Digital governance is a public concern, yet under private control. After numerous scandals, all stakeholders in the European Union (EU) agreed to establish a “novel constitution for the internet” that would effectively constrain the power of large platforms. Yet the Digital Services Act (DSA) ultimately legitimized and institutionalized their position as the gatekeepers of the internet. Why? We argue that platforms prevailed thanks to their ability as intermediaries to quietly shape the available policy options. Our “platform power mechanism” combines institutional and ideational sources of business power to show how big tech drew on its entrenched position as an indispensable provider of essential services and promulgated the idea of itself as a responsible and neutral intermediary. We follow the unfolding of platform power through a process-tracing analysis of Google and Meta’s activities with respect to DSA legislation from its announcement (2020) to its adoption (2022). Besides contributing a reconceptualization of the DSA as a regulatory capture, we integrate the notion of platform power into a “regulator–intermediary–target” model and demonstrate how gatekeepers have exploited information asymmetries to share “the public space.” Our analysis thus supplements established approaches that have derived regulators’ deference to platforms from the tacit allegiance of consumers.

This article explores the legalisation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) and its increasing use of sanctions. It argues that the breadth and depth of the numerous sanctions regimes in place shows that EU foreign policy is not merely an aspiration but produces law and legal processes which share similarities with those in the rest of the EU’s legal order. Further, the article examines the extent to which non-EU Member States in Europe have aligned themselves with EU sanctions. The argument is made that this is evidence not only of Europeanisation, but also crucially of a legalised foreign policy which has allowed Europe-wide, EU-led foreign policy to emerge.

How do China, Russia, and the European Union (EU) facilitate or hinder political liberalization in Belarus? In this paper, using the qualitative case study method, I primarily highlight the competition that the EU faces with the Russian active autocracy promotion in Belarus. The EU provides aid only in exchange for promise of democratic and economic reforms, which might be very costly and danger the persistence of ruling elites. Russia, at the same time, offers economic and diplomatic support to Belarus, which is, however, conditioned by privatization of the Belarusian strategic assets in favor of Russian stakeholders. I also claim that China, with growing international ambitions, passively supports autocracy in Belarus, by providing financial aid without interfering with internal political affairs. For Belarus, whose leadership still enjoys legitimation by a large part of the population due to the economic stability, losing major state enterprises might weaken sovereignty. Thus, diversification of economic partners is of crucial importance for Belarus. I argue that Belarusian ruling elites may have found an escape away from democratic and autocratic pushes from the EU and Russia, respectively, by increasing linkages with China. To promote effectively democracy in its neighborhood, the EU ought to reconsider interactions with external non-democratic actors. The paper concludes by providing some policy recommendations for the EU.

Many Irish graduates chose to pursue specialist psychiatric training in Britain. Regulations governing UK specialist training are currently changing in response to European Union (EU) directives. Furthermore, over the past five years the UK national health service has undergone significant reforms. This paper reviews the current status of British postgraduate training and examines the options for Irish doctors who take this route to a career in psychiatry.