Monomorphemic words have been found to influence category formation, as they encode one general category and thus activate it more than other related categories in the same lexical network. On the other hand, multimorphemic words can encode multiple categories from the same network by the multiple forms they combine. Superordinate categories are encoded by sub-lexical forms (e.g., affixes), while the entire words encode lower categories in the hierarchical structure. In the present study, we asked whether sub-lexical forms influence the learning of the meaning encoded by the entire word they underlie. We used Semitic-like words where sub-lexical forms (syllabic patterns) encode superordinate categories of manner-of-motion, and the entire words encode lower-level categories (moving characters). In our main experiment, a word-learning test showed that a shared syllabic pattern had a negative effect on the learning of the moving characters encoded by the entire word. This effect was revealed mainly in dimensions related to the superordinate category encoded by the pattern. The effect and its direction are beyond the expectations of enhanced category representations suggested in previous literature. We conclude that the effect of word-form is beyond the specific category they encode and can have different directions at different hierarchical levels.

Scholars have long been aware of the close relationship between two ninth-century Greek-Latin bilingual manuscripts, Codex Boernerianus (GA 012, VL 77) and Codex Augiensis (GA 010, VL 78). However, assessments of the nature of this relationship differ. The present article seeks to resolve this question by comparing full electronic transcriptions of the Greek texts of these manuscripts in Romans, Galatians, Ephesians, and First Timothy. An examination of the points of divergence, including unique readings, word division, corrections and lacunae confirm that their Greek text was either copied from the same exemplar, or that one served as exemplar for the other. Close analysis of the types of errors and the way in which corrections in Codex Boernerianus are handled in Codex Augiensis proves that the latter was copied from the former. These findings indicate that, as a copy of an existing manuscript, Codex Augiensis should no longer be cited in the apparatus of the Greek New Testament.

This article argues that Thomas Kuhn's landmark work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, has not been adequately explored by theologians and scholars in the field of science and religion. While many cite Kuhn to suggest that science and religion share structural similarities, I contend that his work is crucial in addressing current debates about the definitions of ‘science’ and ‘religion’ and the potential for intellectual progress between them. Kuhn's framework provides more than a justification for adhering to incommensurable worldviews; it offers a nuanced understanding of how science and religion interact and the significance of tacit knowledge in scientific practice. This article explains Kuhn's focus on exemplars in his philosophy of science, which underpin his argument for key differences between science and theological inquiry. The article concludes that Kuhn's pluralistic view of truth offers theologians an opportunity to engage more deeply with science, rather than sidestepping it entirely.

This article seeks to explain Matthew's description of Joseph as righteous (δίκαιος) by investigating Matt 1.18–25 within its ancient context, especially Judean practices of marriage and divorce as illuminated by Judean legal papyri from the Dead Sea region in the first and second centuries ce and from the Judean politeuma of Herakleopolis in the mid-second century bce. The examination will demonstrate the importance of these papyri for understanding the narrative in Matt 1.18–25 in its original social setting where honour was a dominant value, especially the extent to which it reveals Joseph to be an exemplar of Matthean righteousness.

This article examines the version of Christocentric exemplarism recently proposed by theologian Patrick Clark, whose Thomistic virtue ethics incorporates features of Linda Zagzebski's exemplarist moral theory. This article suggests that Clark and similar approaches to Christocentric virtue ethics would be better situated to appropriate Zagzebski's insights into exemplarity if it gave more prominence to the imitation of Jesus.

In this paper I discuss the role of non‐humans in Aquinas’ account of moral learning. I intend to show that the entire created order can play an important role in demonstrating to us the life of virtue, and argue that non‐human exemplars offer important advantages to the moral learner. I begin by addressing apparent problems with this approach, founded on the observation that human virtue, for Aquinas, is unique to humans. I resolve these by showing that Aquinas’ approach to exemplars is fundamentally analogical, meaning that exemplars point beyond themselves and need not necessarily live the good life to which they direct learners. I show that this means that Aquinas can use non‐humans as moral exemplars and offer examples of him doing just that. Finally, I offer an assessment of the benefits of this approach. Among other things, it offers ethicists new ways to focus on particular virtues and provides a plausible way to include non‐humans in the moral realm.

In speaking of the divine ideas or God's creative act in general, Aquinas's favorite analogy is that of the artist. Hence, understanding the finite artisan, especially in the way his idea functions as an exemplar, is key to understanding the mentem Thomae on a whole host of issues most especially exemplar causality. This paper asks a question seeking specificity on the causality of the artist's idea and thereby exemplar causality in general. Is an exemplar cause in its primary instance (the idea) an instrument? Does an exemplar idea always cause in an instrumental mode? This paper, after delineating exemplar and instrumental causality separately, argues the affirmative. All ideas which function as exemplars also necessarily function as instruments, the objections of mediation, temporality, the relation of intellect/will, and efficient causality notwithstanding. In concluding the paper identifies three possible implications for this finding including a slight qualification of Aquinas's mature rejection of instrumental creation.

Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts. Doing without Concepts (Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts.