Domestic fruit and vegetable producers contend that rising imports during seasonal harvesting windows have negatively impacted domestic prices and revenue. This study simulates producers’ revenue with the removal of above-average imports as defined by the U.S. International Trade Commission. Results indicate significant additional revenues to domestic producers in the simulated scenario. Also, additional revenues to producers by state and season show substantial heterogeneity with robustness checks revealing similar patterns. Options such as risk management and technological improvements are needed to enhance the competitiveness of U.S. fresh produce industries instead of limiting imports in the absence of illegal dumping.

Drawing upon recent studies that empirically estimate both the benefits and costs of trade, this paper addresses a simple and important question: By how much do the benefits of increased global trade outweigh the costs? To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to answer this question at global and World Bank income-grouping levels using empirically estimated relationships from the trade cost literature. Using a structural gravity model, we simulate changes in three primary trade constraints: a 10% reduction in tariff levels, a 10% reduction in effective distance, and a 10% increase in free trade agreement depth. The projection leads to a roughly 5% increase in global trade by value. Our model suggests that increased trade has an incredibly high benefit–cost ratio (BCR) for the developing world with an order-of-magnitude estimate for low- and lower–middle-income countries of 100 and for upper–middle-income countries of 50. However, the BCR for high-income countries is substantially lower, with a value closer to 5. Overall, the results suggest that free trade leads to substantial net benefits globally, generating US$ 700 billion in benefits (0.83% of global GDP) and US$ 100 billion in costs (0.12% of global GDP) in the first year, a differential that grows over time. Sensitivity analyses suggest that our BCRs are on the lower end of a plausible range. The results point to the incredible value of free trade, particularly for developing countries, and reiterate the importance of considering distributional impacts when implementing trade reforms.

In this contribution, we exploit machine learning techniques to evaluate whether and how close firms are to become successful exporters. First, we train various algorithms using financial information on both exporters and non-exporters in France in 2010–2018. Thus, we show that it is possible to predict the distance non-exporters are from export status. In particular, we find that a Bayesian Additive Regression Tree with Missingness In Attributes (BART-MIA) performs better than other techniques with an accuracy of up to 0.90. Predictions are robust to changes in definitions of exporters and in the presence of discontinuous exporting activity. Eventually, we discuss how our exporting scores can be helpful for trade promotion, trade credit, and assessing aggregate trade potential. For example, back-of-the-envelope estimates show that a representative firm with just below-average exporting scores needs up to 44% more cash resources and up to 2.5 times more capital to get to foreign markets.

A proposal to reform the United Kingdom's excise duty on alcohol is under consideration during 2022. The proposal would change the tax base from volume of product to volume of alcohol, which would see a fall in the tax on sparkling wine (by about one-fifth), a rise in the tax on fortified wines of 18% alcohol by volume (ABV) (by about one-sixth), and table wines with more (less) than 11.5% ABV would become dearer (cheaper). With taxes on most beers unchanged and taxes on spirits lowered slightly, the pattern of UK wine consumption and imports would alter considerably. This article draws on a global model of national alcoholic beverage markets to estimate the likely bilateral trade effects of this proposed reform to UK excise duties. It compares them with the trade effects of the United Kingdom's first two bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), following the post-Brexit EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which allows Australian and New Zealand vignerons tariff-free access to the UK wine market. Those two FTAs are estimated to cause the United Kingdom to import far more wine than is lost by the proposed changes in UK excise duties.

Under the Trump administration, a transatlantic trade conflict has been escalating step by step. First, it was about tariffs on steel and aluminium, then about retaliation for the French digital tax, which is suspended until the end of the year. Most recently, the US administration threatened the European Union with tariffs on cars and car parts because of Canadian seafood being subject to lower import duties. As simulations with NiGEM show, a further escalation of the transatlantic trade conflict has the potential to slow down economic growth significantly in the countries involved. This is a considerable risk given the fact that the countries have to cope with the enormous negative effects of the pandemic shock. Furthermore, the damage caused by the trade conflict depends on the extent to which the affected countries use fiscal policy to stabilise their economies.

With international trade increasingly undertaken within vertically fragmented supply chains, this paper considers the impact of changes in trade costs on domestic output. In the context of the UK’s exit from the EU we show that the negative impact on UK output will depend on changes in both domestic and export competitiveness. Since for many firms the majority of their sales are to the domestic market, the domestic competitiveness impact may be quantitatively more important. The impact on output will be more significant the greater the integration of firms in international supply chains, and the greater the asymmetric impact of leaving the EU on UK firms relative to EU firms.

We analyse the costs of Brexit. The results show that by 2030 a hard Brexit would reduce cumulative GDP growth by 18 percentage points compared to a situation where the UK continued its EU membership. The economic damage in our FTA and soft Brexit scenarios is less severe than in our hard Brexit scenario, although it will still cost the UK economy roughly 12.5 percentage points and 10 percentage points of cumulative GDP growth by 2030, respectively. We find much larger negative effects than most existing studies that use macroeconometric modelling to assess the effects of Brexit. This is due to two reasons. First, we use an improved tariff version of the macroeconometric model NiGEM, which enables us better to assess the negative impact of cost-push inflation resulting from imposed trade barriers. Second, we estimate a new productivity model for the UK, which allows us to gauge adequately the negative UK-specific effects on productivity caused by Brexit.

For a large number of countries, we augment the specification of import demand in NiGEM by accounting for different import contents of individual expenditure components. Three examples illustrate that these changes have important implications for model outcomes. In the case of the recently enacted US tax reform and in a ‘hard landing’ scenario for China, spillovers become more pronounced while the domestic effects turn out more muted than in the default specification. The reverse is true for the ramifications of a public investment push in Germany. Hence, we believe that our add-on to NiGEM can be a useful tool for robustness exercises, in particular for spillover studies.

Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) could be costly for U.S. beef exports to Japan given existing trade agreements such as the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA). We estimate the demand for imported beef in Japan by source and product and assess the impact of tariff reductions on exporting countries. Our results suggest JAEPA will result in considerable increases in Australian beef exports to Japan, largely at the expense of the U.S. beef. However, similar tariff reductions for U.S. beef could eliminate these negative effects and even result in a net increase in beef imports from both countries.

This paper studies local economic impacts of the increases in trade barriers associated with Brexit. Predictions of the local impact of Brexit are presented under two different scenarios, soft and hard Brexit, which are developed from a structural trade model. Average effects are predicted to be negative under both scenarios, and to be more negative under hard Brexit. The spatial variation in negative shocks across areas is higher in the latter case as some local areas are particularly specialised in sectors that are predicted to be badly hit by hard Brexit. Areas in the South of England, and urban areas, are harder hit by Brexit under both scenarios. Again, this pattern is explained by sector specialisation. Finally, the areas that were most likely to vote remain are those that are predicted to be most negatively impacted by Brexit

Simulation results showed that simultaneous outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in Asia, the United States, Brazil, and selected European countries will have significant impacts on world poultry trade. Assuming demand for chicken meat is constant, the global export price is simulated to increase by 9.63%. HPAI outbreaks in the United States, Economic Union, and Brazil will have a greater impact on export price than in any other possible three-region case. Outbreaks in the United States and Brazil would still lead to major impacts on world poultry trade, confirming large country effects.

U.S. growers filed an antidumping case against Canadian growers of greenhouse-grown tomatoes, alleging that U.S. growers were being injured, or threatened with material injury, by imports from Canada. The U.S. Department of Commerce determined that imports of greenhouse-grown tomatoes were being sold in U.S. markets at less than fair market value. The U.S. International Trade Commission determined the “like product” to be all fresh market tomatoes, concluding the domestic industry was not materially injured. Anecdotal evidence used by the Commission Department in determining like product ignores the wealth of knowledge that economics can add. An economic model is proposed for purposes of determining like product.

Increases in the United States tariff-rate quota for sugar are simulated to determine the impact of Cuban market access and an increased Mexican allotment. The effects on both domestic and international sugar markets, including production, consumption, prices, and trade, are determined and welfare effects identified. This analysis is carried out using a partial-equilibrium simplified world trade model, Modele Internationale Simplifié de Simulation (MISS), which simulates, in a comparative-static framework, the effects of various policy actions.

International agricultural trade has evolved over time. Processed foods and developing countries have become major growth markets for U.S. agricultural exports, and foreign direct investment (FDI) has become even more important than exports as a means of accessing foreign markets. The critical question is whether FDI is a substitute for or a complement of exports. This research builds upon an existing theoretical FDI model and contributes to the literature through the development of a simultaneous equation system for FDI and exports, which is estimated using two-stage least squares. Empirical analyses were used to examine the relationship between U.S. FDI and exports of processed foods into East Asian countries-China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan-from 1989 to 1998. The results indicated a complementary relationship between FDI and exports. Additionally, these results indicated that interest rates, exchange rates, gross domestic product (GDP), and compensation rates are important variables that influence U.S. FDI in East Asian countries, while GDP, exchange rates, and export prices are important export determinants.

We calculate the welfare effects of the Washington State University (WSU) wheat breeding programs for producers and consumers in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and the United States, and for importers of U.S. wheat. We develop a partial equilibrium multiregion, multiproduct, multivariety trade model for wheat that provides consumer, producer, and total surplus for each wheat class and region. Our results provide evidence suggesting that WSU wheat breeding programs have increased welfare for the state of Washington, the United States, and importers of U.S. wheat.

We estimate the demand for imported cotton in China and assess the competitiveness of cotton-exporting countries. Given the assertion that developing countries are negatively affected by U.S. cotton subsidies, our focus is the price competition between the United States and competing exporters (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, India, and Uzbekistan). We further project how U.S. programs affect China's imports by country. Results indicate that if U.S. subsidies make other exporting countries worse off, this effect is lessened when global prices respond accordingly. If subsidies are eliminated, China's cotton imports may not fully recover from the temporary spike in global prices.