filter bubbles, conspiracy theories, and fake news have received increasing attention. Free internet access requires that users are reasonably protected by public authorities from such rights violations. The chapter looks at this problem from the perspective of three necessary elements required for the enjoyment of all rights: (1) rights enforcement, (2) an environment conducive to rights, and (3) education and skills training. In terms of enforcement, public authorities face the problem of having to identify often anonymous individual offenders without undermining general internet user anonymity. With respect to a safe environment, the chapter focuses on political polarisation and to what extent online misinformation is responsible for it. Finally, the chapter sets out certain skills that states ought to teach their citizens so they are able to defend themselves against attacks by other internet users.

Most people who regularly use the Internet will be familiar with words like “misinformation,” “fake news,” “disinformation,” and maybe even “malinformation.” It can appear as though these terms are used interchangeably, and they often are. However, they don’t always refer to the same types of content, and just because a news story or social media post is false doesn’t always mean it’s problematic. To add to the confusion, not all misinformation researchers agree on the definition of the problem, or employ a unified terminology. This chapter discusses the terminology around misinformation, guided by illustrative examples of problematic news content. It also looks at what misinformation isn’t: what makes a piece of information “real” or “true”? Finally, we explore how researchers have defined misinformation and how these definitions can be categorized, before presenting the working definition that is used throughout this book.

This chapter looks closely at the influence of online news, especially social media, echo chambers, fake news, populism, political polarisation and foreign propaganda. There is lack of information but what there is does not fit well with current worries and concerns about the political content and effects of the new media and suggests a different set of conclusions.

Human minds are particularly biased when processing information in digital environments. Behavioral economics has highlighted many cognitive biases that afflict our economic decision making. We may choose people like ourselves for important jobs or we may focus on irrelevant characteristics. We may also focus on recent, available information because our brains interpret that as more relevant for the current situation, whereas, optimally, we might benefit from a deeper dive into collecting more representative or comprehensive data and analyzing it appropriately. Even the way information is presented influences whether we believe it. Designers of digital content and experiences need to be aware of and account for such biases when engaging users.

This chaptercomments on the relationship between moderation and civility and argues that the latter can work as an effective antidote to a festering climate of fear, rage, and intimidation.

This chapter discusses the interaction between QAnon and the media. As the group turned from fringe to mainstream, it swamped social media. Eventually, social media companies had to take measures to stop the spread of disinformation associated with QAnon. Groups such as QAnon might use media to manipulate news frames and set agendas, which propels conspiracy-laden topics to mainstream media sources, and creates a platform for spreading disinformation. This chapter also examines how social media use relates to belief in conspiracy theories, and the potential consequences of exposure to conspiracy theories on social media platforms. This relationship between conspiracies, media, and disinformation is explored and applied to QAnon. A brief discussion of how QAnon is similar or different from other groups in their use of social media is offered, along with some research questions for future study about the QAnon movement.

This chapter offers a critique of the idea that writing has unique or inherent benefits. It argues that the promise or potential of writing lies in what we do with writing, rather than what writing does to us. The chapter focuses on the ways in which we think with writing as well as how we label and organize our environment, and navigate the world, in both a literal and a metaphorical sense. It also shows how writing has evolved as a way of initiating and sustaining our social relationships. Writing can be used to mislead us, or to persuade us to do things we might later regret, and this is used to counter overenthusiastic claims about the promise of writing.

Chapter 7 analyzes misinformation and conspiracy theories as contemporary examples of fake news. These include the “death panels” controversy, the Obama “birther” conspiracy, Pizzagate, QAnon, and Covid-19–related myths and conspiracies. Not all conspiracy theories originate from the American right, although this chapter documents how the highest profile ones are embraced by right-wing media and the Republican Party. These conspiracies rise to prominence after being indulged by Republican officials, right-wing media outlets, and in social media. Social media increasingly serve as prime disseminators of reactionary conspiracies. I also examine how traditional “agenda setting” news media have held the line against these conspiracies, with consumption of these venues associated with increased rejection of the conspiracies. In contrast, social media consumption – in general and particularly for Republican Americans – is regularly associated with embrace of conspiracies. This rising culture of conspiratorialism has reached crisis levels with movements like QAnon, and with the Covid-19 pandemic and the failure of millions of Americans to take the crisis seriously or think about it in factual ways. In an era when traditional media gatekeepers are being pushed aside in favor of social media venues, people curate their own information and construct echo chambers, allowing conspiracy theories free reign.

Chapter 3 documents how the meaning of fake news changes over time. I look at how fake news was understood during the 2000s and 2010s – prior to the Trump era – in the New York Times. I discuss how fake news was primarily understood in three ways – related to fabricated stories passed off as real news events, as entertainment content pertaining to current events, and as government propaganda masquerading as journalism. Further, the US media’s understanding of fake news has shifted over the years. My analysis of the New York Times’ coverage of fake news in the 2010s finds that the paper defined the concept in many ways, compared to Trump’s various definitions, with little overlap between the paper and the former president. Editorially, the paper emphasizes conventional definitions of fake news that avoid understanding it as a form of propaganda operating in service of governmental interests. I examine various competing definitions of fake news in other media venues, providing evidence that the social construction of fake news is a contested phenomenon. I examine US partisan cable media, alternative left- and right-wing media, and social media venues – each of which puts forward its own interpretations of what fake news means.

Chapter 4 analyzes public opinion surveys to understand how Americans define fake news. I show that concern with fake news is pervasive among Americans, despite a majority who struggle to define what it means. I identify various ways that the phenomenon of fake news is contested by Americans, with at least nine different definitions for the concept being embraced by large segments of the public. I examine where concerns with fake news are likely to originate, identifying statistical predictors of public concern with the phenomenon. Such concerns are more likely to be expressed by privileged sociodemographic groups, heavier media consumers, and those with high levels of media distrust – the last factor itself appearing to be a function of right-wing partisan and ideological socialization. I examine Americans’ thoughts about how to best combat fake news. I focus on various definitions of fake news that I argue are the most practically significant out of the nine identified in the chapter – those related to reporters’ overreliance on official (corporate and governmental) sources in producing the news, partisan biases in the news, and the rise of conspiracy content in media sources.

After summarizing the findings from the book, I discuss steps for how Americans can tackle the challenge of fake news. These include promoting more effective civic education and information literacy, guiding Americans in recognizing the value of empirical evidence and reasoning, identifying the value of reliable informational and news sources, and assessing potential governmental actions for combating rising misinformation. Mass disinformation and misinformation do not have to be facts of life in contemporary society, and there are steps that Americans can take to combat them.

Chapter 5 analyzes two cases of fake news as disinformation – the 2003 Iraq war and climate change. I look at how political and economic actors manipulate the news media to promote disinformation, in the process “manufacturing consent” for the public. With Iraq, I document the initial success of the Bush administration in selling the US invasion, producing growing support for the war, with the news-consuming public based on notions that Iraq possessed WMDs and ties to terrorism. Support for war declined over time, as the public was increasingly sensitized to rising casualties and the financial cost of the war, after the United States failed to find WMDs, and as the war was increasingly seen as unwinnable and immoral. I also examine how the fossil fuel industry utilized “false balancing” as a news management technique for encouraging mass confusion related to climate change, pitting climate-change skeptics against individuals recognizing planetary warming. Examining “climategate” and cap-and-trade legislation in the late 2000s, I show how reactionary narratives dominated the news, driving increased public opposition to efforts to address climate change. Public opposition receded by the mid-to-late 2010s as extreme weather and a warming planet undermined efforts to foster mass ignorance.